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Collaboration and other forms of interaction between complex arrangements of 
private, nonprofit, and public organizations to address challenging policy problems now 
occurs routinely. In many cases collaboration is mandated by law, and often disbursement 
of grants to nonprofits is contingent upon demonstrating collaboration with other 
organizations. To understand this contemporary landscape of public administration and 
develop cumulative knowledge, theory requires reliable and valid constructs of 
collaboration and other forms of interorganizational interaction. Theoretical rigor then 
underpins practice, including the growing discipline of evaluating the level of interaction 
between organizations or an organization’s “collaborative capacity,” and to understand 
more broadly how public administrators should best lead, manage and interact in 
complex multiorganizational situations. 
This dissertation reviews the approaches to conceptualization and 
operationalization of interorganizational interaction in the public administration 
literature. While many frameworks, typologies and arrays have been offered, few have 
been tested empirically. Furthermore, the literature incorporates a widely stated but 
untested notion that interactions between organizations can be placed on a “continuum” 
of intensity or integration. 
 iii 
Using insights from previously developed systems-based frameworks and arrays, 
this research creates a generalized interorganizational interaction array (GIIA) that 
conceptualizes and operationalizes three forms of interaction common in public 
administration literature: cooperation, coordination and collaboration. From a sample of 
over 200 interorganizational interactions between national and international defense 
organizations, the GIIA is tested using cluster analysis to determine: the extent to which 
collaboration, coordination and cooperation are observed; which variables are most 
important in differentiating interaction states, and to explore the concept of a continuum 
of interaction. 
Results show the only interaction state clearly observed is collaboration in about 
half of sample cases; the remaining cases cannot be easily classified as either cooperation 
or coordination. Only variables relating to collective decision making structures and 
processes are essential for identifying collaboration, but are not useful in distinguishing 
between cooperation or coordination. Variables relating to the context or situation have 
little influence on differentiating interaction states, and variables describing properties of 
the organizations such as trust, autonomy and shared perspectives have more ability to 
distinguish outcomes rather than form. Finally, the concept of a continuum of interaction 
is not supported. The implications of this finding for future conceptualization and 
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CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
The phenomenon of multiorganizational governance and implementation is of 
considerable importance to the disciplines of public administration and policy. A growing 
body of research and practice demonstrates that the landscape of public governance is 
characterized increasingly by interdependence, multiorganizational action, network 
governance and management, collaboration, and blurring public-private sector 
boundaries. While many government organizations execute their missions via 
hierarchically-structured bureaucracies, seldom is governance and implementation in any 
given policy area the sole domain of a single organization. Collective action with 
nonprofits, businesses, citizen groups and multiple levels of government to lead and 
administrate programs is now a necessity for public organizations, rather than a choice. 
There are many drivers behind this phenomenon. In response to political forces to 
increase state legitimacy following the rapid expansion of centralized state power in the 
early twentieth century, many nations adopted political and administrative 
decentralization and regionalization policies (Joumard & Kongsrud, 2003; Kettl, 2002; 
Rodiguez-Pose & Gill, 2003; Sorens, 2009). As part of this broader devolution trend, 
fiscal conservatism in the 1980s and increasing calls for accountability in government led 
to the “new public management” movement, which saw governments enact a variety of 
strategies and policies based on results-orientated management principles and 
marketization ideas derived from the private sector and public choice concepts (Dunleavy 
& Hood, 1994; Hood, 1991). This “hollowing out the state” through privatization, 
contracting, and other forms of indirect government increased the extent to which 
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government programs were implemented via complex and interconnected networks of 
public and private actors, rather than solely government bureaucracy (Kettl, 1993, 2000; 
Milward & Provan, 2000). These various trends are overlain against the basic fact that the 
growth in size and scope of government coupled with the complexity of contemporary 
“wicked” societal issues (Head & Alford, 2013; Rittel & Webber, 1973), makes defining 
boundaries of responsibility between government organizations challenging, and 
increases the need for multiorganizational policy formulation and implementation (Kettl, 
2006; O'Toole, 1997). 
There is growing recognition that in this era the “the task of public problem 
solving has become a team sport that has spilled well beyond the borders of government 
agencies and now engages a far more extensive network of social actors...whose 
participation must often be coaxed and coached, not commandeered and controlled” 
(Salamon, 2002, p. 601). In the light of this new reality, scholars and practitioners face 
fundamental questions (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Bevir, 2010; Haque, 2001): How to 
lead and manage effectively in this new landscape? How to ensure democratic legitimacy 
and accountability? And how to maintain the intrinsic “publicness” of public 
administration and the public sphere? In response to these challenges, academic literature 
has turned increasingly to topics such as policy networks, governance networks, 
multiorganizational policy implementation, interorganizational relationships, collective 
action, and collaboration. 
The focus of this particular study is the manner in which the variety of 
contemporary multiorganizational arrangements are conceptualized. Given the increased 
focus on collective action in public administration, policy and management scholarship, a 
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key research challenge lies in measurement of interorganizational interactions. Empirical 
research in multiorganizational settings is notoriously demanding: Defining appropriate 
units of analysis and the boundaries of research samples is often hard in network settings 
(Freeman, White, & Romney, 1992; Laumann, Marsden, & Prensky, 1992); the number 
of potentially important independent variables often outnumbers the possible analytical 
cases (Goggin, 1986); interorganizational structures and networks dynamically vary and 
are often strongly influenced by subjective perceptions (Huxham & Vangen, 2000); and 
while case study research is rich and varied, generalizability is low (O'Toole, 1997, 
2000).  
A particular problem—and the focus of this dissertation research—is a lack of 
conceptual and definitional coherence across the literature: multiple understandings, 
perspectives and definitions of interorganizational interactions exist, which prevents 
coherent cumulative research (Galaskiewicz, 1985; Thomson, Perry, & Miller, 2009; 
Wood & Gray, 1991). The past few decades have seen a variety of attempts to rectify this 
issue, and some stability in understanding has been achieved, with scholars developing 
definitions, constructs, typologies and scales of interorganizational interactions (Ansel & 
Gash, 2007; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Simo & Bies, 2007; Thomson, 2001; 
Thomson & Perry, 2006; Thomson et al., 2009; Varda, Shoup, & Miller, 2012). A 
consistent thread through the literature, for example, is the notion that interorganizational 
interaction exists on a scale or continuum from low intensity cooperation, to 
coordination, to high intensity collaboration (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007; Mandell & 
Steelman, 2003; McNamara, 2012).  
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A small body of research develops operationalizations—in varying levels of 
detail—of these three distinct states, by describing what certain dimensions “look like” at 
each level of interaction. Dimensions can be related to the context in which the 
interaction takes place, the participating organizations, or the emerging 
interorganizational forms. While much of this literature has merit on its own terms, the 
majority of definitions are established conceptually, rather than taxonomically generated 
from empirical research (Bailey, 1994). A few case studies have developed and tested 
definitional schemes (Margerum, 2008; McNamara, 2008, 2012), but in general, subtly 
different interpretations of interorganizational forms persist.  
An additional complexity to multiorganizational research is that often, context 
affects process and outcomes. In a now landmark review of “collaboration” research in 
the social sciences, Wood and Gray (1991) characterized the literature in terms of three 
main groupings: preconditions to collaboration, collaborative processes, and outcomes. 
They identified that while the preconditions had received much attention, the process 
aspect was poorly understood as a result of the complexity of collective action and the 
multiplicity of variables. In response to the challenge set by Wood and Gray, scholars 
have since developed various frameworks, which seek to describe the process of 
“collaboration” and its relationship with antecedent factors, context, and outcomes (Ansel 
& Gash, 2007; Bryson et al., 2006; Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012; Ring & Van de 
Ven, 1994; Simo, 2009). While the term “collaboration” is used, in reality much of the 
literature describes a spectrum of interorganizational interactions. 
The framework literature, which generally takes a systems approach to the 
antecedent—process—outcome linkages in interorganizational interaction, emphasizes 
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the dynamic iterative nature of collective action. This view is somewhat at odds with the 
more static interpretation offered by the continuum of interaction approach, which 
conceives of cooperation, coordination and collaboration as distinct points along a 
spectrum. These continuums do not consider process dynamics, but instead develop a 
“snapshot” of what interorganizational interactions look like as they increase in intensity 
or magnitude. This dissertation research refines the conceptualization and 
operationalization of the continuum of interorganizational interaction, and offers an 
survey-based test to determine if the particular states of “cooperation,” “coordination,” 
and “collaboration” can be distinguished empirically.  
Problem Statement 
While generally there is a large number of terms describing the myriad 
configurations of interorganizational interactions in the social sciences, within public 
administration—and to some extent organizational science—a stable set of terms has 
emerged in the past decade (Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsay, 2001). Many scholars 
work under the assumption that any particular form of interorganizational arrangement 
can be placed on a “continuum of interaction,” which is divided typically into three 
distinct states of cooperation, coordination and collaboration. While this concept is 
unproblematic for informal usage, there are several issues that inhibit more refined, 
empirical work on the subject of interorganizational interaction. 
First, the literature employing a continuum approach assumes that collaboration, 
or other levels of interaction, are repeatable or “standard” forms of interaction. Yet the 
growing body of literature on the processes of interorganizational interaction 
demonstrates the complexity inherent in these processes (Bardach, 2001; Emerson et al., 
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2012; Huxham & Vangen, 2000). Interorganizational forms grow and ebb with time, 
membership, and contextual factors (Huxham & Vangen, 2005). Given this complexity, 
the notion that discrete “forms” of interaction exist on a linear scale is called into 
question. Likewise, the scale may better be interpreted as a typology, which defines all 
the possible combinations of dimensions. In a manner very similar to the debate 
surrounding the applicability of the stages model of policy process (deLeon, 1999), the 
continuum of interaction may be merely an abstraction, albeit a useful one, which masks 
a more complex reality.  
Second, the literature is ambiguous on basic conceptual issues regarding 
constructs and operationalizations of states on the continuum. There is an unstated 
assumption that “cooperation,” for example, is defined by the occurrence of all the 
dimensional indicators at that level on the continuum. Yet it is unclear whether this state 
could still be considered as cooperation if one or two of the dimensions were not 
observed. Furthermore, the literature does not specify how to define simultaneous 
observations of dimensions across levels of interaction. There is lack of understanding 
about the basic conditions of necessity and sufficiency for dimensions and constructs 
underlying the continuum of interaction (Goertz, 2006), or whether the states are better 
distinguished based on less clear “familial resemblance” approaches (Wittgenstein, 
1967). 
Third, the literature to date poorly organizes and categorizes the dimensions 
underlying the continuum. Much of the broader literature on collaboration, for example, 
recognizes the importance of context, organization type, and history on how the 
interorganizational interaction plays out (Diaz-Kope & Miller-Stevens, 2015; Margerum, 
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2008; Morris, Gibson, Leavitt, & Jones, 2013). Yet the continuum of interaction research 
often uses potentially non-mutually exclusive dimensions such as context, type or 
historical factors, in the actual definition of levels of interaction. These dimensions could 
apply equally to any interaction state. The literature also fails to recognize that 
dimensions can be categorized by those relating to the participating organizations, and 
those relating to the emergent interorganizational form.   
Finally, there is limited empirical confirmation of constructs of 
interorganizational interaction. One of the few notable examples is Thomson (2001), who 
tests the construct validity of a multidimensional construct of “collaboration.” Building 
on the work of Ring and Van de Ven (1994) and Wood and Gray (1991), Thomson 
identifies five unique dimensions of the process of collaboration: governance, 
administration, organizational autonomy, mutuality, and norms of trust and reciprocity 
(Thomson, 2001; Thomson & Perry, 2006; Thomson et al., 2009). This construct was 
tested via survey data from several hundred organizations, and was subsequently used in 
several other studies to test both the definitional aspects of collaboration and the process-
outcome relationship (Chen, 2006, 2008, 2010; Graddy & Chen, 2009; Thomson, Perry, 
& Miller, 2008). The construct had mixed utility, however, in tests of the antecedent-
process and process-outcome relationships, indicating that further refinement is needed.  
In another notable example, McNamara (2008, 2012) develops a detailed 
operationalization of a three-level, cooperation—coordination—collaboration continuum 
of interaction as part of a single case study. While the operationalizations are the most 
detailed and comprehensive in the literature to date, the above problems are still present, 
and the sample was a single multiorganizational arrangement. McNamara’s work was 
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based on previous studies from the education and public administration literature that 
employed similar approaches, but only on single case studies (Diehl, 2005; Edmondson, 
2006; Thatcher, 2007). 
Empirical studies of interorganizational arrangements can be found in other 
disciplines such as health sciences and management, education, infometrics, business and 
management. Several studies use multilevel confirmatory factor analysis in a manner 
similar to Thomson (2001), but with much less refined survey instruments (Barile, 
Darnell, Erickson, & Weaver, 2012; Brown, Hawkins, Arthur, Abbott, & Van Horn, 
2008; Dedrick & Greenbaum, 2011). Others examine interaction at the individual or team 
level of analysis such as: Scientific research collaboration (Chompalov, Genuth, & 
Shrum, 2002; Cuijpers, Guenter, & Hussinger, 2011; Liao & Yen, 2012); health and 
emergency care worker interactions (Brock & Doucette, 2004; Dougherty & Larson, 
2010; Haraoka, Ojima, Murata, & Hayasaka, 2012; Nair, Fitzpatrick, McNulty, Click, & 
Glembocki, 2012; Ushiro, 2009); or interprofessional interactions in teams (D'Amour, 
Goulet, Labadie, Martín-Rodriguez, & Pineault, 2008; Kenaszchuk, Reeves, Nicholas, & 
Zwarenstein, 2010; Orchard, King, Khalili, & Bezzina, 2012). 
While much of this literature has merit and many of the survey scales have high 
validity (Dougherty & Larson, 2010; Kenaszchuk et al., 2010), they tend to be based on 
arbitrary definitions of collaboration or cooperation, are not grounded in the theoretical 
literature from organizational science and public administration, or emphasize 
partnerships or networks between private businesses (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011). 
Furthermore, much of the focus is on individual—individual interactions in team settings, 
which although provides an interesting comparison to interorganizational and 
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organizational level research, is ultimately not applicable to multiorganizational research 
in the public domain. In summary, there is a significant empirical gap in the literature 
concerning the measurement of interorganizational arrangements. 
Research Objectives and Questions 
Research Purpose 
The overall purpose of this research is to investigate conceptualizations and 
operationalizations of common states of interorganizational interaction as described in the 
public administration literature. There are 2 specific objectives: 1) develop and improve 
the interorganizational interaction array
1
 that conceptualizes and operationalizes states 
of multiorganizational interaction (such as cooperation, coordination and collaboration); 
and 2) test the interorganizational interaction array using a survey sample of 
multiorganizational interactions to determine if interaction states can be empirically 
observed and distinguished from one another. 
Research Questions 
There are four research questions addressed in this dissertation. 1) To what extent 
can the levels of interaction corresponding to the constructs of cooperation, coordination 
and collaboration be empirically observed? 2) Are other constructs observed? 3) Which 
dimensions of the interorganizational interaction array are most important for predicting 
an organization’s level of interaction in a multiorganizational interaction? 4) To what 
extent can dimensions of the interorganizational interaction array be conceptualized as 
increasing along a continuum of interaction? 
                                                 
1
 Interorganizational interaction array is a general term to describe both typologies of interorganizational 
forms, and scales or continuums of interaction. 
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Statement of Research Importance 
The idea that governance is now more important than government is 
commonplace in recent policy and administration literature, thus increasing the emphasis 
on studying how organizations work together rather than solely how individual 
organizations work (O'Leary & Bingham, 2009). Both practitioners and scholars of 
public administration need to ask important questions about performance, effectiveness, 
and outcomes in this new landscape. Interorganizational interaction is often a formal 
requirement for organizations, and a developing stream of research looks at how to 
evaluate joint efforts (Cross, Dickmann, Newman-Gonchar, & Fagan, 2009; Woodland & 
Hutton, 2012). It is imperative for future empirical research and evaluation that suitable 
tools exist to study the various forms of interorganizational interaction and its 
antecedents, processes, and outcomes.  
This dissertation develops further a construct and operationalizations of 
interorganizational interaction at the interorganizational, organizational, and group levels 
of analysis in order to improve future empirical study. This is important for several 
reasons. First, with a few notable exceptions (McNamara, 2008; Thomson, 2001), there 
has been little attempt at rigorous conceptualization of interorganizational interaction for 
the purpose of empirical research. This has led to a multitude of conceptual frameworks, 
typologies, definitions and interchangeable terminology, many of which were developed 
in case studies. While many of these efforts have merit, cumulative empirical research 
has suffered in the absence of standardized conceptualization and operationalization. 
Second, with the multitude of frameworks and definitions available, cross-case 
comparison is challenging. The development of a rigorous and valid construct, confirmed 
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with data, facilitates better comparative research. Lastly, the intermingled usage of 
collaboration, cooperation and coordination is so widespread in general organizational 
life that these terms are practically interchangeable for most practitioners. This results in 
a loss of appreciation of the conceptual richness inherent in these constructs, and the 
potential for unknown and unintentional confusion, or intentional political distortion. A 
key role for academic research should be to establish a rigorous conceptual framework 
and accompanying terminologies, based on empirical data, which can prevent 
miscommunications or distortions in practice.  
Theoretical Approach 
This study can be considered as “descriptive” as it aims to create an empirical 
taxonomy of interaction terms and confirm existing theory from the literature (Bailey, 
1994; Neuman, 2003). This research operates in line with the assumptions of 
organizational functionalism, which asserts that there is an objective reality “out there” 
that can be studied independently (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). This is key to the 
development of an interorganizational array, which affirms that interorganizational 
interactions can be objectively described by observable indicators. The level of analysis 
at which inferences at the construct level are made is the interorganizational field 
(Benson, 1975; Hjern & Porter, 1981; Warren, 1967), which emphasizes relationships 
between organizations, rather than organizational or individual attributes. 
Overview of Methodology 
This primarily quantitative research is conducted utilizing a web-based survey of 
individuals, representing their organizations, involved in multiorganizational projects 
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convened by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The unit of analysis for the 
research is the interorganizational interaction—organization dyad, which is defined as 
the organization and the part of the organization that interacts or overlaps with the 
collective group of organizations interacting as part of a single project. The 
interorganizational interaction array dimensions are specified primarily by organizational 
and interorganizational attributes, rather than individual attributes. The research involves 
development and testing of an interorganizational interaction array, which defines 
constructs of three common interaction terms and operationalizes them with observable 
indicators across a set of common dimensions. There are several distinct stages of the 
research. 
The first stage conducts a detailed review of the literature on interorganizational 
interaction arrays and systems frameworks to determine conceptualizations and 
operationalizations of various interaction states, and more generally about the 
construction of such arrays. Starting from an array created by McNamara (2008), a new 
array is created with more detailed operationalizations, and more refined categorization 
of dimensions into contextual, organizational and interorganizational groups. This 
categorization is on theoretical grounds and allows identification of necessary and 
sufficient dimensions as part of defining each interaction term. 
The second stage involves development and deployment of a survey instrument, 
which measures the observed operationalizations of dimensions in the interorganizational 
interaction array. The third stage employs clustering analysis techniques to identify 
whether, based on the surveyed sample of interorganizational interactions, three clusters 
can be identified that correspond to the theoretically postulated levels of cooperation, 
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coordination and collaboration (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984; Romesburg, 2004). 
Different clustering solutions will be analyzed to determine necessary and sufficient 
dimensions to each interaction term, and to select the best fit within each category of 
dimension (contextual, organizational and interaction). 
Organization of this Dissertation 
This dissertation is presented in six chapters: Chapter 1 – Introduction; Chapter 2 
– Literature Review and Theoretical Framework; Chapter 3 – Methodology and Survey 
Instrument; Chapter 4 – Descriptive Data Analysis; Chapter 5 – Clustering and 
Multivariate Analysis; and Chapter 6 – Conclusions. 
This first chapter has introduced the research problem and study objectives, 
outlined the general approach to the study, and discussed the importance of the research 
and its relevance to the field of public administration. Chapter 2 reviews the literature and 
theory on interorganizational interaction as it pertains to this study and develops a refined 
interorganizational array to test the coordination, cooperation and collaboration terms. 
Chapter 3 discusses the methodology and the operationalization of the construct into 
indicators and a survey instrument. Chapter 4 presents the descriptive data analysis and 
preparations for clustering analysis. Chapter 5 presents the results of the cluster and 
multivariate analysis for each research question. Finally, chapter 6 draws overall 
conclusions and implications from the results, considers the strengths and limitations of 
the study, and suggests areas for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2:  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter reviews the relevant literature and summarizes, organizes, and draws 
conclusions on conceptualization and measurement of interorganizational interaction. 
The review is organized as follows. First, the rationale for the study introduced in chapter 
1 is recapped and the broader context to this dissertation research is explored. Second, the 
scope, search parameters and approach to the literature review is described. Third, 
relevant literature focusing on interorganizational interaction definitions, frameworks, 
and conceptualization is summarized and reviewed. Finally, building from the work of 
McNamara (2008, 2012), a set of dimensions are selected and operationalized for an 
interorganizational interaction array, which will be tested via survey research. 
The Context for Interorganizational Interaction Research 
The foundational questions at the heart of political science, public administration, 
and economics concern how social, political and economic institutions adapt and work 
together to deal with problems, address conflicts, and create a stable and prosperous 
society. These questions are increasing in significance, as a growing body of research in 
multiple disciplines of social science suggests that we live in an increasingly complex 
society, which requires ever more novel and innovative approaches to managing 
problems and finding collective solutions (Mandell & Steelman, 2003). This context of 
complexity provided, to a large extent, the impetus for increasing focus on collaboration 
and networks in the literature.  
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A number of factors drive this complexity: rapid technological changes (Gray, 
1989); changing economic production modes, the decline of manufacturing in the West 
and the rise of information technology and service industries (Alter & Hage, 1993); 
increasing competitive pressures generating increasing rates of innovation; globalization 
(Kettl, 2000, 2002); blurring of boundaries between public and private sectors (Ben-Ner, 
2002; Dees & Anderson, 2003); increasing pressure on government revenues as 
expenditures grow (Goldsmith & Kettl, 2009); and the expanding reach of the state 
coupled with a shift away from direct government to devolution, decentralization, and 
privatization (Loughlin, 2004).  
The implications of this complexity for organizations are numerous. Greater 
environmental complexity and turbulence increases the extent to which organizations 
become interdependent (Emery & Trist, 1965; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Trist, 1977). 
Interdependence is a situation where individual organizations cannot act unilaterally 
without creating unanticipated and often unwanted consequences for other organizations 
(Gray, 1989). Interdependence make boundaries of responsibility or jurisdiction for 
organizational functions and structures challenging to define (Kettl, 2006). Given that 
both problems and solutions are often conceived through the lens of organizational 
boundaries, such conditions bound identification of problems with distributive or political 
economy issues in society, and favor solution by “argumentation” rather than analysis (F. 
Fisher & Forester, 1993). Societal problems are often intractably “wicked,” meaning 
there are neither optimal solutions nor standards of judgment to know right from wrong 
or good from bad (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Problems are rarely isolatable or divisible; 
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instead there are “systems of problems” in which efforts to deal with any individual 
problem generates unwanted consequences with others (Ackoff, 1974). 
In response to this uncertain environment, organizations adapt and evolve in order 
to reduce uncertainty, enhance legitimacy, maintain survival, and “negotiate order” 
(Gray, 1989). While private business organizations are often able to rearrange their forms 
and functions contingent on environmental conditions, government organizations find 
adaptation challenging. Geopolitical boundaries between states, regions and cities, and 
the jurisdictions of responsibility and function of the patchwork of bureaucracies that 
implement policy, are developed and negotiated over long periods of time and are 
relatively immovable. Interest-based politics when combined with the specialist nature of 
bureaucracy and fixed budgetary cycles, generates stability in policy domains and favors 
incremental forms of problem solving (Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993; Wilson, 1989). 
When wicked problems arise that traverse geographical and functional boundaries or 
require rapid action, governments bureaucracies are challenged to act directly (Kettl, 
2006). A feature of contemporary governance is that few organizations have the 
resources and control over their functional domain to be able to accomplish their mission 
alone (Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2011; Milward & Provan, 2000).    
The difficulty faced by governments to address complex societal problems has 
been extensively covered in the public administration and policy literatures, and provided 
impetus for the development of three related strands of research and practice, which in 
many ways precede the contemporary era of collaboration and network governance 
(Bevir, 2010; Dunsire, 1995). The first strand considered factors affecting policy 
implementation and whether top-down control or bottom-up adaptation explained 
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implementation mechanisms (Goggin, Bowman, Lester, & O'Toole, 1990). The second 
strand focused on privatization and decentralization, underlain by political efforts to 
shrink the state (Feigenbaum, Hening, & Hamnett, 1998). The third strand of “new public 
management” (NPM) attempted to change the way government was run by introducing a 
set of private sector techniques and concepts with the aim of increasing accountability 
and focusing on results (Hood, 1995). These three bodies of literature developed roughly 
in the same time period from the 1970’s onwards, however, with the exception of some 
early work on implementation (Hjern & Porter, 1981), the literature developed in 
isolation from interorganizational research occurring in the same time period. 
The development of NPM and the growth of various privatization tools such as 
vouchers, user charges, and direct contracting, signaled a transition away from the 
“problem solving” paradigm of the early to mid-twentieth century where policy 
formulation and policy implementation were led by government, to a paradigm of 
“managerialism” (Hill & Hupe, 2009). Implementation was being “defined away,” and 
made the responsibility of contracted “agents,” where government “principals” focused 
instead on management and accountability (Hill & Hupe, 2009; Isett, Ines, LeRoux, & 
Mischen, 2011). The practical consequence of these changes were a large increase in the 
number of nonprofit and profit-making organizations involved in public service provision 
(Salamon, 2002), a gradual growth in new governmental organizations with missions of 
oversight and regulation (Hill & Hupe, 2009), and changing—although not completely 
new—emphasis on networking and management skills of public managers (Agranoff, 
2006). However, the privatization and NPM literature rarely considered the challenges of 
multiorganizational implementation, given its basic assumption that contracts, monitoring 
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schemes, and management would be sufficient for implementation, even when multiple 
organizations were involved. 
In contrast, implementation literature did recognize the complexity of joint action 
and its importance in implementation success; however, this aspect was under-theorized 
and conceptualized in research (McNamara, 2008). Multiorganizational implementation 
literature took policy as a starting point for analysis while considering broad issues such 
as: the top-down/bottom-up synthesis and the normative issues in this distinction (Barrett 
& Fudge, 1981; Sabatier, 1986); the difference between policy formation and 
implementation (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993); and the effects of 
political contexts and policy content on implementation success (Matland, 1995). 
Interorganizational interaction was considered indirectly by the extent to which policies 
identify actors important to the implementation process, or more generally the 
relationship between policy design and organizational interdependence (T. E. Hall & 
O’Toole, 2000; O'Toole, 1986).  
With the move away from direct government implementation to a complex mix of 
governmental, private and nonprofit actors, scholars began to characterize this mix of 
actors in terms of “network,” which required “network governance” to provide services 
in a coherent manner towards public goals. By tracing the development of the public 
administration, policy implementation, and NPM literatures, Head and Alford (2013) 
identify three themes that emerged gradually, which are essential to dealing with the 
contemporary network governance landscape: systems thinking, leadership, and the 
subject of this research—collaboration. Public administration literature tends to 
characterize the past two decades as a distinct “era” of collaborative or network 
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governance, which requires “new” collaborative or network public management 
techniques (Hill & Hupe, 2009; McGuire & Agranoff, 2011; Rethemeyer & Hatmaker, 
2008). As the subsequent analysis reveals, however, the term “collaboration” is often 
used to describe a broader range of interorganizational interactions including 
deconfliction, coordination and cooperation.   
In the same time frame as the development of policy implementation and NPM 
literatures, an almost entirely separate body of organizational science literature 
developed, which focused on interorganizational relations. Organizational science, 
however, tended either to be related directly to business studies, or existed independently 
without necessarily recognizing the public-private distinction. Consequently, the extent to 
which findings from this body of work are generalizable to the public sector is unknown 
(Isett & Provan, 2005). The development history of interorganizational research is similar 
to that of collaboration and networks in public administration, and involved general 
recognition about the importance of considering network relationships on firms’ 
operations, and the necessity for firms to adapt and change their structure to this new 
landscape (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011). Part of this literature review covers and 
applies key findings from the literature on interorganizational relationships.  
In the light of this wide recognition that contemporary society is characterized in 
terms of networks, and that societal problems are ever more intractable, the importance of 
interorganizational relationships has never been greater. A large body of research in 
public administration, management and organizational science literatures has developed 
on the topics of cooperation, coordination, collaboration and interorganizational 
interaction. The disparate and broad nature of the literature has led to a multitude of 
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conceptual frameworks, typologies, definitions and interchangeable terminology, many 
of which were developed in case studies. While these efforts have merit, cumulative 
empirical research has suffered in the absence of standardized conceptualization and 
operationalization.  
This dissertation aims to build cumulative knowledge in the conceptualization of 
interorganizational interactions by developing an improved interorganizational 
interaction array, which specifies a construct of different levels of interorganizational 
interaction. A critical aspect for cumulative development in scholarly research is the need 
for stable definitions and rigorous conceptualizations and operationalizations, which 
permits valid empirical research such as organizational surveys, evaluations of 
collaboration and comparative analyses. This is the main subject addressed in this 
literature review. 
Literature Review Approach 
The literature on interorganizational interaction in public management and 
administration is large, and when other disciplines are included such as business, 
management, organizational science, psychology and sociology, the body of work is vast. 
A problem encountered generally in this work is that interaction terms such as 
“collaboration” are often used interchangeably or in combination with a wide variety of 
related ideas that involve individuals or organizations working together in some manner: 
coordination, cooperation, interorganizational interaction, joint action, alliances, 
partnerships, networking, multiorganizational implementation, and governance, to name a 
few. An important part of this research, therefore, is to disentangle interaction terms from 
one another. 
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The following paragraphs summarize the scoping, questions, search parameters, 
and overall methods used for the review. The review is conducted and the findings 
structured in accordance to guidance presented in Boote and Beile (2005); Galvan (2006); 
and Randolph (2009).   
Scope. Given the sizeable literature featuring variously-termed interorganizational 
interactions, three scoping criteria are adopted from the outset to delineate and prioritize 
the literature. First, only literature on voluntary interactions is considered; mandated 
types of principal-agent interactions such as contracting or hierarchical interactions 
internally in an organization are excluded. Second, a small body of recent work that 
considers interorganizational interaction mandated by circumstance (e.g. where disaster 
response compels organizations to work together (Bryson et al., 2006; Simo, 2009)) or 
mandated by policy or organizational mission (Ivery, 2008; Rodríguez, Langley, Béland, 
& Denis, 2007) is included. Third, only interorganizational interaction in the public 
sphere is considered; business partnerships or industry alliances are excluded. However, 
references from business and management literature that are listed in the reference 
sections of primary search results are reviewed based on their theoretical merit. A small 
body of organizational science literature is consulted to inform the theoretical sections, 
mainly from well-known and classic textbooks.  
Focusing questions. The main goal of this dissertation is to test and refine 
existing definitional constructs of interaction terms. This chapter will neither recreate nor 
update other recent appraisals of the interorganizational interaction literature from which 
the constructs were derived. Instead, the aim is to understand more broadly how 
interorganizational interaction is conceptualized and defined by other scholars, with a 
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view to evaluating the results of empirical testing against the overall body of literature. 
Several questions are adopted to guide the literature review. 
 How is interorganizational interaction defined and conceptualized?  
 Which theoretical perspectives inform these conceptualizations?  
 How are different forms of interorganizational or collective interaction 
distinguished from one another? 
 How are interorganizational interactions operationalized and measured? 
Search parameters. The initial literature search was conducted via the Old 
Dominion University library “ProQuest” database for journals and dissertations by 
searching using the search terms in Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1: Search parameters used in the literature review 
Search Term Date Range 
“Interorganizational; Organizational+[collaboration, coordination, 
cooperation]” 
Jan 2008 – Dec 2014 
“Collaborative + [public management, governance, leadership, public 
administration, implementation]” 
 
“Network governance”   
“Policy networks” 
Jan 2008 – Dec 2012 
“Collaboration; coordination; cooperation + [assessment, framework, 
indicator, measure, measurement, metric, survey]” 
“[assessment, framework, indicator, measure, measurement, metric, 
survey] + of collaboration; coordination; cooperation” 
Jan 1990 – Dec 2014 
 
Method of review. A first pass through the collected literature identified articles 
from the following categories: definitional research; collaboration frameworks; 
interorganizational interaction arrays; applications or tests of frameworks and arrays; 
empirical measurement of interorganizational interactions; network based research or 
commentary; and policy implementation research. A second pass identified 
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interorganizational research that focused on one or two variables of interest (e.g. trust, 
boundary spanners, leadership), but that did not address broader definitional or 
theoretical issues. Further “cross-cutting” categories were created for literature review 
articles and dissertation research focused on collaboration, networks, interorganizational 
relationships, or some combination (e.g. collaborative network management). Given that 
the focus of this dissertation is testing and adjusting an existing construct, articles 
concerning definitions, frameworks and typologies were prioritized. The reference 
section of these articles were consulted, and a secondary “manual” literature search 
gathered important books, older articles outside the original search date ranges, and non-
academic works.  
Conceptualizing Interorganizational Interaction 
This section lays the conceptual and theoretical scaffolding on which the literature 
review and subsequent empirical research is conducted. First, the challenges of 
conceptualizing and defining interorganizational interaction are explored. Second, the 
meaning of the three most common interaction terms are reviewed. Finally, the 
“language” necessary for theoretical analysis is established to guide and frame the 
literature review: types of organizational theory, paradigms, and levels of analysis. 
The Challenges of Conceptualizing Interorganizational Interaction     
Many scholarly works in this field often refer to the challenge of defining 
interorganizational interaction terms, but rarely specify exactly why this should be the 
case. Creating a definition starts with building a conceptualization of interorganizational 
interaction, which is challenging for a variety of reasons. First, as a fundamental aspect of 
human society collective action has a long history both in terms of practice and theory. 
 24 
Some scholars have expressed interorganizational interaction in terms of the political 
traditions of civic republicanism and classic liberalism in America (Perry & Thomson, 
2004), whereas others identify American federalism and associated intergovernmental 
cooperation as the crucible for multiorganizational practice (Agranoff, 2006; Agranoff & 
McGuire, 2003; McGuire, 2006). Interorganizational interaction is a thread, although 
often not explicitly mentioned, which runs through the broader disciplines of public 
administration and policy implementation (O'Toole, 1986). This long history means that 
interorganizational interaction is linked with many interrelated ideas and disciplines and 
is part of our basic paradigms of thought and value systems, making it challenging to 
isolate and objectively study.  
Second, within this broader political and governmental context, the study of 
multiorganizational interaction has incorporated various theoretical traditions through the 
course of its development. For example, Ostrom’s (1990, 2007) institutional theory of 
collective action relies on game theoretic and rational actor assumptions with a lineage 
from Olsen’s (1965) Logic of Collective Action to Axelrod’s (1984) prisoner dilemma 
theory of cooperation. Other related theoretical lineages can be found in conflict 
resolution and management (R. Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Kriesberg, 2007), group 
psychology and conflict (R. J. Fisher, 1990), stakeholder theory (Barringer & Harrison, 
2000), and interorganizational relations (Alter & Hage, 1993). A basic issue is that 
different theoretical areas use terminology inconsistently. A more fundamental problem 
is that scholars have emphasized these different and often competing theoretical lineages 
to varying extents in conceptualization of interorganizational interaction. 
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Third, interorganizational interaction can be studied at different levels of analysis: 
individual, group, organization, or society. Yet definitions rarely acknowledge the 
conceptual level of inference. A related challenge is that interaction can occur on 
different scales, depending on the particular “unit” involved (Emerson et al., 2012). A 
large body of literature, for example, covers “collaboration” between individuals that 
occurs in “teamwork,” although recent scholars have rejected defining this as 
collaboration (Bedwell et al., 2012). Interorganizational interaction can be conceptualized 
as interactions between groups, organizations, individuals or various combinations of the 
units, yet this is rarely specified in definitions. While several definitions use general 
terms such as “participants” or “actors,” or specifically refer to individuals, studies have 
recognized the critical importance of identifying the extent to which an individual 
represent themselves or an organization (Huxham & Vangen, 2005). 
Fourth, any particular term used for interorganizational interaction is typically 
nested among a set of related terms describing other forms of interorganizational 
interaction—cooperation, coordination, partnering, and so on. Much of the literature 
focuses on antecedents that support or hinder interaction in collaboration, for example, 
yet many of these antecedents apply equally to other forms of interorganizational 
interaction such as cooperation or coordination (McNamara, 2012). This issue stems from 
the fact that the literature often describes a “continuum” of interaction, usually from 
cooperation at the lower end to collaboration at the higher (Keast et al., 2007; Mandell & 
Steelman, 2003; McNamara, 2008, 2012). Much of this literature attempts to separate out 
the various meanings of each level of the continuum; however, as will be shown in the 
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following review, the “continuum of interaction” is an abstraction that masks quite a 
complex reality. 
Finally, a problem relevant particularly in public administration literature where 
one form of interorganizational interaction—collaboration—is more distinct as a concept, 
is the overlap with “networks,” which also have a strong body of scholarship. For 
example, some of the leading network scholars define networks using the same criteria 
for collaboration developed below (Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007; Provan & Kenis, 
2008). Furthermore, many scholars cite findings from network research in studies of 
collaboration, and vice versa, without necessarily acknowledging any difference (Isett et 
al., 2011; Mandell, 1999). Given the importance of networks to theories of society and 
collective action in general, defining “network” is as challenging—if not more so—as 
defining collaboration, for many of the same reasons listed above. Network scholarship 
has a long history of development in sociological analysis (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, 
& Wenpin, 2004; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Granovetter, 1973), policy studies (Adam & 
Kriesi, 2007; Heclo, 1978; Heilman, Johnson, Morris, & O'Toole, 1994; Sabatier & 
Jenkins-Smith, 1993), organizational science (Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Nohria & Eccles, 
1992), and business and management (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011), and thus 
inherits a complex theoretical lineage.  
Cooperation, Coordination, and Collaboration 
While the definitional challenge posed at the start of this chapter is still the case, 
several advances have been made in the past decade with regard to terminology and 
understanding is becoming increasingly stabilized. Many scholars have offered 
definitions, which do not need further review here. Thomson (2001), for example, 
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presents an exhaustive review of definitions offered up to date of publication, and much 
of the interorganizational interaction array literature reviewed in this chapter, in effect, 
offers definitions for various interaction terms. While there is a surprising lack of 
rigorous “construct” definitions and operationalization of interaction terms, a short 
overview of the differentiation between these three levels of interaction is instructive for 
proceeding. More detail is provided on collaboration, mainly because understanding 
collaboration aids understanding of the other interaction terms by defining what they are 
not. At this stage, it is critical to note the empirical evidence that these three levels of 
interaction can be empirically differentiated is fairly limited; a fact which underscores the 
importance of this dissertation research.  
Cooperation. As a widely used term both in academia and general usage, the lack 
of definitional rigor is surprising. Much of the social science literature references 
landmark works such as Axelrod (1984) and Ostrom (1990), which examine how 
repeated interactions or “cooperation” between individuals and groups lead to stable 
institutions of decision-making. In the interorganizational literature, cooperation has been 
used as a general term to convey “working together” for mutual benefit (Alter & Hage, 
1993) for which a typology of interorganizational arrangements is possible. 
 The notion of a continuum of interaction took hold in the public administration, 
policy and program evaluation literatures, which placed cooperation at the lower end of 
the scale. Scholars view cooperation as an interaction between organizations or 
individuals that do not necessarily need to work together, but chose to do so for varying 
reasons. Cooperative work may occur within existing organizational structures and 
processes, and generally does not conflict with individual participants’ goals (Keast et al., 
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2007; Mattessich et al., 2001; McNamara, 2008, 2012). A succinct definition of 
cooperation is provided in Keast et al. (2007, p. 17): “getting along with others so that 
you c[an] both achieve your own goals.” Cooperative interactions may involve 
information sharing, social networking, or de-conflicting work programs.  
Coordination. The term coordination has been typically used in organizational 
and administrative sciences to refer to the structuring, management and control of 
different components of a complex body or process to enable the components to work 
together effectively, usually in the case of a departmentalized organization (Fayol, 1949; 
Gulick, 1937). Coordination, therefore, assumes some interdependence meaning that 
individual organizations would not be as effective on their own without active 
coordination. Furthermore, coordination—in the context of an individual organization—
requires some system of legal rational authority both to compel different departments to 
work together when needed, and to facilitate independent action without having to 
constantly communicate, by assigning clear domains of responsibility to departments. In 
the case of interorganizational interaction, this legal rational authority may be formally 
created by a collective group, or other dimensions such as trust may act as proxies for 
authority (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). 
Coordination is placed on the middle of the scale of interaction, for the reason that 
mutual goals between participants may exist, but they do not conflict with individual 
organizational goals (Keast et al., 2007; McNamara, 2008). The presence of shared goals 
and interdependence to effectively achieve them necessitates some level of shared 
planning, whether or not this occurs formally or informally depending on circumstances 
(Kettl, 2003; Morris, Morris, & Jones, 2007).  
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Collaboration. In the public administration literature in particular, collaboration 
is the interorganizational form that has garnered most attention in recent decades, 
although perhaps the term is often used to refer to a broader set of interactions. A group 
of relatively stable common themes can be identified from the literature to distinguish 
collaboration from other interaction forms, although definitions vary or overlap in the 
extent to which these themes are emphasized (Mayer & Kenter, 2016).  
A necessary prerequisite for collaboration is the condition of shared problem 
interdependence between actors (a generic term for individuals, groups or organizations), 
such that a certain problem affects actors in way that they cannot resolve it alone (Emery 
& Trist, 1965; Gray, 1989). A conference of city managers from across the country 
meeting to discuss how to resolve homelessness in cities, for example, would not qualify 
as collaboration. While the problem is shared by all actors, each city manager could 
resolve the problem individually in a way unique to a particular city and state. However, 
a group of city managers from contiguous cities such as in Hampton Roads, may frame 
homelessness in terms of the transient nature of people through the region and poor 
geographic distribution of shelters. The case where city managers worked to pool 
resources, create an intercity committee on the subject, and develop a coherent homeless 
regional policy, would qualify as collaboration as the homelessness problem could not be 
resolved individually by one city. 
If collaboration forms around situations of interdependent problem-solution sets, 
typically the group will adopt a common goal—the next key discerning characteristic of 
collaboration (Ansel & Gash, 2007; Conley & Margaret, 2003; Frey, Lohmeier, Lee, & 
Tollefson, 2006; Mattessich et al., 2001; McNamara, 2012; Vangen & Huxham, 2012). 
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This distinguishes collaboration from other forms of interaction such as coordination in 
which actors may “review goals for compatibility” (Mattessich et al., 2001, p. 61), or 
deconfliction, in which actors simply inform each other about their respective missions 
(Williams, 2010). Related to the common goal characteristic is the requirement for 
mutual benefit; it is unlikely an actor would agree to a goal that was wholly incompatible 
with its interests, thus all participants to a collaboration must gain something (Gray, 
1989; Morris et al., 2013). Often, the link between interdependence, common goals and 
mutual benefit is expressed in terms of shared purpose (Woodland & Hutton, 2012).  
Collaboration can be identified by several process conditions. First, collaboration 
requires the development of trust between actors (Ansel & Gash, 2007; Johnston, Hicks, 
Nan, & Auer, 2011; Klijn, Edelenbos, & Steijn, 2010; Kocoglu, Imamoglu, & Ince, 2011; 
Lundin, 2007; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Tsasis, 2009). Other lesser forms of interaction 
such as coordination can occur in the absence of trust (Raymond, 2006). Trust is critical 
given the related condition that participation in the collaboration is voluntary (R. H. Hall, 
Clark, Giordano, Johnson, & Roekel, 1977; Morris et al., 2013). In the absence of formal 
organizational authority and legitimacy, collective action must emerge initially through 
informal relationship development (Thomson et al., 2009). While informal relationships 
eventually become institutionalized in governance structures, trust is a prerequisite to 
their development (Emerson et al., 2012).  
The second process condition required for collaboration is a specific type of 
multidirectional communication that emphasizes conflict resolution, shared perspectives, 
consideration of power dynamics, and equality (Gray, 1985, 1989; Huxham, 2003; 
Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Imperial, 2005). The voluntary nature of collaboration means 
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there is no external arbiter of disputes nor formal organizational tools to end conflicts via 
authoritative measures, thus communication between actors is essential. In other forms of 
interorganizational interaction in which actors do not have common goals, conflicts may 
go unresolved between actors or communications may be via intermediary bodies and is 
of lesser importance.  
Third, collaboration is defined by a situation where actors share resources (Guo 
& Acar, 2005; Kanter, 1994; Tschirhart, Amezcua, & Anker, 2009). Resources may 
include personnel, expertise, funding or materials. Sharing or pooling resources requires 
an assumption of shared risk, and a distribution of organizational authority over 
resources. This distinguishes collaboration from lesser forms of interaction in which 
resources may be offered, but are strictly controlled by a sending organization or must 
prioritize only the sending organization’s goals (Williams, 2010). 
Finally, collaboration is defined by collaborative rationality, where “rationality” 
means the normative conception of reasoning. Hierarchical organizational forms tend to 
develop “instrumental” rationality, in which individuals are conceived as reasoning on 
the basis of objective information to attain clear organizational goals, and “true” 
knowledge is defined by that which permits prediction and thus control (Fay, 1975). The 
implication of this conception of rationality for organizations is the tendency to assume 
that “solutions” can be engineered or discovered and thus “planned” in order to attain 
goals or solve problems. 
Instrumental rationality is distinct from that which is used in collaboration. 
Habermas (1981) described a “communicative rationality,” in which rational reasoning is 
conceived as a discursive process to uncover realities hidden by socially constructed 
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understandings, thus rationality is defined by process rather than knowledge outcome. In 
their landmark text on collaboration in urban planning, Innes and Booher (2010) detail 
“collaborative rationality,” which like Habermas’ theory is defined by process conditions 
of a diversity of participants with interdependent interests engaging in authentic dialogue 
to develop shared meanings and “heuristic” solutions (Innes & Booher, 2010, p. 35). 
While this set of common themes provides some stability to the definition of 
collaboration and its respective empirical study, points of disagreement and ambiguity 
remain in the literature. For example, some contend that a key feature of collaboration is 
a flat (or no) hierarchical structure organizing participants (Gray, 1989). Others present 
evidence, however, of complex organizational forms emerging in collaborations that in 
many respects resemble, if not replicate, features of organizational hierarchy (Bardach, 
1998; Thacher, 2004). 
Other contended distinctions involve whether collaboration can be defined by the 
type of participants involved, the organizational level of participants (leadership, 
management or working level), the extent to which individuals represent themselves or 
an organization, the reason for the collaboration forming or its intended goal, the time 
duration of the activity, the extent to which a stable set of participants is required, and the 
extent to which participant’s commitment is legally formalized. Another major source of 
ambiguity lies in distinguishing collaboration from network concepts (Isett et al., 2011; 
Provan & Kenis, 2008). These issues are explored in the empirical data analysis in 
chapters four through six. 
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Theoretical Language of Interorganizational Interaction 
This short review of current understandings of common interaction terms 
illustrates the complexity of establishing rigorous conceptualizations and thus definitions. 
Definitions allow us to determine what is and what is not included as part of the 
definiendum—the “thing” being defined. Yet for complex, multidimensional phenomena 
such as collaboration, definitions often hide more than they convey. As 
interorganizational interaction involves a complex mix of variables interacting at 
different levels of analysis, single paragraph definitions cannot fully capture the true 
meaning nor allow sufficient distinction between other similar cases (Bailey, 1994). An 
analytical approach to understanding the phenomena is required, which involves 
specification of constructs built from dimensions, and detailed operationalization of those 
dimensions. This section presents the theoretical grounding for defining states of 
interorganizational interaction. 
Interorganizational Interaction and Organizational Science 
Whether occurring between organizations, groups, or individuals, 
interorganizational interactions are social groupings or collectivities that come together to 
pursue goals (Bedwell et al., 2012). In the most general sense—and with some important 
caveats—interorganizational interaction and the various social structures that emerge 
during the process can be analyzed through the lens of organizational science. 
Surprisingly, contemporary interorganizational literature in public administration pays 
little reference to classic organizational science work. Partly, this may be because early 
literature already incorporated key organizational science tenets, however, the 
definitional problems concerning interorganizational interactions stem from the challenge 
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of defining the boundaries of interorganizational forms and the level of analysis. Much 
contemporary interorganizational literature glosses over these issues (Klein & Kozlowski, 
2000), thus it is pertinent to review the fundamental definitional and theoretical concepts 
in organizational science to start on a solid foundation. 
Organizations as a general class of social collectivity are ubiquitous in modern 
societies (Parsons, 1960). Scholars have identified several common features of any 
organization whether bureaucracy or network: social structure, participants, goals, 
technology, and environment (Rainey, 2003; W. R. Scott, 2003). Social structure refers to 
the patterns of relationships among participants in a collectivity and features normative, 
cultural, and behavioral elements. While a long tradition of organizational research 
conceives of structures as objective, separate from participants, and largely static, some 
suggest structure should be replaced with the dynamic concept of “structuration,” where 
social structures are “virtual” indicators of dynamic human activity (Giddens, 1984; 
Weick, 1985).  
Participants are the social actors, whether individuals or groups, that contribute to 
the organization in return for inducements. It is a matter of debate, however, the extent to 
which participants can be used to define the boundaries of an organization (Pfeffer, 
1982). Goals are the desired ends of the organization or the reason why the organization 
came into being. Again, debate surrounds whether individual participants’ goals, shared 
organizational goals, or the basic goal of organizational self-sustainment are more 
important (Pfeffer, 1997). Technology is a general term for the process, systems or 
objects that translate inputs into outputs; the “work” that the organization conducts (W. 
R. Scott, 2003). Finally, all organizations exist in a “specific physical, technological, 
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cultural, and social environment” (W. R. Scott, 2003, p. 23). A large part of 
organizational study examines how goals, technologies, participants and structures adapt 
to and with the environment.  
The ongoing debates about the nature and relative importance of these core 
organizational features result from the differing sociological paradigms of thought 
underpinning any organizational analysis. Depending on one’s ontological and 
epistemological perspectives, there are several possible paradigms. Burrell and Morgan 
(1979) contrast subjectivity-objectivity debates in social science methodology, with 
consensus-conflict debates in the “theory of society” (Hassard, 1991) to identify four 
main paradigms: functionalism, interpretivism, radical humanism, and radical 
structuralism. Each paradigm focuses on different elements of organizations and 
incorporates very different explanatory frameworks (Vibert, 2004). While individual 
interpretation of organizational phenomenon is critical in how organizations operate and 
how organizational reality is constructed, extensive research on institutionalist logic tells 
us that individual perspectives are shaped greatly by objective structures such as 
organizational design, policies, processes, and resources (J. P. Olsen, 2007). 
Consequently, organizational science is dominated by functionalism, which searches for 
regularities and patterns leading to generalizable and universal principles (Gioia & Pitre, 
1990). 
In addition to these core paradigmatic positions, key debates in organization 
science revolve around the choice of level of analysis and assumptions about the extent to 
which participants’ behaviors are self-determined or dictated by organizational structure  
(Astley & Van de Ven, 1983). Thus depending on the level of analysis and assumptions, 
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organizational theories come to varying conclusions about key questions such as whether 
organizations should be viewed as functionally rational or socially constructed, whether 
structural change is driven by internal or external factors, and whether organizational-
level behavior is determined by individual or collective action.  
This short probe into organizational science serves to prime the analysis on 
interorganizational interaction by highlighting several important considerations. First, a 
researcher’s choice of ontological and epistemological positions affects fundamentally 
how theories of organization and thus interorganizational interaction are conceptualized. 
Recent investigations show that, similarly to organizational science, the dominant 
paradigm in public administration research is functionalism, yet rarely is there discussion 
about the implications of this choice (Raadschelders, 2011; Raadschelders & Lee, 2011). 
The remainder of this literature review periodically questions the paradigm aspects of 
various interorganizational interaction frameworks and theories. Second, the level of 
analysis at which theoretical inferences are made has an equally large impact on 
understanding, yet this aspect remains generally underspecified in interorganizational 
public administration literature. Third, defining the core features of organizations is 
important to determine the scope of inquiry. This aspect is well covered in the literature, 
although part of the definitional problem lies in different choices for core variables.  
Levels of Analysis in Interorganizational Interaction  
The “level of analysis” is the level of social reality at which theoretical inferences 
or explanations are made and is usually determined by the nature of the dependent 
variable (Neuman, 2003; Rousseau, 1985; Yurdusev, 1993). Levels of analysis are often 
described as micro, meso, and macro, which generally correspond to individual, group, 
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and societal levels. Levels of analysis are distinct from “units of analysis,” which refer to 
the unit with which data are directly attached (Hitt, Beamish, Jackson, & Mathieu, 2007). 
Correct specification of levels and units of analysis is critical in empirical research, as 
inappropriate combination of different levels and units risks biases of misspecification 
and aggregation (Rousseau, 1985). While many of the interorganizational interaction 
frameworks described in the following review group variables at different levels of 
analysis and show interactions, they do not typically specify rigorous theoretical 
relationships—a task necessary for development of a multilevel measurement and 
construct model (Hitt et al., 2007). 
Scott’s (2003) categorization of levels of analysis as social psychological, 
organizational structure, and ecological, is particularly suited to organizational research. 
The social psychological level focuses on the behavior and characteristics of individuals, 
interpersonal relations between individuals, and the impact of context or environment on 
individual attributes. Group or organizational characteristics are viewed as the 
environment or context. While interorganizational interaction is a multilevel 
phenomenon, much of the process dynamics occurs between individuals thus basic 
social-psychological theories about decision making, trust building or sensemaking are 
important, as are their basic models of the individual. Axelrod’s (1984) theory of 
cooperation, for example, employs a rational self-interested actor model and shows that 
under the right context of repeated interactions, group level cooperation emerges. This 
emergent property, however, is explained by the individual self-interest. 
The organizational structure level encapsulates structural and process 
characteristics of an organization or its sub-units including department structure, 
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authority ranks, hierarchy, specialization and division of labor, or communication 
networks. Examples of this level in the interorganizational interaction literature include a 
large body of work on governance structures in collaboration (Ansel & Gash, 2007; 
Emerson et al., 2012; Hardy & Koontz, 2009; Hodges, Ferreira, Mowery, & Novicki, 
2013; Huxham, 2000; Johnston et al., 2011; C. Lewis & Marsh, 2012). 
The ecological level examines relationships between an organization and its 
environment, viewing the organization as a single entity. Examples of ecological level 
literature include studies that treat an interorganizational form as a single unit and ask, for 
example, whether collaboration reduces service delivery costs (Bel, Fageda, & Mur, 
2014), or whether performance or outcomes are affected (Chen, 2010; Gulati, Lavie, & 
Madhavan, 2011). Scott also defines three further graduations of the ecological level: 
organizational sets, which views the environment from the perspective of one particular 
organization; organizational populations, which examines populations of organizations 
with similar structures or functions; and interorganizational fields, which highlights the 
competitive and cooperative relationships between organizations in the same policy or 
business domain. 
The construct in this dissertation research is theorized at the level of 
interorganizational field, reflecting the fact that interaction between organizations is 
affected by the broader collectivities or networks of organizations in which the 
interacting organizations are embedded (Warren, 1967). Interorganizational interaction is 
an emergent phenomenon with a set of characteristics distinct from the participating 
organizations and individuals. This is analogous to the idea that the social network in 
which an individual is embedded—what one might call the “inter-individual” field—can 
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be characterized by emergent properties such as centrality, complexity or differentiation, 
which are not attributes of an individual. As a multilevel construct, however, 
interorganizational interaction features lower level constructs at the structural and 
individual levels of analysis.  
Distinguishing between Frameworks, Theories, Models, and Heuristics 
In order to compare the various conceptualizations, frameworks and theories of 
interorganizational interaction, a set of comparison criteria is required. “Theory” is a 
word appearing with high frequency in social science literature and is used with several 
understandings. Ostrom (2005, 2007)  distinguishes between “frameworks,” “theories,” 
and “models” as three levels of specificity to the term “theory” in its most broad sense. 
According to Ostrom, frameworks “help to identify the elements and relationships…that 
one needs to consider…Frameworks organize diagnostic and prescriptive inquiry…, 
provide the most general list of variables…(and) provide a metatheoretical language that 
can be used to compare theories” (Ostrom, 2007, p. 25).  A framework, therefore, is the 
broadest organizing construct with which to begin “theory” development.  
A framework focuses theories—the next level of specificity—on the general 
classes of variable necessary to explain phenomena (Ostrom, 2005). According to 
Schlager (2007), theories “place values on some of the variables identified as important 
in a framework, posit relationships among the variables, and make predictions about 
likely outcomes” (p. 296). Theory is always bound by assumptions, either explicitly 
defined or implicitly received from the theorist’s paradigm (Miner, 2005). The criteria 
that define a scientific theory are well known (Sabatier, 2007). In order to achieve the 
criteria of falsifiability variables should be logically coherent, show a clear sense of 
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causality and explicit drivers of causal processes. Finally, theories should clearly identify 
their boundaries and scope of application. In order for theories to meet these scientific 
requirements in multilevel multiorganizational fields such as collaborative governance, 
policy implementation and policy process studies, theories should specify: boundaries 
and scope of inquiry; a model of, or assumptions about the individual; a mechanism for 
collective groupings and organizations to emerge; wider environmental contexts or 
institutional structures; and an explanation about how the system changes (Blomquist, 
2007). 
Models are one step more in specificity from theories and make “precise 
assumptions about a limited set of parameter and variables” (Ostrom, 2007, p. 26). 
Although the difference between models and theories is somewhat contrived, models can 
be considered as the first level abstraction of operationalized variables. By fixing a 
limited number of variables at specific values in certain settings, models can test, revise 
and further develop theory (Schlager, 2007).  
A final category of “theory” is termed a heuristic, which means a “short-hand” aid 
to learning, problem solving or discovery. Heuristics display certain features of 
frameworks in terms of organizing concepts, certain features of models in terms of 
focusing on a limited set of variables, and sometimes may verge into metaphor. An 
example is the policy stages heuristic (deLeon, 1999), the garbage-can “heuristic” of 
organizational decision-making (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972), and the policy streams 
framework (Kingdon, 1995). Rather than make predictions or specify causal links, these 
heuristics provide us with a starting point to sort through and understand very complex 
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organizational and social systems. Given their limited Theoretical scope, heuristics are 
not considered further. 
The interorganizational literature leans heavily on the use of frameworks—
reviewed in the following sections—that order important variables at various levels, and 
to some extent develop more specific models, which focus on one or two key 
relationships of interest. In the terms described above there are few theories, and 
approaches using frameworks and models generally gloss over important theoretical 
aspects such as levels of analysis, boundaries, paradigms, and units. The following 
sections review the literature to date on the development of frameworks and theories of 
interorganizational interactions. The term “Theory” with a capital “T” is used to describe 
to describe the collective group of framework, theories and models.  
Review of Interorganizational Interaction Frameworks and Theory 
Interpretation of empirical results gained from testing interorganizational 
interaction arrays would likely benefit from a greater understanding of the numerous 
threads of thought that form the interorganizational relations discipline’s knowledge base. 
This section unravels several such threads by focusing on two important bodies of 
literature. First, the mainstay of contemporary interorganizational interaction Theory in 
the public administration literature is analyzed, which exists in the form of systems-based 
frameworks. Second, literature on interorganizational arrays is reviewed. The arrays 
specify constructs and operationalizations of interorganizational interaction terms in the 
forms of scales or continuums of interaction, or in the form of classification typologies, 
which enumerate the possible ways to arrange different dimensions. Finally, the analysis 
compares and contrasts these two bodies of knowledge, discusses the link with network 
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research, and sets the scene for the development of the interorganizational array to be 
tested in this dissertation research. 
Interorganizational Interaction Frameworks 
Given that interorganizational interactions occur as dynamic processes in complex 
organizational and institutional settings, there are many variables to consider (Emerson et 
al., 2012). Scholars have made a variety of attempts to describe these variables and their 
interactions. Most attempts are examples of frameworks, as Ostrom termed them, which 
strive to organize, order, and prioritize key variables for further theoretical refinement. 
For example, an influential early attempt by Wood and Gray (1991) organizes key 
variables into three separate, but sequentially linked, categories: antecedents 
(preconditions), processes, and outcomes. They do not specify hypotheses between these 
categories but instead investigate important factors in each category as determined by 
various organizational theories.  
Early Systems-Based Frameworks 
Attempts such as Wood and Gray’s to order basic components of sociological 
knowledge stem from work of early system theorists, who recognized that social systems 
could be represented in the form of input—process—output frameworks. Easton’s (1957) 
political system framework, for example, describes a general political system as one that 
converts inputs into outputs, with a feedback loop connecting back to the inputs, and 
nested within a wider contextual environment. While this approach was critiqued as 
overly general, it laid the foundation for a way of thinking about and ordering research on 
complex organizational systems; the vast majority framework literature adopts this basic 
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systems approach. The purpose of this section is to review key interorganizational 
interaction frameworks from the past two decades. 
Frameworks vary in their level of detail and specificity. Some simply organize 
important variables in the categories of inputs, processes, and outcomes, and suggest 
basic associations between them at the level of category (e.g. that processes affect 
outcomes). Some propose hypotheses that a variable in one category affects another 
category overall (e.g. continuous trust building (a variable in the “process” category) 
leads to greater collaboration outcomes (Bryson et al., 2006)). Others specify causal paths 
directly between variables in different categories, causally linking for example a specific 
antecedent variable to a specific process variable (e.g. interdependence between 
stakeholders (antecedent variable) leads to greater interorganizational communications 
(process variable) (Gray, 1985)). Furthermore, some frameworks operate at an individual 
level of analysis, while others—the majority in fact—are multi-level. While all 
frameworks employ the basic systems template categories of inputs—processes—
outputs, some frameworks emphasize the process aspect more so than others. 
One of the early and influential frameworks, developed by Gray (1985, 1989), 
shows association between antecedent factors, collaborative forms, and outcomes. For 
example, if the antecedent factor behind collaboration is conflict and the expected 
outcome is a joint agreement, then the collaborative process will likely take the form of a 
negotiated settlement. Gray also elaborates “collaborative forms” to specify a sequential 
process conducted during collaboration: problem setting  direction setting   
implementation. Each of these stages are described by specific activities performed by 
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collaborative groups such as stakeholder or resource identification, establishing ground 
rules, and searching for information jointly (Gray, 1989).  
Gray is explicit about the boundary of application of her framework. Its level of 
analysis is the interorganizational domain, where domain is the “set of actors that become 
joined by a common problem or interest” (Gray, 1985, p. 921) and the problem is one 
that cannot be dealt with unilaterally by any single organization. The framework applies 
only to “underorganized systems,” meaning that domains are characterized by loosely 
connected networks, rather than well-established collaborations. Thus the three stage 
process of “collaboration” conveys moving from a state of low intensity to higher 
intensity interorganizational interaction. The framework is not intended to apply only to a 
particular level of interaction such as a well-developed stable collaborative situation, but 
captures the full development process from initial conditions to full collaboration. Gray’s 
framework is also not strictly limited to organizational interaction, as some of the actors 
may be individual citizens. 
Gray emphasizes the process aspect of interorganizational interaction, which was 
recognized to be under-theorized (Gray & Wood, 1991). In another similar framework 
that emphasizes process but omits inputs and outputs, Ring and Van de Ven (1994) 
analyze how interorganizational relationships develop and dissolve over time. They 
describe an iterative and cyclical process of negotiation, developing commitment, and 
implementation, with assessments of each stage (Figure 2-1). If organizations negotiate 
and then develop certain expectations about necessary collective action, they will then 
commit to certain steps of implementation. If organizations assess that commitments are 
met, then they will increase their mutual commitments to further implementation. If 
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commitments are not met, then corrective measures will be taken to potentially de-
escalate their commitment or the implementation overall (Thomson & Perry, 2006) 
Figure 2-1: Ring and Van der Ven’s (1994) cyclical collaboration process, adapted from 
Thomson and Perry (2006) 
 
Ring and Van de Ven’s framework is multi-level. The overall framework 
explains, at the interorganizational domain level, how organizations develop 
interorganizational relationships involving mutual commitments and trust at the 
organizational level; however, the explanatory variables are all individual or group level 
phenomena such as trust, sensemaking, and motivation. Ring and Van de Ven 
hypothesize that as interorganizational relationships become more “institutionalized,” 
informal relationships become initially more important than formalized organizational 
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structures and rules, but eventually formal agreements such as rules, policies and 
contracts then start to mirror the informal relationships. Thus organizational level 
characteristics are driven partially by individual level variables.  
There is broad consensus that the process aspect of interorganizational interaction 
is intrinsic to the very nature of phenomenon; indeed, as Weick (1985) considered 
“organizing” a more appropriate way to discuss “organization,” the literature on 
“collaboration,” for example, could be better described by “collaborating.” Many of the 
key frameworks in the interorganizational interaction literature emphasize this dynamic 
and self-reinforcing process aspect and specify causal pathways involving individual 
level variables in a manner similar to Ring and Van de Ven (1994).   
Interorganizational Interaction Frameworks in the Public Administration Literature 
In the context of public administration, the process of governance is an important 
consideration. “Governance” is a slippery concept like its interorganizational interaction 
cousin (Pollitt & Hupe, 2011), however, broadly speaking it refers to the manner by 
which collective impacts are produced in a social system (Hill & Hupe, 2009). Using a 
major review of the collaboration literature, Ansel and Gash (2007) derive a 
“collaborative governance” framework that describes “a governing arrangement where 
one or more public agencies directly engage nonstate stakeholders in a collective 
decision-making process that is formal, consensus-orientated, and deliberative and that 
aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets” (pg. 544). 
This differentiation between state and nonstate actors implies that multiorganizational 
collaboration between only state agencies is somehow different from when nonstate 
organizations are included. While Ansel and Gash do not elaborate on the extent to which 
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actor type affects the nature of collaboration, other scholars have explored this question 
in typologies, described in the next section (Diaz-Kope & Miller-Stevens, 2015; 
Margerum, 2008; Moore & Koontz, 2003; Morris et al., 2013), and in research on the 
mechanisms of collective action in networks (Herranz, 2008). 
Ansel and Gash’s collaborative governance framework incorporates multiple 
levels of analysis. At the individual and group levels of analysis, they describe a cyclical 
positive feedback process that is very similar to the Ring and Van de Ven framework. 
Face-to-face dialogue leads to trust building, which in turn enhances participants’ 
commitment to the process. Commitment is characterized by mutual recognition of 
interdependence, shared ownership of processes, and understanding of mutual gains. 
Trust and commitment allows shared understanding to develop. Depending on the context 
and the activity undertaken by the interorganizational form, partners may work on 
problem definition, mission planning, and identification of mindsets and values. These 
intermediate outcomes reinforce further face-to-face dialogue and further trust building, 
and a positive feedback loop is created.  
Ansel and Gash recognize that the interorganizational interaction process is highly 
dynamic and cyclical, but is affected by broader institutional factors such as the formal or 
informal governance and administrative structures created by interacting organizations. 
Part of the interaction process involves creating such organizational level structures, 
which then in turn interact with the individual level variables. Positive feedback loops at 
the individual levels then reinforce the development and subsequent stability of 
organizational or institutional level structures and rules. 
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Emerson et al. (2012) refine the Ansel and Gash framework by removing the 
emphasis on government as the convener of interorganizational interaction. They 
describe a “collaborative governance regime” as the: 
processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that 
engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of 
government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a 
public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished (Emerson et al., 2012, p. 
2).  
Thus they do not limit collaboration to only formal state-initiated arrangements. 
Emerson et al.’s framework is in the form of input—process—output, but with 
some key differences to many other frameworks of this form. First, they distinguish 
between two types of inputs/antecedents to collaboration: the general system context, 
which describes situational aspects that are often present in collaborations such as 
turbulence and complexity; and specific drivers of collaboration, which are necessary 
conditions to collaboration forming (leadership, consequential incentives, 
interdependence, and uncertainty). Second, they distinguish between the immediate 
outputs of collaboration (e.g. getting resources, enacting policy) and the longer term 
impacts that are described in reference to the system context. Finally, they specify 
adaptation as a separate outcome of collaboration, in that collaborations that adapt to 
system contexts and changes in rule structures are more likely to be sustainable and self-
reinforcing. In a manner similar to Ansel and Gash, they identify the positive feedback 
between individual level factors such as motivation and engagement, with the creation 
and sustainment of more formalized institutional rules and processes.  
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While the Emerson et al. and Ansel and Gash frameworks are widely cited in 
recent collaboration literature, a closer look reveals some potential issues. First, both 
frameworks clearly focus on the “governance” level of organizations and thus are more 
applicable to organizational leadership responsible for negotiating and authorizing 
collaborations; it is not clear if these frameworks apply at all levels of the organization 
including at the “street level” where much actual collaborative implementation happens. 
Second, the frameworks do not elaborate on important organizational factors such as 
authority to commit resources, organizational size, goals, and structure. As the following 
review of interorganizational interaction arrays reveals, hierarchical structure and the 
distribution of authority within an organization are of key importance to determining the 
intensity of interorganizational interaction. While the Emerson et al. and Ansel and Gash 
frameworks are clearly multilevel, it is not clear how to overlay the frameworks on the 
recognized levels of analysis of individual, structural-organizational, interorganizational 
domain, and ecological. This reflects the challenging nature of identifying levels of 
analysis at which conceptual or statistical inferences are made in networks and 
collaboration research. 
The frameworks covered so far have placed great emphasis on the process of 
interorganizational interaction, but lesser focus on the surrounding context, antecedent 
conditions, and outcomes. A framework developed by Bryson et al. (2006) expands more 
on the other dimensions
2
 in addition to the process. The framework links antecedents—
which they call “starting conditions”—to outcomes, via two related dimensions: process, 
and structure and governance. The process dimension identifies both formal and informal 
                                                 
2
 Note: Up to this point, category was used to refer to a collection of variables organized in input, process 
or output categories. As subsequent frameworks create separate groupings of variables within categories, 
they are referred to as dimensions. 
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mechanisms for developing interorganizational agreements, leadership, legitimacy, and 
trust. They identify that managing interorganizational conflict (e.g. disagreement over 
goals, strategy, or use of resources) and planning are key elements of any 
interorganizational interaction (Bryson et al., 2006; Lai, 2012). 
In contrast to other frameworks covered, they separate out the 
structure/governance dimension from the process dimension, although a bi-directional 
arrow between the two dimensions conveys a close relationship. The structure dimension 
considers how partnering organizations are structurally arranged in their collective work, 
such as the linkages between levels of organization, or whether their interdependence is 
sequential or pooled (O'Toole, 1986). While other frameworks emphasize the self-
reinforcing relationship between individual motivation and trust, and institutional 
governance structures created in the collaboration, Bryson et al. point out the connection 
between antecedents and context. The governance structure in a collaboration could take 
one of a number of forms: hierarchically flat inclusive deliberative panels; via a powerful 
lead agency such as a government agency or major nonprofit; or via a “network 
organization” created especially for the collaboration. Bryson et al. contend that the 
matching between antecedent factors (such as stability of the policy context, turbulence 
of situation, and participants) and the particular governance structure has a major effect 
on collaborative outcomes. 
In a modification to the Bryson et al. framework, Simo and Bies (2007) look at 
the particular nature of cross-sector collaborations as an explanatory dimension for 
collaborative outcomes. Simo and Bies identify the importance of “informal sector 
involvement,” in which out of a sense of community spirit individuals and local groups 
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spontaneously organize. This localized emergent collaboration often becomes formalized, 
or strengthens the collaborative initiatives of formal organizations including government 
agencies and established nonprofits. Morris et al. (2013) pick up on this theme by 
introducing the dimension of social capital to the input—process—output framework. In 
the context of local grassroots collaborations, social capital is considered as an 
antecedent, process, and output and thus is a key explanatory factor in the self-reinforcing 
nature of the collaborative process (Wagner & Fernandez-Gimenez, 2008).  
The concept of social capital is fundamental to Thomson’s (2001) framework, 
which seeks to conceptualize and operationalize interorganizational interaction—or 
“collaboration” as she terms it—rather than describe the dynamics of interaction as other 
frameworks do. Thomson describes two competing views of collaboration in the 
literature: aggregative, in which collaboration translates private preferences into 
collective choices via a mechanism of rational utility maximization (Ostrom, 1990); and 
integrative, in which collaboration creates new shared understandings and consensus over 
compromise (March & Olsen, 2010). Underlying these collaboration mechanisms are two 
perspectives of social capital, described by Morris et al. (2013). One views social capital 
as a transactional mechanism between actors that requires mutual exchange to establish 
norms of trust and reciprocity. Another views social capital as generated in a generalized 
way from social interactions across a network (Putnam, 2000). 
Linking Back to Foundations – Ostrom’s Institutional Framework  
Social capital as the basis of collective action is also at the heart of Ostrom’s 
institutionalist framework, which is one of the most refined and general frameworks 
derived from a systems approach. Institutional approaches to political science analyze 
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how a wide variety of social interactions found in hierarchies, markets, political systems 
and societies can be described by a set of underlying components universal to all 
situations. One such component is that of the institution—formal and informal rules, 
prescriptions and structures that individuals use to organize a variety of structured 
interactions. Institutions affect the behavior of individuals by affecting the various 
incentives and constraints confronting an individual (Ostrom, 2005, 2007), and the 
development of reciprocity, reputation, and trust, which are the drivers of collective 
action (Ostrom, 1998). By adopting the basic assumptions of institutionalism and systems 
theory, Ostrom led a research effort to develop multilevel frameworks and conceptual 
language to describe the fundamental components of social interactions, whether market 
or hierarchy (Seidl, Becker, & Luhmann, 2005). 
The basic conceptual template is a systems framework that describes a process of 
social interaction affected by inputs and contexts, and leading to certain outcomes, which 
then become part of the inputs in a cyclical fashion (Figure 2-2). In true systems fashion, 
this template is “nested” at different levels depending on the scale of the participants (e.g. 
from individual to nation state) and the type of rules governing the situation (from 
“operational rules” to “constitutional rules”). The most important part of the framework 
is arguably the basic process unit of social interaction called an “action arena,” which 
refers to the social space in which individuals interact, exchange resources, and enact or 
resolve conflicts. Using a rational actor assumption and game-theoretic reasoning where 
actors rationally evaluate costs and benefits of their actions and expected outcomes, 
Ostrom surmised that any collective interaction situation could be generalized by looking 
at seven core variables: the involved participants; their positions; their potential 
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outcomes; the link between their actions and outcomes; the various controls that 
participants exercise; the types of information generated; and the costs and benefits 
assigned to actions and outcomes (Ostrom, 2007). 
Figure 2-2: Ostrom's institutional analysis and development framework 
 
New institutionalism is a foundation of Ostrom’s collective action framework. 
This theory presumes that actors are rational and self-interested, but that their perception 
of what is optimal is affected by a surrounding institutional context. Moreover, in 
situations where no external authority is present to resolve problems or coordinate action, 
actors create new institutions in the form of rules, sanctions and monitoring systems in 
order to govern self-organized collective action (Ostrom, 2007). A problem with previous 
rational theories and economically-focused game theoretical models of collective action, 
was that they failed to explain why rational actors create self-governing systems in the 
first place, when in many cases a better option would be to “defect” and act purely in 
their own self-interest (M. Olsen, 1965; Ostrom, 1990). 
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Ostrom showed that this “institutional supply” problem, coupled with the 
interrelated problems of development mutual monitoring and credible commitments, 
could be solved by face-to-face communications involving discussion about the 
governance system of rules and monitoring. Face-to-face communication builds trust, 
which increases the propensity of actors to commit to a governance system. Once the 
governance system of joint-decision making, mutual monitoring, and administrative 
implementation is established and continued, participants experience joint benefits. 
Successful governance systems continue, while others are either discarded or adapted. 
This evolutionary adaptation of governance systems, in effect, increases trust between 
participants. Ostrom found that, providing a minimal amount of face-to-face 
communication occurred, governance systems transform into trusted institutions. This 
explains why, in general, stronger governance and administrative systems in 
interorganizational interactions are associated with great norms of trust and reciprocity. 
Likewise, while an antecedent to interorganizational interaction is known to be 
“problem” interdependence (Emerson et al., 2012; Gray, 1985; Trist, 1977), once 
participants jointly develop governance and administration arrangements a new form of 
interdependence emerges. First, as a governance system is created, participants face 
increasing psychological sanctions for defection from a collective action, where breaking 
commitments is viewed very negatively in a group setting (Ostrom, 2007). Second, 
entering into a shared governance and administration system involves transaction costs, 
which represent a deterrent to leaving the system especially when significant time and 
resources have been committed. Finally, increasing development of joint decision making 
and administrative processes enables participants to better identify opportunities where 
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resources can be shared. Thus interorganizational interaction is stimulated by resource 
dependence; however, in order to be activated, this dependence requires collective 
governance processes to enable resource sharing rather than purely economic 
considerations of resource exchange (Tschirhart et al., 2009).  
These basic theoretical mechanisms explained by Ostrom underpin much of the 
more recent work on interorganizational interaction frameworks. Emerson et al. (2012), 
for example, describe a “collaborative governance regime,” meaning the implicit and 
explicit principles, rules, norms, and decision-making procedures that govern actors’ 
behaviors. The collaborative governance regime is bolstered by an iterative interactive 
process in which “principled engagement” (communication), “shared motivation” (trust, 
commitment and mutuality), and “capacity for joint action” (administrative procedures) 
reinforce each other in a positive feedback loop to strengthen the institutional regime of 
collaboration. Based on this logic, Emerson et al. (2012) hypothesize that “the quality and 
extent of collaborative dynamics depends on the productive and self-reinforcing 
interactions among principled engagement, shared motivation, and the capacity for joint 
action” (p. 17).  
Ostrom’s framework works well for common-pool resource problems where the 
costs of not participating are often greater than participation. The framework relies upon 
the assumption that the above list of core variables such as costs and benefits are 
explicitly known, and that the boundaries of the collective interaction situation can be 
defined; indeed, a core prediction of the game-theoretic logic behind the framework is 
that collective action is more effective when costs are known, information is available, 
and participants can expect repeated and routinized interactions thus increasing incentive 
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to cooperate (Axelrod, 1984; Ostrom, 1990). Much of the interorganizational public 
administration literature, however, takes different starting assumptions due to the 
previously identified “wickedness” of public problems where costs and benefits are much 
harder to calculate and the constituent factors and participants of the problem situation 
are rarely stable and identified.  
While there are interorganizational interaction cases where Ostrom’s framework 
likely can be applied, public domain problems require different incentives to participate 
in collective action such as high levels of interdependence (Emery & Trist, 1965; 
Logsdon, 1991; Trist, 1977, 1983), turbulence (Bryson et al., 2006; Gray, 1989) and a 
favorable social and political climate (Mattessich et al., 2001). Furthermore, 
interorganizational interaction mechanisms, which mirror “action situations” in Ostrom’s 
framework, can be described in different ways by variables derived from other bodies of 
literature such as conflict resolution, leadership, management and stakeholder theory. 
This does not mean that the list of core variables of action situations identified by Ostrom 
are incorrect or do not apply, but that given the wicked problem situations encountered in 
public domain interorganizational research, the core variables rarely can be objectively 
identified in a useful manner. 
Theme-Based Frameworks of Interorganizational Interaction 
Other scholars do not use a systems-based approach to develop Theory of 
interorganizational interaction. The final framework covered, developed by Huxham 
(2003, 1996) and Huxham and Vangen (2000, 2005), is a “theme-based” framework. The 
core of the framework is a collection of “practitioner-generated” themes created from 
extensive grounded theory case study work of participants in interorganizational 
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interactions, which Huxham and Vangen term “collaborations.” They subsequently 
identify “cross-cutting” themes that are part of all the practitioner themes, “policy-maker” 
themes identified by policy researchers and policy makers not necessarily directly 
involved in the collaborations, and “researcher-generated” themes such as social capital, 
which academic researchers identify as important but are not necessarily identified by 
practitioners. The work by Huxham and Vangen does not specify detailed dynamic 
processes nor suggest causal linkages, but instead intuitively maps out the conceptual 
landscape of interorganizational interaction by identifying and describing key variables of 
interest. 
One particular variable of interest with respect to the present study is that of 
membership structure in the interorganizational interaction; Huxham and Vangen identify 
three issues of ambiguity, complexity, and dynamics. They note that interactions are 
often characterized by ambiguity in membership and status, meaning that participants’ 
perceptions about the extent to which other participants are involved may vary. 
Furthermore, participants exhibit ambiguity over the extent to which an individual 
participant is acting individually or representing an organization. While many other 
frameworks and arrays define interorganizational forms, in part, by membership structure 
and type, (Keast et al., 2007), Huxham and Vangen present evidence to suggest 
otherwise. For the purposes of this study, as interorganizational interaction may be 
intrinsically different depending on the extent to which individual citizens are involved 
versus individuals acting on behalf of organizations, or citizen groups, it is important to 
sample only one kind; in this case, interaction between organizations.  
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Another key observation is the complexity of interorganizational structures, 
especially within a single policy domain. Huxham and Vangen show that often multiple 
interactions exist within any policy domain, and most have overlapping goals, structures, 
and participants. Often, interorganizational interactions evolve complex hierarchies of 
structure such as working groups, committees, and network organizations—a fact 
identified in other frameworks. Different departments within an organization may 
participate independently in the same interaction, or are involved in many different ones. 
This creates difficult sampling issues in terms of whether individuals, departments, 
organizations or collaborative groupings are the unit of analysis. This point is addressed 
in chapter 3. 
Finally, Huxham and Vangen note the dynamic nature of membership. Many 
scholars identify increasing membership stability as a feature of increasing 
interorganizational interaction (Keast et al., 2007; McNamara, 2012), or assume stable 
membership in the cyclical trust-commitment feedback loops (Ansel & Gash, 2007; Ring 
& Van de Ven, 1994). Huxham and Vangen point out that inevitably, people change jobs, 
organizations send different staff to the interaction on different days, and organizations 
face other pressures that affect their involvement. They contend that dynamic variation in 
membership affects the interorganizational interaction purpose and creates a situation of 
continual negotiation and renegotiation of aims and goals. While interorganizational 
interactions with stable memberships can be found, care is needed in research as 
application of many of the systems frameworks requires an assumption of stable 
membership. 
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Conclusions – Interorganizational Interaction Frameworks  
Several conclusions can be drawn from this review of interorganizational 
interaction frameworks. First, they reflect a fundamental point about the complexity of 
collective action. Most frameworks are constructed in input—process—output form with 
multiple possible hypotheses linking variables and feedback loops between dimensions, 
demonstrating that collective action situations are complex adaptive systems. Various 
scholars have considered the implications of this in organizational terms (Anderson, 
1999; Bovaird, 2008; Buijs, 2010; Innes & Booher, 2010; Thietart & Forgues, 1995). 
Multiorganizational systems tend to exhibit chaotic (unpredictable but not random) 
behavior as a result of counteracting forces such as the autonomy tension between 
individual or organizational goals and those of the interorganizational form (Thietart & 
Forgues, 1995). Positive feedback loops between interorganizational dimensions and 
variables creates nonlinear relationships, meaning caution must be applied when 
attempting to use linear regression modeling to test hypotheses (Aydinoglu, 2010). Stable 
equilibrium states such as regular stakeholder meetings may develop but are highly 
sensitive to contextual conditions (Bryson et al., 2006; Van Buuren & Gerrits, 2008)  
Consequently, as a result of the multiplicity of variables, their potential 
combinations and dynamic iteration, organizations and derivative interorganizational 
groupings exhibit action irreversibility such that encountering the same situation and 
combination of factors more than once is unlikely (Thietart & Forgues, 1995). This 
emphasizes the importance of rigorous case study research, however, as was realized in 
earlier strands of policy implementation research (Goggin, 1986; O'Toole, 2000), 
complexity and an abundance of variables does not make cumulative and generalized 
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research a hopeless endeavor as the various frameworks show broadly similar findings 
and prioritize important factors. 
Second, in conceptual terms all frameworks suggest relationships between levels 
of analysis. In many cases, positive feedback loops generate emergent characteristics in 
which aggregate, higher level characteristics are generated from a complex interactions of 
individual level factors such as the link between individual trust and organizational level 
structures created during interorganizational interaction. However, this is also an 
indication of institutionalism. Apart from the special case of conflicts over common pool 
resources, which have particular dynamics and outcomes (Ostrom, 1990), in situations 
where stakeholders are interdependent and face a common and individually unresolvable 
problem, certain interorganizational interactions tend to develop features of organization 
(regular meetings, aspects of hierarchy, division of labor) reflecting the pervasive 
institutional norm of organization as a way to achieve collective goals in unstable or 
unordered situations (Thacher, 2004). 
Third, inherent in the basic systems structure of most frameworks is adaptation 
and iteration, allowing for changes in processes, participants and governance structures as 
a situation changes. While the frameworks specify little about how this adaptation might 
unfold, other scholars have described a series of first, second, and third order effects that 
result from higher intensity interaction (collaborative) activities. Innes and Booher 
(1999), for example, describe first order effects as collaborative outputs as per many of 
the frameworks: creation of social capital, robust agreements, innovative solutions, or 
stable collaborative organizations. Second order effects are similar to the collaborative 
impacts described by Emerson et al. (2012): changes in original contexts, offshoot 
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partnerships arising as a result of increasing network density, or changes in practices and 
perceptions (Bryson et al., 2006). Finally, third order effects may emerge after some time 
and include new cultural or societal norms about conflict resolution and deliberative 
planning. This suggests that second and third order effects may be an “indicator” of 
collaboration, an observation that is missing from the interorganizational interaction 
literature reviewed in the next section. 
Fourth, the frameworks have little utility in defining interorganizational 
interaction terms, with the exception of Thomson (2001). All the frameworks could apply 
at different levels of interorganizational interaction, and some are explicitly intended to 
capture the whole life cycle of interorganizational interaction from birth to dissolution. 
The basic self-reinforcing feedback loops show how these collective action situations 
form with limited levels of interaction (i.e. “deconfliction” or “cooperation”) and then 
ratchet up all the way to full collaboration—a much higher intensity of interaction. While 
this is not necessarily a problem in terms of the frameworks, there is an inconsistency 
with the body of work on interorganizational interaction arrays, which ascribe specific 
operationalizations to common terms such as coordination, cooperation or collaboration. 
In some cases, a more appropriate and general name for many of the “collaboration” 
frameworks reviewed may be “interorganizational interaction” framework.  
Fifth, while most frameworks intend to be general, the dynamic of 
interorganizational interaction is affected by context, specifically the nature and 
organizational level of participants, the scale of the policy problem, and the membership 
size of the interaction. For interactions involving organizations rather than individual 
citizens, the organizational hierarchical level at which a framework applies is not 
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specified. In the array literature, for example, lower levels of interaction (cooperation) are 
distinguished from higher levels (collaboration) by the involvement of more senior staff 
or denser interactions from working level up to leadership level. Some frameworks may 
apply only to leadership (Ansel & Gash, 2007), but then other frameworks explicitly spell 
out roles for all participants (Gray, 1989). While there is no conclusive evidence from the 
literature and further research is needed, the case may be that regardless of level in the 
hierarchy, drivers and mechanisms of interorganizational interaction are similar, with the 
exception that higher up levels tend to have greater authority to commit resources.  
Another issue affecting interorganizational interaction dynamics is the importance 
of the scale of the policy problem and the way participants “interface” with the problem. 
Morris et al. (2013), for example, points out that the failures of collaborative efforts in 
Chesapeake Bay restoration projects may stem from the large number of organizations 
involved, the large geographic area over which the problem exists, and the very broad 
policy problem. This is in contrast to successful efforts to restore the rivers in the 
Hampton Roads area, which involved locally-based groups, smaller numbers of 
organizations and individuals, and thus allowed social capital to be a “gluing” mechanism 
of collaboration. While some of the array literature has attempted to include 
characteristics of the policy problem into a definition of interorganizational interactions, 
it is unclear the extent to which the frameworks reviewed apply across varying 
geographic, financial or impact scales of policy problems.   
The final conclusion concerns the state of Theory in collaboration literature. This 
review started out by selecting “frameworks,” with a general observation that most do not 
meet the set of five criteria for theory presented by Blomquist (2007) and Schlager 
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(2007): specification of boundaries and scope of inquiry; assumptions about individual 
actors; a mechanism for collective grouping; links to the wider context / environment; 
and a mechanism for system change. A closer inspection shows that while none of the 
frameworks other than Ostrom’s meets the five criteria, some do come close, as 
illustrated in Table 2-2. Ostrom’s framework is not considered as theory, however, as it is 
“empty” of specific hypotheses linking variables (Ostrom, 2007). 
Table 2-2: Assessment of theoretical potential of interorganizational interaction 
frameworks 
 Selection of frameworks reviewed 




































































































Boundaries / scope 
of inquiry 
  X    X 
Assumption about 
individual 
  X   X X 
Mechanism for 
collective action 
X X X X  X X 
Link to wider 
context 
X X   X X X 
Mechanisms for 
system change 
X X  X X X X 
 
Several scholars note that the particular type of collaboration (Gray, 1989) or the 
particular organizational forms that emerge from the process (Bryson et al., 2006) depend 
strongly on the localized context such as the nature of the participants or the stability of 
the policy domain. Thus for a framework or theory to meet the above five-fold criteria 
would require a typology of cases, pairing up combinations of participants, situation type, 
policy domain, and other contextual factors, with different forms of frameworks. This 
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conclusion points towards the tension between creating generalized mechanisms of 
interorganizational interaction versus highly specific cases that enumerate all possible 
combinations of inputs, processes, and outputs. This may explain why many scholars 
either develop high level frameworks, or pick out specific variables for study and create 
highly specific “models,” which look at one or two particular relationships from a 
framework under particular cases. In sum, developing Theory of interorganizational 
interaction is very challenging. 
Another related Theory aspect concerns the paradigmatic basis of the frameworks. 
With the exception of Huxham’s, all are generally functionalist—they assume objective 
reality and tangible variables. Huxham, however, opens the door for a social 
constructivist perspective, noting that interorganizational interactive dynamics depends 
largely on the perceptions of participants. All the frameworks treat interorganizational 
forms as an open system, as defined by W. R. Scott (2003), yet they emphasize natural 
and rational aspects to varying extents. While Thomson (2001), for example, specifies 
explicit operationalizations of governance and administration structures as intrinsic to the 
collaborative process, Gray (1989) emphasizes human relations aspects such as the 
legitimacy and power balance of participants, and the importance of the convener and 
mediator roles in collaboration. 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) postulate that the reasons for such diversity of 
Theory lie in the different backgrounds and experiences of the theoreticians: rational 
theorists typically have managerial or engineering backgrounds, while natural theorists 
tend to be academics. W. R. Scott (2003) notes that the type of organization that theorists 
study is important. Rational theorists typically study business firms or government 
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bureaucracies, while natural theorists study voluntary, service or community 
organizations. Continuing the example above, Thomson, who trained at a mainstream 
public administration school, developed her framework by studying a major nationwide 
nonprofit organization; Gray, who was an organizational behavior theorist, developed her 
work from studying conflict situations in local community problems. 
While these observations may be unsurprising, they highlight an important point 
with regard to the interorganizational interaction frameworks. Rational paradigms are 
intuitively applicable to stable interorganizational forms, while natural paradigms fit with 
dynamically varying or less-structured groupings. The interorganizational interaction 
frameworks do not specify their limits of applicability in terms of the various actors 
constituting the interaction, the stability of participation, or the dynamic variation in 
system context. The case may be that interorganizational interactions between 
government bureaucracies, with all other things equal, are more likely to recreate 
signatures of hierarchy during the interaction as observed by Bardach (1998), in 
comparison to interactions between local community groups and individuals. This 
highlights the limits of generalized frameworks, as the dynamic unfolding of a 
interorganizational interaction over time may vary quite considerably depending on the 
history, experiences and identities of the participants. This conclusion will be revisited 
when the sample for this particular study is defined.   
Interorganizational Interaction Arrays 
Organizations are intricate systems composed of multiple social structures, 
participants, goals, and technologies, interacting with the external environment and 
exhibiting complex individual and group behaviors. From this initial description, scholars 
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have identified many distinct “dimensions” of organizations that merit study and often 
form the basis of entire disciplines. Rainey (2003), for example, identifies key 
dimensions as: goals, values, leadership, strategy, culture, organization type, hierarchical 
structure, processes, tasks, technologies, performance, incentives, individuals, and 
groups. Each of these dimensions can be further broken down; the dimension “structure” 
is composed of: specialization, division of responsibility, departmentalization, 
centralization, hierarchy, and formalization. 
While this list of dimensions describes a single organization, the 
interorganizational literature recognized that when organizations interact and form 
interorganizational relationships and structures, these dimensions are generally affected 
by the interaction (Whetten, 1981). Efforts to define interorganizational interaction terms 
can be considered part of this broader body of interorganizational literature, which 
attempts to create typologies and arrays of interorganizational forms using the 
organizational dimensions—with some additions particular to interorganizational 
structures—as discriminating characteristics. This section reviews important 
interorganizational interaction array work from the interorganizational and collaboration 
literatures. 





Form Type A Form Type B Form Type C… 
Dimension 1 Indicator of Dimension 
1 for Form Type A 
Indicator of Dimension 
1 for Form Type B. 
Etc. 
Dimension 2 Indicator of Dimension 
2 for Form Type A 
Etc.  
Dimension 3    
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From the literature reviewed, the scale forms of interorganizational interaction 
arrays generally have two axes as illustrated in Table 2-3. The first (horizontal) axis 
defines names for a particular interorganizational interaction, form or relationship, for 
example: collaboration, cooperation, or partnership. The second (vertical) axis contains 
the discriminating characteristics or “dimension,” for example: information, structure, 
resource, or decision-making. Each cell of the typology then describes what that 
particular dimension looks like for each interorganizational form.  
Early scholars realized that different interorganizational forms exhibit different 
processes, depending on their purpose and how they operate. As shown in Table 2-4, 
Astley and Fombrun (1983) create a typology of “forms of internal interdependence” 
based on three dimensions: resource flow through the network; form of control; and 
emergent structures of coordination. They define four general types of interorganizational 
forms or “collectives:” agglomerate, confederate, conjugate, and organic. The organic 
collective, for example, is characterized by an “indirect symbiosis” form of internal 
interdependence, where diverse types of organizations depend on the same resource pool 
for existence, such as vast spectrum of medical providers depending on the supply of sick 
people. An organic’s forms of institutional control (second dimension) is “political,” 
where the dominant regulative force between organizational interactions is the political 




Table 2-4: A typology of "ideal type" interorganizational forms adapted from Astley and 
Fombrun (1983) 
Dimensions 



































While this typology presents “ideal types” of interorganizational forms, a problem 
with this approach is that the four forms are not mutually exclusive, meaning the same 
dimension indicator can be repeated for multiple interorganizational forms (Gueguen, 
Pellegrin-Boucher, & Torres, 2006). For example, it is likely that “information flows” 
and “influence flows” would both be seen in the organic form. Categorizing 
interorganizational forms aims to support theoretical development and empirical study by 
analyzing which forms lead to certain outcomes or behaviors, yet non-mutually exclusive 
independent variables (the interorganizational forms) negatively impact a typology’s 
empirical utility (Smith & Larimer, 2009). While Astely and Fombrun describe the cells 
as representing “dominant” aspects of each interorganizational form, the dimensions are 
not practicable for rigorous empirical research.  
Gray (1989), in her influential book on interorganizational relationships, which 
she terms as “collaborations,” again emphasizes that the characteristics of 
interorganizational forms vary depending on context, and that the form eventually affects 
 69 
outcomes. As show in Table 2-5, she defines four interorganizational forms or 
“collaborations” first by the function that they perform, and secondly by the possible 
outcomes that may result.  









































An “exploratory” collaboration may occur as one of the first activities between 
organizations in order to acknowledge interdependence between actors, establish trust 
and conduct initial problem scoping to “formulate the mess” (Ackoff, 1974). “Advisory” 
collaborations extend these functions and identify solutions. “Confederative” 
collaborations consider implementation of solutions, and may start to exchange resources 
to do so and develop increasingly formalized agreements. Finally, “contractual” 
collaborations see a high level of formalized solution implementation with legally 
binding contracts. A research and development consortia of industry and academic 
organizations is an example of a contractual collaborative, in which participants develop 
 70 
legal contracts about profits and copyright, but also complex formal and informal rules 
about how participating organizations interaction. 
Employing the function or purpose to discriminate interorganizational forms such 
as in the Gray typology is useful to allow a researcher to relate interorganizational 
interaction directly to the context of the situation or environment, and this approach has 
been employed in many typologies and scales of interaction. From a review of 36 
environmental management case studies, Margerum (2008) constructs a typology of three 
interorganizational forms: action, organizational, and policy “collaboratives,” according 
to whether the main reason for interaction between organizations is to act directly, change 
organizations’ policies about a collective problem, or attempt to change government 
policy concerning the problem. In a similar vein, Alter and Hage (1993) identify different 
“coordination methods” depending on whether the interaction is for policy making, 
administration, or operations. In a more detailed analysis, Aiken et al. (1985) note that the 
comprehensiveness, accessibility and compatibility of an interorganizational form 
depends on whether the purpose of interaction is for coordinating programs, resources, 
suppliers, consumers or information. More recently, Donahue and Zeckhauser (2011) 
organize their analysis on whether collaboration is for the purpose of improving 
productivity, gaining information, increasing legitimacy, or sharing resources. As will be 
discussed later, however, while this approach is useful in some respects, attempting to 
define interaction terms using dimensions of function, purpose or outcomes introduces 
logical errors. 
Gray, Aiken and Margerum do not elaborate further on the discriminating 
dimensions of interorganizational forms, making it challenging to use their typologies 
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other than for initial theory development. Gray, however, introduces the notion that 
interorganizational interactions become “progressively more institutionalized” (Gray, 
1989, p. 240) proceeding from exploratory to contractual forms. That different 
interorganizational forms exhibit different “intensities” of interaction is the foundation 
for another influential early work on interorganizational theory: Organizations Working 
Together by Alter and Hage (1993).  
Building from the Astley and Fombrun (1983) typology, Alter and Hage (1993) 
start with a “form of interdependence” dimension with two values of competitive and 
symbiotic—the justification being that organizations in symbiotic relationships have 
much different logics and more opportunity for interaction compared to competitive 
relationships. As shown in Table 2-6 they add another dimension with two categories 
based on the number of partnering organizations (dyadic / triadic interactions, or 
multisectoral / networks), given strong findings from interorganizational relations 
literature noting that collectivities with few members exhibit much greater tendency for 
self-interested behaviors. They use these four basic combinations to define the nature of 
three types of interorganizational forms: limited, moderate, and broad “cooperation.” 
Alter and Hage’s work, which established the idea that interorganizational interaction 
occurred on a scale of “intensity” or magnitude, led to subsequent efforts to classify 




Table 2-6: A typology of interorganizational interaction adapted from Alter and Hage 
(1993) 
Dimensions Extent of Interorganizational Interaction 
Form of 
Interdependence 








Competitive Dyadic / Triadic Descriptors of Interorganizational forms such as: joint 
ventures, partnerships, contractual relationships, social 
networks, systematic production networks,  
Multisectoral 
Symbiotic Dyadic / Triadic 
Multisectoral 
 
Empirical research on interorganizational interaction is challenging because 
interorganizational forms evolve considerably with time and many organizational 
behaviors are affected by social constructions (Ansel & Gash, 2007; Lincoln, 1985). 
Many of the typologies reviewed attempt to classify interorganizational forms into 
categories based on simple characteristics with qualitative values (e.g. network strength 
as “high” or “low”), yet network strength may vary considerably over time, or may be 
measured in different ways by different observers. Such inconsistencies diminish the 
empirical utility of the early interorganizational interaction arrays. 
Later efforts by McNamara (2012), Williams (2010), and Keast et al. (2007) for 
example, include mixes of objective organizational characteristics in addition to more 
general qualitative dimensions. These interorganizational interaction arrays, in effect, 
provide “snapshots” of complex and dynamic interaction processes and give reasonable 
indicators about the level of interaction, without overly specifying structural details. In 
reality, the particular choice of name for an interorganizational form—whether 
“cooperation” or “collaboration”—is largely arbitrary; what is important is how the 
dimensions change for that particular form, and what this signifies for an organization. 
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While the arrays do not spell out these implications in detail, they provide a starting 
point. 
The most developed interorganizational interaction array to date is McNamara 
(2012), from her Ph.D. dissertation (McNamara, 2008) building on prior work by Fagan 
(1997), Mattessich et al. (2001), Diehl (2005); Edmondson (2006); Thatcher (2007). 
McNamara defines three levels of interaction—cooperation, coordination, and 
collaboration—and ten dimensions: design of administrative structures supporting the 
collective efforts; formality of the agreement determining roles and responsibilities; 
organizational autonomy; key personnel who have responsibility for implementing the 
partnership; information sharing; decision making; the extent to which there is a process 
for resolution of turf issues; resource allocation; systems thinking; and trust. 
Some scholars use characteristics of the context or situation in which 
interorganizational interaction takes place to define the extent of interaction. For 
example, the McNamara (2008) typology has additional dimensions over her later 2012 
version, including: duration of interaction (time); difficulty of task; and impetus for 
collective action. Moore and Koontz (2003) create a typology based on the type of 
participant to the interaction: agency, citizen, or mixed. While these dimensions have 
descriptive utility, using them to define the interorganizational form is a logical fallacy—
equivalent to defining a river by the presence of a valley: a valley is a sufficient condition 
for a river, but it is not necessary. Similarly, those typologies that incorporate antecedents 
and outcomes of interorganizational interaction suffer from the same logic error. For 
example, the Margerum typology discriminates interorganizational forms on the basis of 
whether the goal of participating organizations is to act directly, change organizations’ 
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policies about a collective problem, or change government policy concerning the problem 
area. It stands to reason that any collective effort could have all three or none of these 
goals. A more rigorous approach may involve restricting definitions to those dimensions 
relating to the interorganizational form itself, and those relating to the organizations 
involved in the partnership.  
Comparing the interorganizational interaction arrays reviewed, it is possible to 
classify the various dimensions used into three categories: dimensions relating to the 
context or environment in which the interorganizational interaction occurs; dimensions 
relating to the interacting organizations; and dimensions relating to the actual 
interorganizational form itself. For example, the dimensions of “organizational 
autonomy” and “key personnel” are clearly from the perspective of the organization, 
whereas “formalized agreements” relates only to the interorganizational form. Table 2-7 
arranges the dimensions in the interorganizational interaction arrays reviewed according 
to these three categorizations. In effect, Table 2-7 lays out all the various dimensions by 
which any interorganizational form such as collaboration could be defined. 
Conclusions – Interorganizational Interaction Arrays 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this review of interorganizational 
interaction arrays. First, as observed in the comparison in Table 2-8 the terms chosen for 
various forms of interorganizational interaction are arbitrary and their acceptance is a 
matter of convention. This explains, for example, how Himmelman (2002) considers 
networking as the most informal and limited interorganizational interaction, whereas 
Mandell and Steelman (2003) define it almost oppositely as the most intense and 
comprehensive interaction. 
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Table 2-7: Summary of interorganizational interaction array dimensions arranged in 
three categories 
Dimensions Relating to Context, 
Situation, Antecedents or 
Outcomes 
Dimensions Relating to 
Structural and Behavioral 








Time required for problem 
solution 
Length of time problem has 
existed 
Complexity of problem domain 
Antecedents to collective action 
(e.g. extent of history of prior  
work together; extent to which 
an organization is well-known 
in problem domain) 
Function of II (e.g. information 
exchange, production, 
resolving conflict, planning, 
analysis, evaluation) 
Type of goods produced by II 
(public, private, common-
pool) 
Intended outcomes of II (e.g. 
policy change, rule change, 
direct action) 
Type of organization involved 
(e.g. government, nonprofit, 




Number of participating 
organizations 
Level of staff participating in II 
(e.g. leadership, junior, 
working level) 
Type of interdependence 
between organizations (e.g. 
organizations could achieve 
goals without II, or require II 
to achieve goals) 
Organizational autonomy 













Time duration of II 
Frequency of II 
Differential of level of staff 
engaged in interaction (e.g. 
manager-manager; CEO-
manager; CEO-CEO) 
Design of interorganizational 
infrastructure 
Formality of interorganizational 
agreement 
Extent of information sharing 
Decision Making 
Resource allocation 
Resolution of turf issues 
Culture 
 
A. Organization is understood in a conventional “rational” perspective with boundaries defined by the hierarchical 
structure (i.e. org chart). 
B. The dimensions belonging under the II column are those that emerge out of the interaction, and are not 
something that can be measured meaningfully in the participating organizations. 
C. Italic text denotes that the dimension can be categorized under two columns, depending on how it is defined. 
D. This dimension is not placed in the “organization” column as it is not a structural or behavioral characteristic. 
That is, while different types of organization will vary in structural forms, the impact of organization type on II is 




Apart from the recent exceptions of McNamara (2008), Thatcher (2007) and 
Thomson et al. (2009), definitions created by dictionary writers and many scholars are 
generally conceptually constructed by thinking, rather than taxonomically generated from 
categorization based on empirical observations (Bailey, 1994; Smith, 2002). What is 
more important is understanding how the various dimensions pair together in certain 
combinations and what effects these have on outcomes. It is useful for future research, 
however, to create standardization in the usage of terms.  
Second, a repeated notion is that interorganizational interactions exist on a 
“continuum” characterized by both increasing magnitude of implications for partnering 
organizations and increasing formalization and interdependence of the emergent 
interorganizational form. In most cases, however, this continuum is “quantized” such 
that, with some exceptions, dimensions have a discrete number of values. While some 
continuum approaches have used the term “maturity” to describe the increasing 
interorganizational interactions that occur from cooperation to collaboration (Alberts & 
Hayes, 2007; NATO, 2006), “maturity” suggests both elements of quality and superiority 
and implies that moving up the scale of interaction is preferable. Many studies suggest, 
however, that operating at the highest level is not appropriate for all situations (Chisholm, 
1992; Mattessich et al., 2001). Although the term magnitude can be misconstrued to 
imply quantity, this is not the intent. Interaction magnitude is meant to convey that the 
magnitude of the impact on partnering organizations will be greater at higher levels of 
interaction. 
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Table 2-8: Comparison of terminology used for interorganizational forms in typologies 
Author Terminology Used for 
Interorganizational Forms 
(presented in order of lower 
to higher intensity) 
Discriminating Dimensions 





Form of interdependence (competitive or 
symbiotic); number of partnering organizations (2 







Vision and relationships; structure, responsibilities 
and communication; authority and accountability; 













Temporary task force 




Extent to which problem orientation is individual or 
shared; commitment to goal (common or 
separate); intensity of linkages (loose or tight); 
breadth of effort (narrow or comprehensive); 
complexity of purpose; scope of effort 





Purpose; strategies and tasks; leadership and 
decision making; interpersonal and 
communication. 
Note – Gajda consider all these levels as forms of 
collaboration 









Not specified; the spectrum of interaction is used to 
compare a several other typologies (cite). 





Goals of interaction; perspectives of participants 
about these goals; stability of structural linkages; 
formality of connections; risks and rewards of 
participation 
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Author Terminology Used for 
Interorganizational Forms 
(presented in order of lower 







Reciprocity; extent of interaction between 
organizations; purpose of interaction; decision 
making format; types of relationships between 
organizations and individuals; action; skills; 
participation (nature of leadership); mechanism of 
leadership; technology of communications 














Organizational structure; communications; 
information sharing; decision making; operating 
procedures; authority and accountability; culture 






Design of administrative structures; formality of 
agreements; organizational autonomy; key 
personnel; information sharing; decision making; 
resolution of turf issues; resource allocation; 
systems thinking; trust 
 
Third, an observation unexamined in the literature is that interorganizational 
arrays represent a morphological field, that is, a way of displaying all the possible 
combinations of dimensions that could occur (Ritchey, 2006, 2011). Continuums of 
interaction lead to the conclusion that cooperation is defined by the occurrence of all the 
dimensional indicators at that level, yet this may not be the case. Many situations could 
occur where dimensions A and B indicate a high level of interaction (i.e. collaboration), 
but dimensions C and D indicate a low level of interaction (i.e. coordination). The 
interorganizational interaction arrays do not tell us how to define this state. Furthermore, 
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the evolution of an interorganizational interaction through time may see ebbs and flows 
of interaction intensity, a fact not captured by arrays. 
While arrays represent a useful abstraction or conceptual tool, they mask the 
complex reality of interorganizational interaction, as hinted at by the framework 
literature. Other research has suggested that cross-level combinations are indeed possible. 
In an emerging field of research on interorganizational team working, scholars have 
developed a theory of knotworking—a combination of networks and tight collaborative 
“knots”—in which collaboration exists but only for short timescales and with 
fragmentary ties between participants (Engestrom, 2005). In other research using a 
network perspective, Herranz defines a typology of “network coordination” (Herranz, 
2008, 2009, 2010a). He shows that depending on the “strategic orientation” of network 
actors (the extent to which actors prefer collective action to be conducted 
bureaucratically, entrepreneurially, or community-focused), the form of “coordination” 
displays differing combinations of dimension, which do not correspond with the levels of 
interaction reviewed thus far. Further research is needed about the possible combinations 
that could occur in reality, versus those that are theoretically or logically excluded 
(McNamara, 2012). 
The final conclusion concerns the paradigm of interorganizational interaction 
arrays. Given the basic purpose of an array is to classify concepts and generate rigorous 
definitions for terms, all the arrays assume an objective functionalist paradigm. They aim 
to give descriptive indicators or “snapshots” of how various levels or forms of 
interorganizational interaction are operationalized in terms of key organizational 
dimensions, in addition to some emergent characters of the interorganizational form. 
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Typologies and continuums of interaction cannot be considered as “theory” per se, as 
they say little about the particular level of analysis—although most seem to cover 
multiple levels—and cannot be easily classified as rational or natural systems. They 
provide a starting point, however, for the organization of key variables and suggest some 
important hypotheses, when examined with the collaboration framework literature in 
mind. 
Comparing Frameworks and Arrays 
The main body of this literature review has focused on interorganizational 
interaction frameworks and definitional arrays from contemporary public administration 
scholarship and antecedent works in organizational science. For this chapter, three 
questions guided the review: how is interorganizational interaction defined and 
conceptualized; which theoretical perspectives inform these conceptualizations; and how 
are different interorganizational forms distinguished from each other? The following 
conclusions first compare the literature on frameworks and typologies, then reflect on the 
broader aspects of the definitional questions by applying organizational and network 
lenses. 
As the mainstay of contemporary interorganizational interaction research in 
public administration relies either on frameworks or arrays, a comparison between the 
two is pertinent. This comparison, which is summarized in Table 2-9, highlights the 
strengths and limitations of each approach. It is not intended to be evaluative as both the 
framework and typological approaches have theoretical and practical utility depending on 
the circumstances and particular research questions. 
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Table 2-9: Comparison of conclusions from review of frameworks and arrays 
Interorganizational Interaction Frameworks Interorganizational Interaction Arrays 
Illustrate the complexity of collective action: 
chaotic, nonlinear processes, with action 
irreversibility 
Portray linear steps between stages or levels of 
interaction; assumes collaboration or other 
levels are repeatable or standard forms of 
interaction 
Postulate causal relationships between levels of 
analysis, and between multiple variables 
Causality is not directly specified 
Dimension indicators for each stage of interaction 
are correlated as a result of the typology 
structure 
Interorganizational interaction processes adapt to 
context and lead to broader impacts 
Adaptation is not considered 
Definition of interorganizational interaction levels 
remain ambiguous 
Very specific about definitions of interaction 
terms, though the choice of term is ultimately 
arbitrary 
Present a “quantized” continuum of interaction, 
but in reality represent a morphological field 
with multiple possible combinations 
Ambiguous about the extent to which frameworks 
can be applied at different organizational levels 
(e.g. leadership level or street level), or in 
different contexts (e.g. for policy change, 
implementation, temporary emergencies)  
Very specific, in certain cases, about applicability 
to different organizational levels and contexts 
 
First, as a basic consequence of systems-based construction with feedback loops 
and adaptation, frameworks emphasize the complexity of collective action. While certain 
patterns in interorganizational interaction processes can be observed and predicted, 
emergent behavior and the fact that each case of interorganizational interaction is slightly 
different makes theoretical generalizability and conceptual operationalization 
challenging. In contrast, many arrays assume that stable—and thus presumably 
repeatable—characteristics of interorganizational interaction exist. Furthermore, while 
frameworks stress the dynamic, iterative and adaptive nature of interorganizational 
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interaction, arrays say little about adaptation, nor the conditions under which a shift from 
one level of interaction to another would occur. This does not intend to imply that 
developers of arrays fail to recognize this important point, but simply that arrays are 
limited by their structure in what can be represented. 
Second, frameworks and arrays differ in the extent to which they capture 
relationships between interorganizational interaction input, process and output variables. 
Arrays suggest relationships between variables in the sense that “collaboration” or other 
interaction terms are defined by the simultaneous presence of disparate indicators of 
variables (i.e. dimensions) at the same level of interaction. In contrast, frameworks 
hypothesize specific relationships between variables, often at different levels of analysis. 
Frameworks offer descriptions of process, while in general, arrays cannot capture the 
process aspect of interorganizational interaction particularly well. 
Third, frameworks are ambiguous about the extent of their applicability to 
different organizational levels (from the leadership level where interorganizational 
interaction is governed, to the “street-level” where implementation actually happens), or 
in different contexts such as situation type or the purpose of interorganizational 
interaction (e.g. for policy change, implementation, temporary emergencies). In contrast, 
arrays clearly specify the level of applicability in organizational terms, and often build 
context into the construction of the array—even though this creates situations of non-
mutually exclusive distinctions between different levels of interaction. 
Finally, while arrays offer definitional operationalizations of interaction terms as 
a result of their intrinsic purpose, frameworks have less utility in this area. Many of the 
frameworks specify processes that span multiple levels of interaction, meaning they apply 
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equally to coordination and collaboration. Furthermore, some frameworks imply 
dynamically varying combinations of dimensions across interaction terms that are 
undefined by the arrays, such a combination of several dimensions of cooperation with 
several of collaboration.  
A Sidebar on Networks 
The Theoretical findings developed so far in this literature review permit a short 
diversion, which, while not explicitly related to the main aim of this research, is 
important enough in the grand scheme of the literature to consider. One of the major 
difficulties in scholarly research on interorganizational interaction in general, and 
collaboration in particular, is that a significant parallel literature exists on networks. This 
parallel literature develops many of the same conclusions and employs similar research 
tools, yet often creates confusion due to overlapping perspectives on interorganizational 
interaction and general use of terminology. A further difficulty is that both network and 
collaboration literatures draw from organizational theory. One of the guiding questions 
presented at the start of this literature review asked how different forms of 
interorganizational or collective interaction can be distinguished from one another. The 
analysis presented so far allows us to consider how “network” can be reconciled with the 
continuum of interaction, focusing on collaboration first. This analysis will be reflected 
upon again later, in the conclusions for the overall study.   
Differentiating between collaboration and network is challenging: both concepts 
share an intertwined development with significant interchange of terminology in the 
literature (Börzel, 1998; Rethemeyer & Hatmaker, 2008). Similarly, the underpinning 
paradigmatic and theoretical perspectives of both collaboration and networks overlap 
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considerably. Networks can be defined and characterized by the same set of dimensions 
presented in Table 2-7, however, additional characteristics are required, such as whether 
connections are between different levels of government (federal, state, local), 
organizational hierarchy (leadership, management, working level), sectors (private, 
nonprofit, government), or policy domain (T. E. Hall & O'Toole, 2004). To distinguish 
fully between network and collaboration concepts in a rigorous manner would require 
another analysis of similar length to the present study; nevertheless, some key conceptual 
overlaps can be observed. It should be noted that given the lack of synthesis of 
collaboration and network perspectives in the literature, the following is primarily an 
exercise in conceptual scoping; an effort to identify some basic conceptual similarities. 
Recently, several reviews have summarized the literature from the perspective of 
networks and presented several categories of approaches to network research (Borgatti & 
Foster, 2003). In one approach, networks are viewed as structure: a framework of 
connections between actors, either organizations or individuals, often in the context of a 
particular policy domain such as water or climate policy (Ingold, 2011). Network 
topology is examined as an explanatory variable in how actors, groups and the network 
overall behaves (Coleman, 1990). Another approach emphasizes the connections between 
network actors by focusing on the resources, both physical and social that flow within the 
network, as an explanatory factor (Borgatti & Cross, 2003). In collaboration, or 
interorganizational interaction more generally, both structural and connectionist 
perspectives are important and are required as an intrinsic part of collaboration 
frameworks and associated theory. 
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It is possible to characterize the continuum of interorganizational interaction 
covered in this chapter in terms of structural and connectionist network parameters, with 
an important caveat. Given the inherent construction of interorganizational interaction 
arrays, descriptors such as “coordination,” “cooperation” and “collaboration” cannot be 
applied to networks in the same way as averaged network parameters such as centrality, 
density or complexity. Interorganizational interaction arrays and the terms that they 
define are applicable either from the perspective of a single actor (i.e. how any given 
organization views dyadic relationships with other organizations), or generally to a 
collectivity of first-degree network connections. They do not describe the general 
behavior of a total network, and thus apply only to a specific part of a network—the part 
engaging in collaboration, cooperation, or otherwise. Unfortunately, network scholars 
often confuse this issue by using “collaborative network” to refer to both a group of first 
degree connected network actors engaging in collaboration, and the broader web of n
th
-
degree connected actors (For examples of this usage see: Agranoff, 2006; Rethemeyer, 
2005; Rethemeyer & Hatmaker, 2008).  
In any given policy domain, a “latent” (Heilman et al., 1994) or “serendipitous” 
(Herranz, 2010b) network may be present in which actors with a variety of functional 
specialties are connected via first, second and third degree ties, but without centralized 
organizing forces such as formalized relationships or common problems. For any given 
group of first-degree network actors, this state can be viewed as a lower level of 
interorganizational interaction such as cooperation, where actors are not necessarily 
“working together” but are in “informal networks” that exchange resources such as 
information, without identifying common problems or losing independence (Isett et al., 
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2011). This situation is illustrated by the bottom cell in Figure 2-3. Structurally, this 
situation is characterized by an average low centrality and density across the network. 
If network actors begin to be affected by a common problem, the latent network 
may “activate” to produce a higher degree of interaction such as coordination, 
characterized by increasing formalization of relationships, more regular contacts, 
involvement of leadership and some joint decision making. As the density and strength of 
network ties increases, varieties of network governance emerge. Provan and Kenis (2008) 
describe three different forms: participant, lead organization, and network organization-
governance. Participant-governed networks do not have a separate governance entity, but 
instead rely on decentralized and individual actors to coordinate collective action in small 
groups in the network. In general, participants are equal in terms of power and are 
connected by trust. This state corresponds to the level of coordination in Figure 2-3, 
where structurally, the network is characterized by low centrality, but high density.  
Lead organization network governance occurs when a single organization—often 
a government department or nonprofit—acts as a decision focal point for the network. 
Provan and Milward (1995), for example, describe the concept of “core agency 
centrality,” in which a central government agency, a community mental health center in 
their study, “coordinates” all services of actors in a network. While a lead organization 
may provide overall network “coordination” as an output, they will likely engage in 
collaboration with first-order network actors. This network state, characterized by high 









Pictoral Representation of Network 
Collaboration High centrality 




affecting all actors 
Formalized 
governance system 
among first degree 
network ties 
 
Coordination Low centrality 








Cooperation Low centrality 
Low density of 
informal connections 
Common problem may 
affect all actors, but 
no collective 
approach is present 
 
 
In certain cases, first degree network actors may decide to form an entirely new 
organizational structure to govern the activities of the network, often called a “network 
administration organization” (NAO) (Provan & Kenis, 2008; Saz-Carranza & Ospina, 
2011). In terms of network structure, the NAO-governed network is analogous to the lead 
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organization-governed network with high centrality and density, however, the NAO can 
be interpreted as the maximum level of interorganizational interaction, which several 
scholars define as “integration” (Gajda, 2004; NATO, 2010).  
The concept of governance is especially important in the NAO-governed and lead 
organization-governed networks that display collaborative activities, which echoes the 
concern of governance in study of collaboration (Ansel & Gash, 2007; Emerson et al., 
2012). Network scholars have created various qualifier terms to attach to “network” to 
describe these states. Provan and Kenis (2008, p. 231) define “goal-directed” networks as 
“three or more legally autonomous organizations that work together to achieve not only 
their own goals but also a collective goal.” They contend that such networks require 
centralized governance, whether by lead organization or NAO, to ensure that actors 
“engage in collective and mutually supportive action, that conflict is addressed, and that 
network resources are acquired and utilized efficiently and effectively” (231), in other 
words, that collaboration occurs.  
Similarly, Isett et al. (2011, p. 162) describe “formal networks” as “multiactor 
arrangements explicitly constituted by public managers to produce and deliver public 
services.” Formal networks are governed by a variety of formalized mechanisms 
including contracts, legislation, memoranda of understanding, or joint agreements. In 
descriptive terms, it is challenging to differentiate between a collaboration and a formal 
network as described by Isett et al. 
While collaboration can be used to describe a structural configuration of actors 
bounded by a common problem situation, it is inherently a process. One possible way to 
integrate collaboration and network terminology is to view collaboration as a process 
 89 
between a subset of first degree actors embedded in a network. Labeling networks as 
“collaborative” as many scholars have done (Agranoff, 2006; Isett et al., 2011; Milward 
& Provan, 2006) should be discouraged, as collaboration can only occur in a small subset 
of a network (first degree ties) rather than more generally. If we permit the notion of 
“collaborative networks,” then presumably “cooperative networks” or “coordinative 
networks” should also be permitted: a terminological situation that could hardly be 
described as parsimonious.  
Terminology aside, collaboration and network literature draw identical findings 
when considering the connectionist approach to network analysis. Certain features of 
networks “generate” the conditions for collaboration recognized in the literature such as a 
previous history of working relations or the development of trust between actors. As Isett 
et al. (2011) note, in certain cases such as mandated interactions or emergency crisis 
situations, collaboration can occur in the absence of a network, yet in most cases, 
collaboration will have emerged from an existing network structure.  
In conclusion, collaboration can be interpreted as an organization in a state of 
organizing overlain on a network. In other words, collaboration occurs in a network, but 
is not a characteristic of a network. As the level of interaction increases between network 
actors and collective activity moves from cooperation to collaboration, organization 
within the network becomes more defined, though not necessarily in terms of hierarchy. 
The lead organization or NAO governance concepts described by Provan and Kenis 
(2008), or the formal networks of Isett et al. (2011), reflect this increasing “organization” 
at higher levels of interaction, exhibited in stronger governance mechanisms requiring 
increased trust between participants. Lower down the level of interaction, the network is 
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less centralized and dense. There is a pleasing symmetry with Scott’s (2003) definition of 
organizations as consisting of social structure, participants, technology, goals and 
environment. Cooperation in informal networks has all the elements in some form, with 
the exception of a shared goal. At the other end of the spectrum, collaborations or lead-
organization networks require shared goals, thus can be conceptually equated with an 
organization. 
Summary – Review of Frameworks and Arrays 
This literature review focused on how interorganizational interaction can be 
defined and conceptualized. The review highlighted the basic problems of defining 
interaction terms, then analyzed two main bodies of literature in public administration: 
frameworks, which emphasize input-process-outcome relationships and process 
dynamics; and interorganizational interaction arrays—typologies of interorganizational 
forms and scales or continuums of interaction—which describe specific construct and 
operationalizations of collaboration and interorganizational interaction more generally. A 
conclusion is drawn that while both literatures have strengths, the framework literature 
fails to incorporate the importance of context, while the array literature may oversimplify 
the true nature of interorganizational interaction. The review highlights the important 
facets of each literature and demonstrates the complexity and challenge of developing 
theory in this area.  
The purpose was not to enumerate all the possible definitions and 
conceptualizations, but to establish a “meta-theoretical” language that underlies the 
various approaches in the literature. Using these tools and the various findings from the 
review, the main subject of research can now be addressed. 
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Development of an Interorganizational Interaction Array (IIA) 
The overall purpose of this dissertation research is to investigate 
conceptualizations and operationalizations of common states of interorganizational 
interaction as described in the public administration literature, and to question the idea 
that interaction states lie on a “continuum of interaction” as presented in Figure 2-4. This 
requires the development and testing of an interorganizational interaction array 
(hereafter, IIA) that conceptualizes and operationalizes states of interaction. While the 
literature conceives of numerous possible conceptualizations of interaction states from 
two to nine distinct levels (Frey et al., 2006), this research addresses the most prevalent in 
the public administration literature, namely cooperation, coordination and collaboration. 
However, while the public administration literature uses the terminology of cooperation-
coordination-collaboration relatively consistently, there is still great variation in how the 
constructs of those interaction levels are defined. This final section of this chapter derives 
the interorganizational interaction array (IIA) used to test the research questions. 
Figure 2-4: Example continuum of interaction 
 
 
There are four research questions addressed in this dissertation:  
1. To what extent can the levels of interaction corresponding to the 
constructs of cooperation, coordination and collaboration be empirically 
observed? 
2. Are other constructs observed? 
 92 
3. Which dimensions of the interorganizational interaction array are most 
important for predicting an organization’s level of interaction in a 
multiorganizational interaction? 
4. To what extent can dimensions of the interorganizational interaction array 
be conceptualized as increasing along a continuum of interaction? 
The first research question involves empirical testing of an IIA. The most 
developed IIA to date in the literature is by McNamara (2008, 2012), which is used as a 
starting point and refined based on findings from the literature review in this chapter. The 
McNamara IIA is refined into a generalized interorganizational interaction array or 
“GIIA.” The McNamara IIA—and the GIIA refinement—specify constructs of three 
interorganizational interaction levels: cooperation, coordination, and collaboration. The 
analysis will determine whether observed clusters correspond with the interaction levels 
specified in the GIIA. In other words, will clusters corresponding to cooperation, 
coordination and collaboration be empirically observed? If the public administration 
literature is correct, then from a large sample of interorganizational interactions we would 
expect to see clusters appear as in Figure 2-5. If, however, other interaction states are 
possible, then we may see interaction states that do not correspond to the cooperation—
coordination—collaboration continuum, as presented in Figure 2-6. Such a finding would 
call into the question the basic idea of a “continuum of interaction” that is so prevalent in 
the literature.  
The second research question involves analyzing the extent to which other 
constructs of interaction levels emerge from the empirical data. In this case, an inductive 
approach will be taken to allow clustering to emerge freely from the data. The third 
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research question asks to what extent certain dimensions of the GIIA are important in 
distinguishing clear constructs of interaction levels. Various sensitivity analysis 
techniques will be employed to the clustering solutions obtained in both research 
questions one and two. The final research question examines whether a “continuum of 
interaction” exists by reviewing clustering of dimensional indicators for each 
interorganizational interaction sampled.  
This section is organized as follows. First McNamara’s IIA—the 
“Multiorganizational Implementation Model” (MIM)—is described and evaluated. 
Second, the conceptual lens for the study is presented, which places the MIM in a wider 
systems context of interorganizational interaction. Finally, each dimension in the model 
is described justified.   









McNamara’s Multiorganizational Implementation Model (MIM) 
The starting point for the MIM, development by McNamara (2008), was a model 
developed in the health education literature by Intriligator (1994), called the 
Interorganizational Arrangement Model (IAM). The IAM is not strictly a “model,” as 
specified by the criteria earlier in this literature review, but in fact an IIA that describes 
three levels of interaction (cooperative arrangement, coordinative arrangement, and 
collaborative arrangement) in terms of 15 dimensions arranged in three constructs 
(collaborative infrastructure, collaborative procedures, and collaborative leadership). The 
IAM has been employed in several case studies such as Thatcher (2007), however, the 
IAM was typically used as a framework of analysis for studying interorganizational 
interactions, rather than as the specific focus of study.  
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McNamara (2008) used the IAM as the basis for her dissertation work, and made 
several refinements in accordance with findings from the policy implementation and 
interorganizational literatures. The multiorganizational implementation model made some 
improvements on the IAM including clarifying terminology, refining the 
operationalizations of dimension, and organizing dimensions into constructs more 
appropriate for interorganizational public administration literature. In McNamara’s study, 
the MIM was the object of analysis, and was developed and tested in a single case study 
of 15 federal and state agencies, local governments, and nongovernmental organizations, 
implementing the Virginia Seaside Heritage Program. The MIM, which is displayed in 
full in Appendix A, contends that four constructs impact the level of interaction between 
organizations on the continuum of interaction between cooperation, coordination and 
collaboration.  
The interorganizational policy objective construct describes the collective policy 
goal that organizations work together to achieve. Four dimensions are used to 
operationalize this construct: time, difficulty, role of single organizations, and the 
impetus for collective action (McNamara, 2008; Thatcher, 2007). The interorganizational 
infrastructure construct describes the manner by which organizations structure and 
formalize relationships in the interorganizational interaction. Five dimensions 
operationalize this construct: design, the formality of the agreement, organizational 
autonomy, policy authority, and key personnel (McNamara, 2008; Thatcher, 2007). The 
interorganizational procedures construct describes the various procedures used to 
support operations of the collective group and sustain interorganizational relationships 
during collective action. Five dimensions are used to operationalize the construct: 
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information sharing, decision making, resolution of turf issues, resource allocation, and 
systems thinking (McNamara, 2008; Thatcher, 2007). Finally, the organizational 
management construct describes key factors which organizational management would 
need to develop to support interorganizational relationships. This construct was originally 
operationalized by five dimensions: incentives, commitment, trust, risk taking, and 
willingness to change; however, after testing the MIM, the risk-taking dimension was 
removed as it was not supported by empirical findings (McNamara, 2008; Thatcher, 
2007). 
While the MIM represents a good example of cumulative Theory development 
and the most detailed IIA to date, several issues can be identified in the light of the 
literature review on frameworks and IIAs carried out in the previous sections. The 
following issues are addressed in the refinement of the MIM into a revised IIA called the 
generalized interorganizational interaction array (GIIA), which will be the object of 
testing in this dissertation to examine the research questions posed earlier. 
First, the reason for the choice of the four MIM constructs (interorganizational 
policy objective, infrastructure, and procedures, and organization management) is not 
fully explained, nor are we sure about how to interpret the MIM in terms of interaction 
process and the wider system context. The literature review in this chapter identifies that 
a general deficiency in the way IIAs are formulated is their lack of ability to be set in a 
wider systems context—a pitfall that the MIM has not avoided. Thus we are unsure of 
how system-wide input and output variables could affect the MIM. One refinement to the 
MIM, therefore, will be additional “input” variables that allow a better understanding of 
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the impact of contextual and environmental factors, and better appreciation of the range 
of applicability of the MIM.  
Second, as the MIM is an incremental development from the IAM, the choice of 
MIM constructs and dimensions is restricted by the original formulation of the IAM. As 
the IAM has been employed successfully in several studies, this is not a major criticism, 
but a review of other IIAs from the literature sheds light on alternative ways to 
operationalize interaction states using different dimensions and indicators. A second 
modification to the MIM, therefore, is refinement of dimensions through either deleting, 
combining, separating out, or adding new dimensions, based on recent IIA literature 
(Bedwell et al., 2012; Cross et al., 2009; D'Amour et al., 2008; Woodland & Hutton, 
2012). Furthermore, the grouping of dimensions into the four constructs will be revisited, 
using recent research on the internal processes of interorganizational interaction and 
collaboration frameworks (Thomson & Perry, 2006; Thomson et al., 2009). 
Finally, while the MIM contains detailed operationalized indicators of the 
dimensions, there is room for improvement. Some dimensions appear to have duplicate 
indicators across levels, while others have highly composite descriptions or rely on 
particulars combination with indicators of other dimensions, rather than unique 
indicators. 
At the end of this process of refinement, a new version of the MIM is produced, 
which is named the Generalized Interorganizational Interaction Array (GIIA). Note that 
that McNamara’s original work sought to use the MIM to recast the top-down / bottom-
up debate in the policy implementation literature, hence the “I” stands for the 
“implementation,” and her empirical case study focused on an implementation setting. I 
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choose the more general term “interaction,” to allow the GIIA to apply to other purposes 
of collective action such as policy formulation or joint evaluations (Andersen & 
Broegaard, 2012; Beck & Buchanan-Smith, 2008; OECD, 2005). The process to move 
from the MIM to the GIIA is described in Table 2-10. The final version of the GIIA is 
presented at the end of this chapter in Table 2-11.  
Table 2-10: Derivation process of the GIIA 





The process began with McNamara (2008; 2012), which is the greatest effort to 
date to develop an IIA. This study was based on three main sources (Thatcher 
2007; Keast et al 2007; and Mandell et al 2003). Reference lists were consulted 
from these sources, in addition to the wider literature review in Chapter 2.  
A review process gathered a core set of IIA, and eliminated duplications from the 
list. The process overall was cross-checked with the original dissertation 
literature review, described in Table 2-1.  
Define dimensions The core set of IIAs were transcribed into Excel tables and each dimension 
defined. In some cases, authors provided their own definitions of dimensions, 
in other cases they did not and definitions had to be inferred from the article. 
This is identified by noting [*Author* Definition] or [Inferred Definition] in 
each dimension.  
Construct analysis The four constructs from the McNamara IIA were reviewed in light on the more 
recent literature on interorganizational interaction (namely Thomson et al., 
2009; Emerson et al., 2012; Ansel and Gash, 2007). Several of the original 
McNamara constructs could be revised, and additional constructs added. 
While this change has little effect on the way in which interaction levels are 
defined, it may be important during the analysis phase when necessary and 
sufficient conditions for levels of interaction are identified.  
Dimensional analysis The set of IIA were reviewed to identify, in particular, contextual dimensions 
that were omitted in the original McNamara IIA. This is important because 




In many cases, IIA dimensions described more than one component of an 
organization or interorganizational form. Such dimensions were decomposed 
into two or more new dimensions, and dimensional indicators were adjusted as 
necessary. 
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Analysis Process Description 
Modification of 
interaction levels 
Many of the IIAs reviewed used more than three levels of interaction. As the 
purpose of the dissertation research is to examine primarily the three level 
continuum, IIAs with greater than three levels were inspected to determine if 
they could be 'collapsed' into three levels. This process was aided by the 
dimensional decomposition stage. 
Three criteria showed that interaction levels could be collapsed: first, dimensions 
with duplicate indicators across levels; second, dimensions with composite 
descriptions; third, dimensional indicators relying on a particular combination 
with indicators of other dimensions, rather than unique indicators.  
Classification of 
dimensions 
Dimensions were classified into 3 categories: 
1) Contextual dimensions: Antecedent factors, inputs or outcomes that belong to, 
or originate directly from, the surrounding context or environment in which the 
interorganizational interaction is set. 
2) Organizational dimensions: Factors relating to structural or behavioral aspects 
of participating organizations, understood in a conventional “rational” 
perspective with boundaries defined by the hierarchical structure. 
3) Interorganizational dimensions: Factors that emerge out of the interaction, and 





A final set of refinements were made during the process of operationalizing the 
GIIA into a survey instrument. This process revealed areas in which the 
understandability of wording was challenging, and where indicators were not 
mutually exclusive. 
 
Conceptual Lens for Refinement of MIM 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, a downfall of the IIA approach is its inability 
to link to wider systems contexts and dynamic, adaptive processes. An IIA shows 
“snapshots” of particular interaction states. Using the findings from the systems 
framework and IIA literature, an approach to reformulating the MIM is presented: first 
focusing on the system nature of frameworks, and second on the specific “black box” 
processes of interorganizational interaction. 
The framework literature shows, in general, that interorganizational interactions 
are set in complex adaptive systems. Input conditions drive interaction processes that 
produce outcomes, which then change the original system state and lead to positive or 
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negative feedback, such as reinforcing trust between participants as a result of stable 
institutions of interaction (Ansel & Gash, 2007; Emerson et al., 2012). The original MIM 
describes how four constructs determine the position on the continuum of interaction, but 
does not provide any rationale for the choice of these constructs or how they should link 
to the wider system context. Using Emerson et al., (2012) as guide, the MIM—or the 
reformulated GIIA—can be placed in the center of the “collaborative
3
 governance 
regime,” thus showing how the GIIA constructs link in systems terms. For example, as 
shown in Figure 2-7, the Interorganizational Policy Objective construct spans the 
“system context” area, the “inputs” box and the “process box” to show that it shares 
elements with these three components as described by Emerson et al. (2012). 
The implication of this simple linkage is to justify inclusion of more contextual 
variables in the GIIA, as the framework literature demonstrates the importance of 
contextual variables on the interorganizational interactive process. In terms of the level of 
interaction and IIA literature, however, there is logical ground for avoiding using 
contextual variables as necessary components of a defining interaction states. This 
underlines the importance of empirical testing of contextual variables on the observed 
levels of dimensions in interorganizational interactions. If inclusion of contextual 
variables allow interaction states to be discerned, then this shows convergence between 
the framework and IIA literature and support the utility of the idea of a continuum of 
interaction. If, however, discernable interaction states cannot be observed with the 
inclusion of contextual variables, then this shows that the continuum of interaction is not 
                                                 
3
 While Emerson et al. use the term “collaboration,” their framework is much broader that the definition of 
collaboration presented in the GIIA and thus can apply across the continuum of interaction.  
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meaningful, as variation across dimensions in any interorganizational interaction process 
is strongly context-dependent.  
The second part of the conceptual lens looks inside the interorganizational 
interaction process. In recent work, Thomson (2001); Thomson and Perry (2006); 
Thomson et al. (2009) undertook a major effort to go inside the “black box” of 
collaborative process, and from an empirical survey of over 400 organizations, defined a 
higher-level construct of collaboration. The construct, however, is arguably broader than 
just collaboration and most likely covered lower level states of interaction. The higher-
order construct is composed of five higher-level (latent) factors: governance, 
administration, mutuality, norms of trust and reciprocity, and autonomy. Thomson 
contends that these five factors constitute the interorganizational interactive process. 




A review at the indicator level of both the MIM and Thomson’s construct show 
that there is significant overlap between dimensions, thus allowing some of the original 
MIM constructs to be recast in terms of the Thomson factors (lower level constructs). As 
the MIM constructs and dimensions were reformulated, not all MIM constructs were 
required to be recast. For example, the interorganizational infrastructure and 
interorganizational procedure construct definitions of the MIM strongly overlap with the 
governance and administration factors in the Thomson construct, thus there is no 
requirement to change them. Some of the lower level operationalizations, however, were 
rearranged. The major difference between the MIM and the GIIA at the construct level is 
the inclusion of norms of trust and reciprocity, and organizational autonomy, as separate 
constructs. The purpose of this change is to ensure closer consistency with the current 
interorganizational interaction literature. 
The Generalized Interorganizational Interaction Array (GIIA) 
In this section, the constructs and dimensions of the GIIA are defined. While 
grouping the dimensions into constructs is primarily for organizing purposes, both 
McNamara (2008) and Intriligator (1994) believed that each construct would 
independently impact the level of interorganizational interaction. A similar finding was 
replicated by Thomson (2001), who found five independent constructs. Identifying 
separate constructs will facilitate further empirical testing focusing on individual 
constructs. 
Constructs consist of one or more dimensions, which form the main objects of the 
analysis in the research. Each dimension is assigned a label of contextual, organizational, 
or interorganizational. Contextual dimensions are not properties of the organization or 
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interorganizational interaction, but instead relate to the context or environment in which 
the interorganizational interaction occurs. Organizational dimensions refer to properties 
of the organization or an organizational perspective on the interaction. Interorganizational 
dimensions refer to the emergent properties of the interorganizational interaction; such 
properties cannot exist independently in a single organization. These dimension labels are 
not variables in the analysis process, but will help in the interpretation of results. 
Interorganizational policy objective construct 
The interorganizational policy objective construct characterizes the external 
system conditions in which the multiorganizational interaction is set. While McNamara 
(2008) limited this construct to the policy goal that organizations work together to 
achieve, the GIIA broadens the construct to include the wider systems variables that 
affect the policy goal. The dimensions in this construct are defined as follows; their 
category (contextual, organizational, or interorganizational) is given in brackets after the 
name:  
Purpose of interorganizational interaction. (Contextual). The overall purpose 
of the interorganizational interaction. This dimension is adapted from Mandell & 
Steelman (2003) and Keast et al. (2007).  
Time. (Contextual). The length of time that the interorganizational interaction is 
expected to work together to accomplish the policy objective. This definition is adapted 
from McNamara (2008). 
Difficulty. (Contextual). The complexity of tasks that the interorganizational 
interaction undertakes to accomplish the policy objective. This definition is adapted from 
McNamara (2008). 
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Role of single organization. (Contextual). The roles individual organizations 
assume to accomplish the policy objective (McNamara, 2008) 
Impetus for collective action. (Contextual). The reason for developing the 
interorganizational interaction and the way in which it was developed. This dimension is 
adapted from McNamara (2008). 
Numbers of participating organizations. (Contextual). The number of 
organizations with first degree network ties participating in the interorganizational 
interaction. The inclusion of this dimension is justified from recent research indicating 
that the complexity—and thus governability—of an interorganizational interaction is 
affected by the number of direct participants (T. Scott & Thomas, 2013). It is important 
to distinguish cases where organizations involved in a partnership do not actually interact 
at all. This is the reason for the level of interaction called "deconfliction" in Williams 
(2010) where organizations are simply aware of one another rather than directly 
interacting. This dimension should capture first-degree network ties only, which relates to 
the choice of unit for the study (interorganizational-organizational dyad). 
Category of participating organizations. (Contextual). The sector and/or type of 
organization: federal government, state government, local government, international 
organization, intergovernmental organization, nongovernmental organization, private 
sector, academia, think tank, and so forth. The inclusion of this dimension is warranted 
by observations that the type of organization may affect the governance and 
administrative procedures of the interorganizational interaction (Ansel & Gash, 2007; 
Thomson, 2001). 
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Organizational management construct 
This construct describes key factors which organizational management would 
need to develop to support interorganizational relationships. In the original McNamara 
(2008) MIM this construct included the additional dimensions of “commitment” and 
“willingness to change,” however, they were removed in the GIIA as they overlapped 
considerably with other dimensions. “Trust” was also included in the MIM, however, this 
was separated out into its own construct. The dimensions are as follows:    
History of previous interaction in the problem domain. (Contextual). The 
extent to which organizations and participants from those organization have worked 
previously together on other projects in the problem domain. This dimension is included 
as previous history of working together is indicated as predictor of effective interaction in 
the future (Bronstein, 2003; Bryson et al., 2006; Simo, 2009). This definition adapted 
from Mattesich et al. (2001).  
Participant's Problem Orientation. (Organizational). This dimension reflects 
the degree to which members of interorganizational interaction view the problem from a 
shared or individual perspective. This has to do with members' values and perceptions. 
This dimension is adapted from Mandell & Steelman (2003). 
Resource allocation. (Organizational). The contributions allocated by individual 
organizations to the interorganizational interaction in support of the policy objective. This 
dimension is adapted from McNamara (2008). 
Incentives. (Organizational). The intrinsic and extrinsic rewards provided to 
individuals and participating organizations to encourage support for the 
interorganizational interaction. This dimension is adapted from McNamara (2008). 
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Interorganizational infrastructure construct 
This construct captures the manner by which organizations structure and 
formalize relationships in the interorganizational interaction. In the original MIM, this 
construct included the dimension “autonomy,” which is separated out in the GIIA into a 
new construct. Another dimension, “policy authority” was deleted due to overlaps with 
other dimensions. The dimensions of this construct are as follows. 
Time to establish multiorganizational arrangement. (Contextual). The length 
of time, relative to the time for implementation of the interaction, that the partnership 
takes to establish. This dimension is adapted from Keast et al. (2007). 
Key personnel. (Organizational). Personnel who are responsible for bringing 
together and implementing the interorganizational interaction. This dimension is adapted 
from McNamara (2008). 
Orientation of policy objective. (Interorganizational). The agreed and 
comprehensive nature of goals between interacting organizations. This dimension is 
adapted from D'Amour et al. (2008). 
Design. (Interorganizational). The administrative structure emerging from the 
interorganizational interaction. This dimension is adapted from McNamara (2008). 
Formality of the agreement. (Interorganizational). The way in which individual 
organizations agree on their roles and responsibilities within the interorganizational 
interaction. This dimension is adapted from McNamara (2008).  
Interorganizational procedures construct 
This construct describes the various features that emerge out of the 
interorganizational interaction, namely information sharing and communications, 
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decision making and conflict resolution processes. In the original MIM, this construct 
contained dimension such as “systems thinking” and “resource allocation.” Systems 
thinking was deleted due to strong overlap with the “information sharing and 
communication” dimension, and “resource allocation” was moved to the organizational 
management construct. The dimensions in this construct are as follows: 
Information sharing and communications. (Interorganizational). The ways in 
which personnel within the interorganizational interaction use information and 
communication processes to attain the policy objective. This dimension is adapted from 
McNamara (2008). 
Decision making. (Interorganizational). The ways in which the organizations 
within the interorganizational interaction make implementation decisions pertaining to 
the policy objective. This dimension is adapted from McNamara (2008). 
Resolution of turf issues. (Interorganizational). The process used for solving 
conflicts between organizations within the interorganizational interaction. This dimension 
is adapted from McNamara (2008).  
Organizational autonomy construct 
This construct is composed of a single dimension (organizational) in the GIIA and 
is defined as the degree to which each partnering organization independently operates, in 
terms of the extent that their operating procedures and policies are adapted by the 
interorganizational interaction, and the extent of authority given to the interorganizational 
interaction to develop policies that guide operations of the collective. This dimension is 
adapted from McNamara (2008). McNamara originally had this dimension as part of the 
interorganizational infrastructure construct, however, Thomson (2001) found evidence 
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that it existed as an independent factor, which supported other theoretical perspectives 
concerning the tension between individual and collective interests in interorganizational 
relationships (Wood & Gray, 1991). 
Norms of trust and reciprocity construct 
This construct consists of one dimension (organizational) defined as the extent to 
which trustworthy relationships between organizations within the interorganizational 
interaction are built. This dimension is adapted from McNamara (2008). As explained in 
the earlier review of framework literature, this dimension is separated out into its own 
construct because it is a fundamental component underlying the mechanisms of the 







Table 2-11: The Generalized Interorganizational Interaction Array (GIIA) 






Context The overall purpose of the 
interorganizational 
interaction [Adapted from 
Mandell & Steelman 
(2003), and Keast et al. 
(2007)]  
Create an informal network 
of communication among 
stakeholders 
Generate support for an 
initiative 
To explore interests 
Joint work with other 
organizations to ensure 
tasks are done 
Leverage or raise money 
Organizations remain 
autonomous but support 
something new 
To reach predetermined 
mutual goals together 
Share material, personnel or 
financial resources to 
address common issues 
Commit for a year or more 
to achieve short- and 
long-term outcomes 
Create institutional and 
system change in a policy 
area 
Time Interorg. Policy 
Objective 
Context The length of time that the 
interorganizational 
interaction is expected to 
work together to 
accomplish the policy 
objective [modified from 
McNamara, 2008] 
Short-term Longer-term Long-term, evolutionary 
nature 
Indefinite duration 
Difficulty Interorg. Policy 
Objective 
Context The complexity of tasks 
that the 
interorganizational 
interaction undertakes to 
accomplish the policy 
objective [modified from 
McNamara, 2008] 
Simple tasks that are low in 
number, very similar, 
known and clearly 
defined, independent 
from each other, routine, 
agreed by all participants 
Multifaceted tasks 
Repeatable 
Complex tasks that are high 




highly contested by 
participants, or 







Dimensions Constructs Type Meaning Cooperation Coordination Collaboration 




Context The roles individual 
organizations assume to 




independent; it is possible 
for them to accomplish 
the objective individually 
Organizations require some 
assistance from other 
organizations to 
accomplish the policy 
objective 
No organization can 




organization is one 







Context The number of 
organizations with first 
degree network ties 
















Context The reason for developing 
the interorganizational 
interaction and the way in 




(initiated by working 
level staff) 
Organizations initiate 
collective action because 
it is helpful to their world 
of work and it builds 
capacity that serves the 
individual organization 
Voluntary, or mandated 
(directly tasked by a 
higher authority or law to 
participate, or where not 
participating would result 
in either severe loss of 
reputation or an inability 
to meet organization 
goals) 
Linkages are mobilized 
because compatible 
mission areas mutually 
increase abilities to 
achieve same goal 
An interagency liaison or 
boundary spanner may 
forge these relationships 
to meet resource needs or 
shared interests 
Legislative mandate or 
grant contracts may 
enhance cohesion or 
minimize duplication 
Voluntary (initiated by 
senior leadership or 
management) or 
mandated (directly tasked 
by a higher authority or 
law to participate, or 
where not participating 
would result in either 
severe loss of reputation 
or an inability to meet 
organization goals) 
Organizations with mutual 
or complementary 
interests come together 
because they cannot 
achieve the desired goal 
or address the identified 
problem without working 
together 
Organizations share 
responsibility for tasks 
that are connected or 
cannot be accomplished 
individually 
A lead agency or convening 
organization brings 
relevant stakeholders 
























sector, academia, think 
tank, etc. 
Unknown Unknown Unknown 
History of previous 




Context The extent to which 
organizations and 
participants from those 
organization have worked 
previously together on 
other projects in the 
problem domain 
[definition adapted from 
Mattesich et al., 2001] 






Org Reflects the degree to 
which the members view 
the problem from a 
shared or individual 
perspective. This has to 
do with members' values 
and perceptions [Mandell 
& Steelman, 2003] 
Mainly individual 
perspectives dominate 
Individual and shared 
perspectives coexist 








Dimensions Constructs Type Meaning Cooperation Coordination Collaboration 
Resource allocation Organizational 
Management 
Org The contributions allocated 
by individual 
organizations to the 
interorganizational 
interaction in support of 




funds may be used to 
contribute to the 
collective action, in the 
pursuit of individual 
goals 
Resources are not pooled, 
information is the main 
resource that is shared 
Staff contribute to the 
interorganizational 
interaction outside of 
their regular duties 
Organizations exchange 
resources to increase each 
organization's abilities to 
achieve individual goals; 
the time and expertise of 
personnel is the main 
resource shared 
Partner organizations 
allocate resources from 
core operating/annual 
budgets to finance 
collective action 
Mandates or grant 
arrangements may 
provide resources 
Resource needs may be 
satisfied by a preexisting 
program within an 
individual organization; 
staff contribute to the 
interorganizational 
interaction as part of 
ongoing projects internal 
to their organization that 
are leveraged for the 
benefit of the group 
Pooled resources; allocation 
is based on balancing 
evolving needs of the 
collective group with 
individual constraints 
Organizational resources 
are allocated to support 
the activities of the 
collective unit 
Independent operating 
budget, based on shared 
financial contributions, 
may be established for 
collective action 
Staff contribution to the 
interorganizational 
interaction is considered 








Dimensions Constructs Type Meaning Cooperation Coordination Collaboration 
Incentives Organizational 
Management 
Org The intrinsic and extrinsic 




encourage support for the 
interorganizational 
interaction [modified 
from McNamara, 2008] 
Opportunities for 
synergistic benefits are 
realized based on the 
desire to avoid negative 
impacts resulting from 
changes in external 
factors 
Staff involved receive 
intrinsic rewards from 
participation in the 
interaction 
Grant contracts may 
provide funding or 
resource incentives to 
support the collective 
effort 
Leaders identify benefits in 
working together and 
emphasize the importance 
of these benefits to 
subordinates 
Staff involved receive 
intrinsic and extrinsic 
rewards from 
participation in the 
interaction 
Incentives are provided by 
the collective group and 
individual organizations 
to encourage individuals 
to stay involved in the 
collective effort 
Leadership and staff in 
participating 
organizations receive 
extrinsic rewards for 
participation in collective 
action 
Staff responsibilities begin 
to change based on 
participation in collective 
action 





Context The length of time, relative 
to the time for 
implementation of the 
interaction, that the 
partnership takes to 
establish. [Inferred from 
Keast et al., 2007] 







Dimensions Constructs Type Meaning Cooperation Coordination Collaboration 
Key personnel Interorg. 
Infrastructure 
Org Personnel who are 






Organizational leadership is 
not involved in decisions 
to work together 
Interaction occurs through 
lower levels of 
organizations 
Leadership establish 
commitment by stressing 
the importance of 
collective action 
Mid-level management 




A facilitator may be 
identified to coordinate 
actions at the local level 
Although no one is 
typically in charge, a lead 
organization may propose 
policies/rules to which 
the collective group must 
mutually agree to 
implement 
Organizational leadership is 
openly supportive AND 
is involved in planning 





responsibilities adapt to 
the task at hand 







Interorg The agreed and 
comprehensive nature of 
goals between interacting 
organizations [Adapted 
from D'Amour et al., 
2008] 
Conflicting goals or 
absence of shared goals 
Some shared goals, in 
addition to individual 
organizational goals 
Shared goals agreed 







Dimensions Constructs Type Meaning Cooperation Coordination Collaboration 
Design Interorg. 
Infrastructure 
Interorg The administrative structure 








changes to their job 
description or 
administrative procedure 
(rules, policies, hierarchy) 
Each organization's 
hierarchical structure is 
used to centrally manage 
specialized roles and 




centralized control of 
participation in the 
interorganizational 





jointly develop shared 
power arrangements to 
support mutually 
beneficial interests, by 
creating new governance 
structures such as 
leadership boards or 
executive steering 
committees 
New program structures 
(within each 
organization) are 
developed based on the 
needs of a specific 
policy/goal 
An administrative staff 
element is present to 
sustain collective efforts. 
This staff may work full 
time on the interaction, 
either virtually, through 








Dimensions Constructs Type Meaning Cooperation Coordination Collaboration 




Interorg The way in which 
individual organizations 
agree on their roles and 
responsibilities within the 
interorganizational 
interaction [modified 
from McNamara, 2008] 
Individual organizations 
informally agree to work 
together to achieve 
individual or mutually-
beneficial goals 







organization's roles and 
responsibilities, are often 
developed and/or 
reviewed by a higher 
authority 
Key stakeholders, often 
leadership, jointly draft a 
shared purpose and 
develop a course of action 
based on mutually agreed 
upon roles and 
responsibilities, rules, 
goals, and organizational 
members 
Formalized agreements are 
supported by extensive 
informal agreements 







Interorg The ways in which 





to attain the policy 
objective [modified from 
McNamara, 2008] 




participants (e.g. staff 
email) 






formalized, with staff 




infrastructures begin to 
develop (group email 
lists, shared web-based 
information repositories 
etc.) 
Open and frequent 
communication through 






and processes (e.g. policy 
requirements to share 
information with partner 
organizations) 
Understanding enhanced by 
a willingness to share 
information about 
individual organizations 
and what can/cannot be 








Dimensions Constructs Type Meaning Cooperation Coordination Collaboration 
Decision making Interorg. 
Procedures 
Interorg The ways in which the 




pertaining to the policy 
objective [modified from 
McNamara, 2008] 
Decisions are made 
independently by each 
organization; rules that 
guide collective decision 
making are not necessary 
Centralized decision 
making is practiced; a 
lead organization(s) 
dominates the decision 
making process 
Senior leadership may 
conduct collective 




making based on 
consensus and 
compromise; generates 
rules to govern activities 




latitude to negotiate rules 
and deliberate agreements 
to identify common 
ground 
Joint decision making 
occurs at all levels of 
organization 




Interorg The process used for 
solving conflicts between 
organizations within the 
interorganizational 
interaction [modified 
from McNamara, 2008] 
Turf issues between 
participating 
organizations are avoided 
based on organizational 
tendencies to function 
independently 
A neutral facilitator, outside 
convener, or full-time 
coordinator is employed 
to resolve turf issues 
Conflicting roles based on 
incongruent demands 
from individual 
organization and group 
A formalized conflict 
resolution process occur 
to adjust policies and 










Dimensions Constructs Type Meaning Cooperation Coordination Collaboration 
Organizational 
autonomy 
Autonomy Org The degree to which each 
partnering organization 
independently operates, 
in terms of the extent that 
their operating procedures 
and policies are adapted 
by the interorganizational 
interaction, and the extent 
of authority given to the 
collective to develop 
policies that guide 
operations of the 
collective. [Modified 
from McNamara, 2008] 
Organizations are fully 
autonomous 
No interorganizational 
policy decisions are 
made; policies to govern 
the collective 
arrangement are not 
developed 
Preexisting policies, 






individual authority over 
the policies that govern 
their respective 
organizations 
Policies pertaining to the 
collective arrangement 
may be developed by 
higher authorities, but 
they are compatible with 
the policies already 
established within the 
individual organizations 
Organizations are not 
autonomous; 
Partner organizations 
jointly develop policies 
and procedures that 
govern the collective 
arrangement 
Interorganizational policies 
and procedures include 
working rules that specify 
which stakeholders can 
make decisions, who will 
guide collective actions, 
and the distribution of 
cost/benefits 
Trust Norms of trust 
and 
reciprocity 





interaction are built 
[modified from 
McNamara, 2008] 
Trust relationships are not 
required 
Leaders work closely to 
create relationships based 
on trust 




necessary; in all levels of 
staff 
Partners reinforce trust in 
each other by sharing 
information through open 
communication 
A history of supportive 
interactions sustains and 
legitimizes relationships; 
reciprocal trust is 






CHAPTER 3:  
METHODOLOGY 
Chapter 1 presented an introduction to the research area, described the problem 
statement, and provided justification for the importance of this dissertation research. 
Chapter 2 reviewed relevant scholarship on interorganizational interaction in the social 
sciences, emphasizing the public administration literature. The generalized 
interorganizational interaction array (GIIA) was introduced as the object of analysis for 
this research. This chapter recaps the research purpose and research questions, then 
presents the research design, methodology, data collection and analysis, and finally 
evaluates the limitations, reliability and validity of the study. 
Research Purpose and Framework 
Research Purpose 
The overall purpose of this research is to investigate conceptualizations and 
operationalizations of common states of interorganizational interaction as described in the 
public administration literature. There are two specific objectives: 1) develop and 
improve the interorganizational interaction array that conceptualizes and operationalizes 
states of multiorganizational interaction (such as cooperation, coordination and 
collaboration); and 2) test the interorganizational interaction array from a survey sample 
of multiorganizational interactions to determine if interaction states can be empirically 
observed and distinguished from one another. 
Research Questions 




1. To what extent can the levels of interaction corresponding to the 
constructs of cooperation, coordination and collaboration be empirically 
observed? 
2. Are other constructs observed? 
3. Which dimensions of the interorganizational interaction array are most 
important for predicting an organization’s level of interaction in a 
multiorganizational interaction? 
4. To what extent can dimensions of the interorganizational interaction array 
be conceptualized as increasing along a continuum of interaction? 
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework for this study is a combination of a systems-based 
framework derived from the “collaborative governance regime” of Emerson et al. (2012) 
and precursor frameworks, and the interorganizational interaction array developed by 
McNamara (2008). The systems framework implies that interorganizational interaction is 
affected by inputs and leads to outcomes. The inputs (the “context” dimensions in the 
GIIA) reflect the basic environment in which the interaction takes place, in addition to 
certain characteristics about the policy problem that brought organizations together in the 
first place. The outcomes are not the focus of this research, but several dimensions 
capture basic indicators about impact of the interaction on participating organizations. 
The interorganizational interaction array—the GIIA in this case—focuses on the 
process of interorganizational interaction and can be considered as a way to take a 
“snapshot” at a given time. The GIIA is located at the center of the systems framework 




particular organization involved in the interaction. Furthermore, the status of the inputs 
affects the level of interaction, which in turn affects outcomes. In addition to observing 
the levels of interaction from the sample, the research will also examine the relationship 
between level of interactions and outcomes—a feature that is not well-studied in the 
literature (Thomson et al., 2009). 
Research Design 
Research Philosophy 
A key but often overlooked requirement in any research is to identify the 
researcher’s assumptions and beliefs about the fundamental nature of reality and of 
knowledge production, as these fundamentals dramatically affect the methodological 
approach (Neuman, 2003; Raadschelders, 2011). Organizational scholars use many 
possible theoretical and paradigmatic lenses to study and understand organizations 
(Lincoln, 1985). Each lens focuses on very different elements of organizations and 
incorporates very different explanatory frameworks. 
This research begins by assuming an explicitly realist ontology, where an 
objective reality “out there” can be discovered through empirical study. This reality is 
relatively independent of the observer. The corresponding epistemological assumption is 
that of researcher-object duality, in which the object of research is external to and free 
from influence of the researcher (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). A counter-argument to this 
position is that any interorganizational interaction is ultimately dependent upon 
individual perceptions and transient common perspectives that are co-created through 




“objective” organizational elements is misleading (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). Indeed, a 
substantial body of knowledge examines organizations as socially constructed entities 
and considers how individual perceptions are critical in how organizations operate and 
how organizational reality is constructed (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Weick, 1995).  
While there is reason to support this view (Huxham & Vangen, 2005), even basic 
systematic study using a constructivist approach requires a consistent set of terminologies 
and meanings to be established. The identified construct and terminology problems in the 
public administration collaboration literature may result in disparities and ambiguities 
being concealed by inconsistent and interchangeable terminology, thus preventing theory 
building (Imperial, 2005). Furthermore, extensive research using institutionalist logic 
tells us that individual perspectives are shaped greatly by objective structures such as 
organizational design, policies, processes, resources and cultural rules (J. P. Olsen, 2007). 
Thus understanding the phenomenon of interaction between organizations can 
legitimately start by examining “objective” organizational structure. 
Some may argue that objectivist and epistemological assumptions are akin to 
“universal” values held by a researcher, which should apply to all areas of social inquiry. 
Yet others suggest there are different levels of reality that lend themselves to different 
approaches, and that depending on the type of understanding required, different 
approaches are valid. As Gioia and Pitre (Gioia & Pitre, 1990, p. 587) observe:   
Approaches to theory building that are grounded in appropriate paradigmatic 
assumptions are better suited to the study of those organizational phenomena that 
are consistent with such ground assumptions (e.g., attempts to describe the 




grounded in objectivist/functional assumptions, whereas attempts to describe the 
social construction of cultural norms are better represented by theories rooted  in  
subjectivist/interpretive assumptions). 
While there are many limitations to a functionalist approach, explored later in the 
chapter, adopting this paradigm is key to the development of an interorganizational array, 
which affirms that interorganizational interactions can be objectively described by 
observable indicators.  
These ontological and epistemological assumptions lead to a primarily 
quantitative methodology using a web-based survey of individuals, representing their 
organizations, involved in multiorganizational projects. This research is both 
“exploratory” and “descriptive” in that it aims to explore the clustering of interaction 
states and describe an empirical taxonomy of interaction terms (Bailey, 1994; Neuman, 
2003). 
Justification of Research Design 
As highlighted in chapters 1 and 2, the basic research problem stems from the fact 
that while the terminology of cooperation, coordination, and collaboration is widely used, 
the underlying constructs to these terms are not well-specified. Furthermore, there are 
few attempts in the literature to create rigorous construct definitions of these interaction 
terms. An appropriate way to fill this knowledge gap is to conduct studies of multiple 
different cases of interorganizational interaction and determine the extent to which 
interaction states can be observed. While a qualitative research design using interviews 
and document analysis would certainly lead to rich comparative data set, this approach is 




approach offers the possibility to scrutinize interaction states across many hundreds of 
samples thus supporting the search for generalized interorganizational interaction 
constructs, providing attempts are made to ensure reliable and valid survey procedures. 
Unit of Analysis 
The “units of analysis” refers to the unit with which data are directly attached, 
sometimes called the “level of measurement” (Hitt et al., 2007). In this research, the unit 
is the interorganizational-organizational dyad (Graddy & Chen, 2009; Klein, Palmer, & 
Conn, 2000). Typically, units of analysis are a whole organizational unit, a group, a 
department in the organization, or an individual. In the case of interorganizational 
relationships, however, defining standard units is challenging as a result of two problems 
(Klein & Kozlowski, 2000).  
The first problem is that for interorganizational relationships the extent to which a 
boundary of an “interorganizational unit” can be defined depends on the type of research 
problem. If the problem is simply to map structural connections, then a distinct boundary 
could be drawn around an interorganizational unit. If, however, the research problem 
considers how the collective unit operates, then typically different organizations are 
likely to experience the interorganizational interaction in different ways. Thus we cannot 
assume homogeneity across an interorganizational unit, without expecting some loss of 
information when the characteristics of the collective unit—“supplied” by the 
contributing organizations—are  averaged across the group. Choosing the 
interorganizational unit for unit of analysis would require that a fully representative 
sample of all participating organizations is gathered—and then averaged for the 




the collective unit. It is for this reason that the interorganizational-organizational dyad is 
chosen, which allows for variations in level of participation across different 
organizations. The implication of this choice is that placement along the continuum of 
interaction is from each organization’s perspective.  
The second problem is that with the exception of highly integrated levels of 
interaction, individuals involved in interorganizational interactions are likely to be 
representative of their organizations first, rather than the interorganizational unit. A 
survey question outlined later, for example, tests the extent of “shared perspective,” 
which captures the extent to which an individual (as representative of their organization) 
takes an organizational view or a collective view. The implication is that 
interorganizational research is dominated by the perspective of single organizations’ 
experiences in the interaction, rather than a collective view. 
In the context of this research, the unit of analysis is neither the individual 
organization nor the interorganizational unit; it is the “dyad,” which captures the 
experience of the interaction from the perspective of one organization. As highlighted in 
chapter 2, a full characterization of an interorganizational interaction relies on many 
dimensions, some of which “belong” to the contributing organizations, and some of 
which “emerge” from the interaction. The extent to which the emergent properties 
appear, however, depends on the level of interaction. Thus if the unit was restricted to 
either an organization or the interorganizational unit, attempting to study the level of 
interaction across a large sample would result in loss of information. Table 3-1 captures 





Table 3-1: Implications of choice of units of analysis in interorganizational studies of 
levels of interaction 
Unit of Analysis Implication for Level of 
Interaction (LOI) 




LOI is a property of the unit 
Different LOIs across different 
units can be directly compared 
Sample is unrestricted 
Averaged values of dimensions of the LOI 
cannot be applied to individual 
organizations; some dimensions of the 
GIIA cannot be applied 




restriction that all 
organizations 
operate at the 
same level) 
LOI is a property of the unit 
LOIs across units can only be 
compared if all organizations 
across all units are at the same 
LOI 
Sample must be carefully designed to 
stratify organizations across LOI, and to 
ensure that all organizational 
representatives refer to the same 
timeframe (as features about the 
interorganizational interaction may vary 
significantly with time) 
Averaged values of dimensions of the LOI 
do apply directly to individual 
organizations 
Organizational unit LOI is a property of the 
organization 
Emergent features of the 
collective unit cannot be 
analyzed 
Sample is unrestricted 
Conclusions about LOI cannot be 
generalized to interorganizational units 
Interorganization-
organization dyad 
LOI is a property of the 
organization 
Emergent features of the 
collective unit can be analyzed, 
with the caveat that they are 
from the perspective of one 
organization 
Sample is unrestricted 
Conclusions about LOI can be generalized 
to interorganizational units in some cases 
(dimensions relating to emergent 
properties)  
 
A related problem that must be addressed in the survey instrument reliability and 
validity, is that individuals represent their organization in the interorganizational 
interaction. In some cases, only one individual from an organization is involved, in other 
cases a team or several individuals from different departments are involved (Huxham & 




experience in the interorganizational interaction assumes that the individual is 
representative of the whole organization and is able to answer a survey question as such. 
Level of Analysis 
The level of analysis at which inferences at the construct level are made is the 
interorganizational field (Benson, 1975; Hjern & Porter, 1981; Warren, 1967), which 
emphasizes relationships between organizations, rather than organizational or individual 
attributes. Interorganizational interaction is an emergent phenomenon with a set of 
characteristics distinct from the participating organizations and individuals. This is 
analogous to the idea that the social network in which an individual is embedded—what 
one might call the “inter-individual” field—can be characterized by emergent properties 
such as centrality, complexity or differentiation, which are not attributes of an individual. 
As a multilevel construct, however, interorganizational interaction features lower level 
constructs at the structural and individual levels of analysis.  
Research Approach 
The research approach is a nonexperimental nonprobability quantitative design, 
featuring self-administered survey-based data collection and employing clustering 
analysis with follow on statistical testing to profile and validate cluster solutions. Cluster 
analysis is a primarily exploratory procedure that identifies and creates classifications in 
data, although it can be used in confirmatory approaches. Cluster analysis empirically 
forms clusters of highly similar entities by maximizing within group similarity and 
minimizing between group similarity (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). Follow on 
statistical testing can then determine if cluster membership predicts certain dependent 




solutions (Romesburg, 2004). Cluster analysis relies heavily upon researcher 
interpretation of the clusters and inspection of the original underlying data. As such, 
cluster solutions are strongly dependent on dimensions used to calculate similarity 
measures and the data set (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006). 
The selected sample was surveyed using the instrument described below. The 
objective of the survey was to rate—across the dimensions specified in the GIIA—a 
sample of organizations’ experiences in participating in an interorganizational interaction. 
Cluster analysis grouped similar cases with the aim to determine if clustered groups 
exhibited averaged dimensional values that correspond to the three-level of interaction 
description in the GIIA. A second analysis allowed a range of cluster solutions to emerge 
freely to determine of other possible forms of interaction are possible, outside the 
expected cooperation-coordination-collaboration scale. ANOVA and MANOVA tests 
checked the criterion and predictive validity of cluster solutions by profiling clusters 
against continuous and interval data variables not used in the cluster solutions. Chi-
square tests conducted similar profiling using nominal variables. Finally, multiple 
discriminant analysis further examined cluster distinctiveness and evaluated which 
dimensions had the greatest impact on cluster membership. 
Research Methods 
In this section, the research methods are presented. First, the survey instrument is 
described and operationalization of GIIA dimensions into survey items is explained. 
Second, the data selection and collection is described. Finally, the data analysis 
procedures are explained. Reliability and validity issues are addressed at each stage and 




Overview of Survey Instrument 
The survey instrument contained 35 questions including three open response 
questions and 32 closed response questions using a mixture of Likert scales, multiple 
choice and forced choice. The survey opened with the necessary statements about 
informed consent, followed by instructions to the respondent to answer all questions from 
an organizational perspective rather than their own individual perspective, in order to be 
consistent with the interorganizational-organizational unit of analysis. Furthermore, 
respondents were asked to answer all survey questions with the same familiar 
multiorganizational interaction in mind, in which their organization participated in the 
past five years. The time criteria was given to reduce bias caused by variations in the 
effects of information communications technology (such as virtual meetings, social 
media etc.) on interorganizational interaction (Madlberger & Roztocki, 2009; Sanders, 
2007; Vaccaro, Parente, & Veloso, 2010). 
The survey was “self-administered” using a commercially available online 
software package, Questions Pro. Online surveys solicited by email are a preferable 
choice over mailed surveys due to the convenience, multinational sample of respondents, 
and to facilitate ease of data capture and analysis (Ritter & Sue, 2007a). There were no 
foreseen issues with respondents’ accessibility to computers (Fowler, 2009). The use of 
professional software also ensures that the questionnaire is well-designed and presented 
and confirms to recognized best practice (Ritter & Sue, 2007b). The survey required 
users to answer all items on the page in order to proceed. The survey closed with a final 
open question asking respondents to give any further information they feel relevant, and 




Only limited data about the organization and multiorganizational interaction was 
collected to comply with confidentiality requirements. Limited demographic data 
(gender, nationality, years of professional experience) was collected to check the sample 
for response biases. No email tracking or IP address data was collected to ensure that 
questionnaire responses are not attributable back to respondents. 
The questions was organized in terms of constructs and dimensions of the GIIA, 
although this was not apparent to the respondent. Where possible, responses were 
randomized in the order that they appear on the screen to minimize primary bias (picking 
earlier options first), learning bias (e.g. realizing that responses matching “collaboration” 
go together), and fatigue bias (not fully reading the entire responses) (Choi & Pak, 2005). 
A full description of the survey is presented in Appendix A. 
Survey instrument development process 
Start point – GIIA. The first stage of survey development began with the GIIA 
framework developed as part of chapter 2. The GIIA is the object of analysis for the 
research and the primary objective of the survey instrument is to test the GIIA. 
Literature search for previously developed scales. The second stage involved a 
literature search for previously developed scales. In most cases these were already 
attained in the chapter 2 review, but some scales required additional searches. The 
primary materials gathered included the following: 
 A 56-item collaboration survey developed by Thomson (2001), of which 17 items 
were determined to be valid. Five additional “outcome” items were also included. 




Thomson et al. (2008) and Chen (2008, 2010), and were shown to be reliable in 
those cases. 
 A 45-item scale developed by Fleishman (2009) assessing the motivations for 
collaboration. 
 The 40-item “Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory” developed by Mattessich 
et al. (2001) to assess factors contributing to the success of collaborative groups. 
 The 45-item “Interorganizational Arrangement Model Partnership Survey” 
developed by Intriligator (1994) and used by Thatcher (2007).  
 A 26-item “Team Collaboration Assessment Rubric” developed by Woodland and 
Hutton (2012). 
 A 32-item survey developed by Alter and Hage (1993) developed to study 
interorganizational networks. 
 An interview protocol developed by McNamara (2008) in development of her 
Multiorganizational Implementation Model—the precursor to the GIIA. 
 An interview protocol developed by D’Amour et al. (2008) to construct a 
typology of collaboration between professionals in healthcare organizations.  
 An interview protocol development by Gajda and Koliba (2007) to evaluate 
interorganizational collaboration. 
The surveys and interview protocols above feature a mix of organizational-unit 
and individual-unit data items, and are not uniform with respect to their use of 
terminology such as collaboration. Appropriate care was taken when the surveys and 




use the previously developed items. The results of this matching are explained in the 
following main section. 
Turn GIIA dimensional indicators into questions. The next stage involved 
systematically moving through the GIIA and either using a pre-existing item or creating a 
new question based on the dimensional indicators in the GIIA. In some cases, more than 
one item is used for each dimensional indicator for reliability and validity purposes. An 
unintended benefit of this process was additional refinements to the GIIA, as the process 
of trying to turn the GIIA into a survey revealed areas of ambiguity. In some cases, the 
dimensions of the GIIA were not mutually exclusive and overlapped. Either the 
dimensions were refined, or the opportunity was used to eliminate a survey question as 
the information for that dimension was already captured elsewhere. A detailed mapping 
of GIIA dimensional indicator to survey item was produced, to facilitate post-survey 
analysis. 
Distribute first draft of survey. A first draft of the survey was given to 
dissertation committee members who made recommendations for changes. Several 
rounds of corrections and revisions occurred. 
Develop into Question Pro survey. Once a final draft was agreed by the 
dissertation committee, the survey was entered into the Question Pro software and tested 
several times.  
Pilot testing. While the survey contains some previously tested items, much of 
the content is new. For this reason a pilot testing process was necessary. Several personal 
connections, family members, faculty, and fellow PhD students were recruited to pilot 




organization and/or relevant theoretical knowledge in the field of collaboration or 
organizational science. Their responses are not included in the main analysis of this 
dissertation. The pilot testing consisted of three stages. 
 Stage 1: The survey was sent to 20 subjects with a deadline for completion and 
some basic instructions and explanation about the project in the email. 
 Stage 2: Within one week of taking the survey, five subjects were interviewed for 
one to two hours about their experience of taking the survey and any 
misunderstandings in wording was discussed. Subjects were offered a paid meal 
or beverage, depending on the time of day and location.  
 Stage 3: Five subjects were sent the revised survey and questioned about the 
improvements made. The dissertation committee also made several 
recommendations for changes at this stage.  
Submission to Institutional Review Board. Once the survey development was 
completed and following a final check by the dissertation committee, the survey and 
relevant information were sent to the Old Dominion University, College of Arts and 
Letters review committee for research involving human subjects.  
Operationalization of Dimensional Indicators – Scale Development 
In this section, the survey items used to measure the dimensions of the GIIA are 
described, and the initial analysis process used for each item is explained. Detailed 
explanations of the calculations made are presented in chapter 4.  
Interorganizational policy objective construct 
Purpose of interorganizational interaction. (Contextual). This dimension is 




items in the multiple choice list; respondents can check all purposes that apply to their 
case of interorganizational interaction. The GIIA allocates indicators to levels of 
interaction, thus a minimum criteria stepped cumulative scale was used to calculate a 
score for this item. For a respondent to indicate that their case is at a level of 
collaboration, for example, they would have to select only one item from the list at that 
level, regardless of other choices made. Any additional items selected at the level of 
collaboration would cumulatively add one point to the scale. This dimension is further 
corroborated by a free-text field earlier in the survey asking the respondent to state the 
purposes of the multiorganizational interaction. This free text field allowed better 
inspection of outliers and interpretation of results.  
Time. (Contextual). This dimension is measured in months; the respondent could 
also select “indefinitely.” 
Difficulty. (Contextual). The complexity of tasks that the interorganizational 
interaction undertakes to accomplish the policy objective. A six-item scale of 
organizational task complexity was developed from the work of Liu and Li (2012); Xia, 
Becerra-Fernandez, Gudi, and Rocha-Mier (2011). As no survey instrument was 
developed in these previous studies, the items for this dimension were tested for 
reliability using Cronbach’s Alpha, followed by an factor analysis to check the 
dimensionality of the scale. The scale failed the dimensionality check and had low 
reliability scores, thus each item was retained for individual analysis. The results are 
explained in detailed in chapter 4. 
Role of single organization. (Contextual). The roles individual organizations 




measured by a single multiple choice question that uses the indicators in the GIIA as 
items in the multiple choice list. Respondents can check select one of three choices, 
which correspond directly to one of three levels of interaction. 
Impetus for collective action. (Contextual). The reason for developing the 
interorganizational interaction and the way in which it was developed. There are 
potentially many reasons under a variety of different contexts why an interaction started, 
thus this dimension is one of the more challenging to operationalize. A current focus in 
the literature is the difference between voluntary and mandated interorganizational 
interactions (Brummel, 2010; Ivery, 2008; Rodríguez et al., 2007), thus a survey item 
captures this essential point. Respondents select from a multiple choice list that describes 
the particular circumstances under which an interaction was mandated or voluntary. 
A second survey item presents a list of seven reasons and asks respondents to rate 
the importance of each one to their organization. This scale is taken from Fleishman 
(2009) and Thomson (2001). As the various reason are too diverse to suggest an 
underlying set of factors, a cumulative composite metric added the Likert score from each 
of the seven items. This is justified from the literature, which tends to recognize that 
more complex underlying problems will require higher levels of interaction (Gray, 1989). 
Numbers of participating organizations. (Contextual). The number of 
organizations with first degree network ties participating in the interorganizational 
interaction. This dimension is captured by a single whole unit number of organizations. 
Category of participating organizations. (Contextual). The sector and/or type of 





Organizational management construct 
History of previous interaction in the problem domain. (Contextual). The 
extent to which organizations and participants from those organization have worked 
previously together on other projects in the problem domain. This dimension is captured 
by two items taken from Mattesich et al. (2001), who recommended creating an averaged 
composite metric.  
Participant's Problem Orientation. (Organizational). This dimension reflects 
the degree to which members of interorganizational interaction view the problem from a 
shared or individual perspective. This has to do with members' values and perceptions. 
This dimension is captured by two items taken from Mattesich et al. (2001), who 
recommended creating an averaged composite metric.  
Resource allocation. (Organizational). The contributions allocated by individual 
organizations to the interorganizational interaction in support of the policy objective. This 
dimension is measured by a three multiple choice questions that use the indicators in the 
GIIA as items in the multiple choice list. Respondents could select one of three choices 
for each of the three questions, which correspond directly to one of three levels of 
interaction. The GIIA allocates indicators to levels of interaction, thus a minimum criteria 
stepped cumulative scale was used for analysis. 
Incentives. (Organizational). The intrinsic and extrinsic rewards provided to 
individuals and participating organizations to encourage support for the 
interorganizational interaction. This dimension requires capturing an organizational-level 
description of intrinsic and extrinsic rewards, which can only be attained by a statistically 




each organization answers the survey, it was not possible to capture this data. However, 
the GIIA specifies that leadership give incentives, thus a single survey item asked 
respondents to rate the extent to which leadership recognized the benefits of participating.  
Interorganizational infrastructure construct 
Time to establish multiorganizational arrangement. (Contextual). The length 
of time, relative to the time for implementation of the interaction, that the partnership 
takes to establish. Respondents enter a whole number of months. 
Key personnel. (Organizational). Personnel who are responsible for bringing 
together and implementing the interorganizational interaction. This dimension is 
measured by a three multiple choice questions that use the indicators in the GIIA as items 
in the multiple choice list. Respondents could select one of three choices for each of the 
three questions, which correspond directly to one of three levels of interaction. The GIIA 
allocates indicators to levels of interaction, thus a minimum criteria stepped cumulative 
scale was used for analysis. 
Orientation of policy objective. (Interorganizational). The agreed and 
comprehensive nature of goals between interacting organizations. This dimension is 
measured by a single multiple choice question that uses indicators in the GIIA as items in 
the multiple choice list. Respondents could select one of three choices, which correspond 
directly to one of three levels of interaction. 
Design. (Interorganizational). The administrative structure emerging from the 
interorganizational interaction. Respondents were presented with a list of six possible 
options derived from the GIIA and could select all that apply. A minimum criteria 




Formality of the agreement. (Interorganizational). The way in which individual 
organizations agree on their roles and responsibilities within the interorganizational 
interaction. This dimension is measured by a single multiple choice question that uses the 
indicators in the GIIA as items in the multiple choice list. Respondents could select one 
of three choices, which correspond directly to one of three levels of interaction.  
Interorganizational procedures construct 
Information sharing and communications. (Interorganizational). The ways in 
which personnel within the interorganizational interaction use information and 
communication processes to attain the policy objective. Respondents were presented with 
a list of six possible options derived from the GIIA and could select all that apply. A 
minimum criteria cumulative scale calculated a score.   
Decision making. (Interorganizational). The ways in which the organizations 
within the interorganizational interaction make implementation decisions pertaining to 
the policy objective. Respondents were presented with a list of six possible options 
derived from the GIIA and could select all that apply. A minimum criteria cumulative 
scale calculated a score.   
Resolution of turf issues. (Interorganizational). The process used for solving 
conflicts between organizations within the interorganizational interaction. This dimension 
is adapted from McNamara (2008). This dimension is not tested in the survey as it is not 
thought to occur in the sample. 
Organizational autonomy construct 
Organizational autonomy. (Organizational). The degree to which each 




procedures and policies are adapted by the interorganizational interaction, and the extent 
of authority given to the interorganizational interaction to develop policies that guide 
operations of the collective. This dimension is measured by a three item reliable scale 
developed by Thomson (2001) and also found to be reliable in Thomson et al. (2008) and 
Chen (2008, 2010). Scale reliability was checked using Cronbach’s Alpha and Guttman’s 
lower bound (Sijtsma, 2009). As these items were already shown by Thomson (2001) to 
represent a single autonomy factor, factor analysis confirmed the dimensionality of the 
scale.  
A further single multiple choice question was added that uses the indicators in the 
GIIA as items in the multiple choice list. Respondents could select one of three choices, 
which correspond directly to one of three levels of interaction. Using this nominal 
variable, a one-way ANOVA with planned contrasts further checked the reliability of the 
autonomy scale. 
Norms of trust and reciprocity construct 
Trust. This construct consists of one dimension (organizational) defined as the 
extent to which trustworthy relationships between organizations within the 
interorganizational interaction are built. The trust dimension is the same as the autonomy, 
using a three-item reliable scale from Thomson (2001) coupled with a three choice 
multiple choice question directly taken from the GIIA, and analysis methods were the 
same. 
Sampling Procedure 
A cross-sectional sample was selected that consists of organizations involved in 




multiorganizational groups formed between the various NATO headquarters, commands, 
and agencies, and between national defense and academic organizations within NATO 
nations who work under a NATO forum, such as the many nation-nation projects under 
the NATO Science and Technology Organization. This sample was chosen primarily for 
convenience and access: at the time of writing, the author is an NATO international 
civilian employed of NATO Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, 
Norfolk, VA. A stratified purposeful sampling strategy was used, which involved 
selecting respondents based on specific criteria to ensure that the three “strata” of 
cooperation—coordination—collaboration in the GIIA are covered approximately by the 
sample.  
As clustering analysis is not a statistical method and does not make assumptions 
about sample distributions, the sample does not have to representative in statistical 
sense—i.e. that variance introduced by confounding uncontrolled variables is averaged 
out by selecting a sample representative of the entire population. Thus there is no concern 
about typical problems with surveys such as response, sampling and coverage biases. 
Instead, clustering analysis requires that samples are representative across the dimensions 
used for the clustering analysis (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). Nevertheless, data was 
profiled for response bias according to gender, organization and years of experience, with 
null results. 
There are also no mathematical or statistical reasons that specify a number of 
required cases for a sample, other than the obvious limitation that the number of sample 
cases cannot be less than the number of dimensions used for clustering. Estimates of 
appropriate sample size range from 5n to 2
n




dimension (Mooi & Sarstedt, 2011). The survey resulted in 206 usable cases, which falls 
within the range of 50 – 1024 range for ten clustering variables.  
The procedure used to select the sample consisted of three steps. First, using a 
combination of personal knowledge, public information and internal NATO project 
management databases, a list of multiorganizational projects in the NATO arena was 
created. Second, each project was rated according to several criteria (presence of formal 
decision making committee or boards; presence of project initiation documents from 
senior leadership; or Microsoft Sharepoint site established for the project or unclassified 
internet website). Whether these features are present for each project gives some 
indication about the placement of the project on the GIIA. The aim was to select a sample 
that is equally distributed across the GIIA; however, this stratification is quite limited as 
different organizations may be involved in different ways, and the accuracy of this scale 
is fairly crude. Furthermore, as respondents were not identifiable, there was no way to 
determine if the sample did actually meet the original selection criteria.  
The third step involved identifying people working on the projects and selecting 
those most likely to answer the survey. For consistency of the sample, mid-level career 
staff were targeted (e.g. officer ranks OF2 (captain) – OF5 (colonel) in the military, 
NATO civilian grades A2 – A5, or national equivalent
4
). This data was easily accessible 
through the organization’s IT systems or through personal contacts and knowledge. 
Starting from February 1
st
 2015, emails were sent out to the identified sample with a link 
to the survey. With each survey sent out, the recipient was asked to send on the survey 
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 According to NATO Standardization Agreement 2119, dated 1992, military officer ranks run from OF1 
(second lieutenant) to OF9 (“4 star” general). An OF10 “General of the Army” category exists in some 
NATO members, but typically this is reserved for wartime positions. The NATO civilian grading system 
runs from A1 (a junior entrant) to A7 (head of an organization). An A5 grade is roughly equivalent to a 




other people involved in the multiorganizational interaction, provided that they worked 
for another organization. Two follow-up emails were sent periodically, before the survey 




Data Analysis Procedures 
Data processing. Once the allotted survey response time was over; data was 
visually inspected using the Question Pro graphical interface, then downloaded into SPSS 
version 20.0 for processing. Incomplete responses were filtered out data was inspected 
for outliers or unusual cases. Composite variables were calculated and Z-standardized 
variables were created using the SPSS. Composite variables were also transformed into 
nominal categorical variables based on the three levels of interaction specified in the 
GIIA. This process is explained in detail in chapter 4.  
Selection of clustering variables. Unlike other dimensional reduction techniques 
such as factor analysis, cluster analysis has no inbuilt process to make evaluations about 
the relevant variables—i.e. GIIA dimensions—to include in the analysis. Thus only 
theoretical reasons and post-hoc sensitivity analysis of the cluster solutions can guide the 
selection of dimensions. Obviously, running clustering on every possible combination of 
dimensions is unfeasible, so ideally the ex-ante considerations should select variables that 
“characterize the objects being clustered and…relate specifically to the objectives of the 
cluster analysis” (Hair et al., 2006, p. 490).  
The GIIA is divided into six separate constructs: interorganizational policy 
objective, interorganizational infrastructure, interorganizational procedures, 




Each dimension within these constructs is classified as either contextual, organizational, 
or interorganizational. All the dimensions in the interorganizational policy objective 
construct are classified as contextual, meaning they are not intrinsic properties of the 
organization nor emergent interorganizational form, but are related to the systems context 
or situation. Thus the interorganizational policy objective construct was not used for 
clustering, but was used instead used to profile cluster solutions in criterion validity tests. 
The remaining organizational- and interorganizational-type dimensions were 
examined using descriptive analyses. Variables were checked for correlations, as highly 
correlated variable (r > 0.9) are likely to reduce the differentiation in clusters and should 
not be used for clustering. No highly correlated variables were found. 
Detecting outliers. Cluster analysis is highly sensitive to outliers, which can 
distort the cluster structure. Outliers may be aberrant observations that are not “real,” 
such as someone who just clicked the first answer on the survey instrument for every 
question; or they may be an undersampling of an actual group in the population (Hair et 
al., 2006). In the former case, outliers should be eliminated from the data set; in the latter 
case they should be included. Cluster analysis is unique among multivariate techniques in 
that it describes similarity of objects only in a sample, and is not concerned about the 
extent to which extreme outliers may skew a distribution away from normality 
(Romesburg, 2004). Profile plots were inspected, which plot the standardized value of 
each case in the sample across selected dimensions.  
Clustering Analysis. Following the recommendation of Hair et al. (2006) a two-
step approach was used. First a hierarchical, agglomerative method using Ward’s 




output range for cluster solutions from two to eight. This initial set of cluster solutions 
was then inspected and a smaller set of solutions was selected to be used as seed points 
for a second step using a nonhierarchical k-means procedure. Hierarchical methods 
calculate all possible inter-case similarities then begin clustering the closest cases into 
clusters, without allowing cases to change clusters once joined. The advantage is that the 
full range of cluster solutions can be examined in a single run. K-means clustering, on the 
other hand, permits cluster membership to switch as the algorithm is run in order to 
minimize within cluster variance. The disadvantage is that, in contrast to hierarchical 
clustering, the solution is sensitive to initial starting conditions. Thus by providing a 
“rough cut” of cluster solutions from a hierarchical analysis, k-means is thought to refine 
the solutions and produce more homogeneous clusters (Hair et al., 2006).  
For the hierarchical clustering, Ward’s method was selected as this algorithm 
works by minimizing within-cluster sum of squares across the complete set of clusters 
(Everitt, Landau, Lesse, & Stahl, 2011) and avoids small sized clusters, which would be 
difficult to interpret given the number of clustering dimensions. The recommended 
similarity measure for Ward’s method is the Euclidean Squared. The range of output was 
set from a two-cluster solution to an eight-cluster solution, a range which provides room 
for interpretation of additional solutions to the expected three-cluster solution. More than 
an eight-cluster solution would be challenging to interpret meaningfully. Given the 
different measurement scales, all clustering variables were standardized as z-scores.  
Cluster profiling and interpretation. Cluster solutions were profiled in four 
ways. First, in order to determine cluster stability, the K-means produced cluster 




seed-point K-means clusters. Also, cluster solutions were compared against randomly 
generated cluster data. Second, clusters solutions were compared by running ANOVAs to 
determine how the mean of clustering dimensions differed across clusters. Second, 
criterion validity tests using one-way ANOVAs and MANOVAs (for the multi-item 
dimensions) were conducted to determine if cluster means differed significantly across 
contextual variables as specified by the GIIA. Chi-square analysis was performed on 
contextual variables in their nominal form.  Third, predictive validity of cluster solutions 
was assessed in by running a MANOVA across the five outcome variables and conducing 
follow-up ANOVA. Statistically significant Lambda’s and F-tests indicate that clusters 
have predictive ability. This process was conducted first for the three-cluster solutions 
(research question one) then for the other cluster solutions produced (research question 
two). 
For research question three, a discriminant function analysis with calculation of a 
“potency index” for each dimension (Hair et al., 2006) was run to determine dimensions 
that most strongly predict cluster membership. Finally, research question four was 
evaluated by using the full results and the descriptive analysis to make a qualitative 
assessment about the extent to which dimensions and the interaction state as a whole can 
existing on a “continuum of interaction”. Table 3-2 describes the approach taken for each 








Table 3-2: Research questions and analysis methods 
Research Question Methodology Contribution to knowledge 
(1) To what extent can the level 
of interaction corresponding 
to the constructs of 
cooperation, coordination and 
collaboration be empirically 
observed? 
Confirmatory 2-step 
(hierarchical / k-means) 
cluster analysis with three 
solutions 
Profiling by ANOVA and 
MANOVA on continuous 
input and outcome variables; 
Chi-square for nominal 
variables 
First large scale survey of 
multiorganizational 
interactions to determine if 
commonly used and 
theoretically postulated 
interaction terms are actually 
observed 
(2) Are other constructs (levels 
of interaction) observed? 
Exploratory 2-step cluster 
analysis without restricting 
cluster number, followed by 
intensive qualitative 
interpretation of cluster 
solutions 
ANOVA / MANOVA and Chi-
square profiling if necessary 
Generation of an alternative 
taxonomy of interaction forms 
that departs from the 
traditional cooperation / 
coordination / collaboration 
form. 
(3) Which dimensions of the 
interorganizational interaction 
array are most important for 
predicting an organization’s 
level of interaction in a 
multiorganizational 
interaction? 
Confirmatory: Using the 
optimal cluster solutions from 
the previous analysis, perform 
a multiple discriminant 
analysis to determine 
dimensions that most strongly 
predict cluster membership 
Using data to justify narrowing 
down list of dimensions to 
describe interorganizational 
interaction.  
Providing data supported 
evidence for priority variables 
for focus on in future research 
(4) To what extent can 
dimensions of the 
interorganizational interaction 
array be conceptualized as 
“increasing” along a 
continuum of interaction? 
Exploratory: review individual 
distributions of dimensions 
Review descriptive analysis and 
interpret previous cluster 
solutions and discriminant 
function analysis 
Challenge a basic idea that 
underpins much of the 
interorganizational and public 
administration ideas 
Evaluation of Reliability and Validity 






Reliability is the dependability or consistency of an instrument in measuring 
whatever it measures (Neuman, 2003). As the research instrument is a self-administered 
survey, several aspects of reliability must be considered. First, the instrument’s 
stability—the extent to which the survey results are consistent over time (Neuman, 2003). 
This was not quantitatively evaluated during pilot testing but instead, the test-retest 
stability assessment reflected more the readability and comprehensibility of the 
instrument by determining whether the same respondent is likely to answer in the same 
way over a time interval. To avoid error due to the time evolution of organization 
features, pilot survey testers were asked to refer to a historical case rather than a currently 
ongoing interaction. Pilot testers were also be divided into those that answer the survey 
based on specific experiences of an interorganizational interaction, and those that simply 
answer the survey to evaluate comprehensibility. A potential limitation with this 
approach is that the pilot testing group were not representative of the research sample.  
The second aspect of reliability concerns the representativeness of the instrument 
such that it is consistent across subpopulations (Neuman, 2003). The survey instrument 
captured basic demographic data to be used for a subpopulation reliability analysis. 
Again, as the unit of analysis is the interorganizational-organizational dyad, not an 
individual, survey representativeness is of limited importance to the overall reliability.   
The third aspect of reliability concerns the measurement error or response error, 
which is the difference between a survey response and the “true” value (Franklin & 
Walker, 2003). Several strategies were be adopted to minimize this error. First the 




Guttman’s lower bound (Field, 2013). As several different constructs are evaluated in the 
survey instrument, applying Cronbach’s Alpha to the entire test is likely to inflate the 
value (Schmitt, 1996), thus only the dimensions that are known to be represented by an 
underlying factor and assessed by multiple items were evaluated for this form of 
reliability. 
Second, the alternate forms reliability—the extent to which the structure of the 
instrument affects responses—was considered. Several types of bias may be introduced 
by the instrument structure: the tendency to focus on the first or last items in a list 
(primary bias) or to not read all items in a list (fatigue bias); and the tendency for 
respondents discern patters of responses in the answers (learning bias) (Choi & Pak, 
2005). These categories of bias were mitigated by randomization of the order in which 
multiple choice lists are presented, and randomization of question order where 
appropriate in the entire survey.  
The final aspect of response error concerns the general understandability and 
comprehensibility of question wording. Five to seven pilot testers were recruited for in-
depth cognitive interviews following the initial pilot test in order to review question 
wording an identify areas of ambiguity.  
There are a number of other reliability issues concerning sampling that affect the 
eventual validity of statistical conclusions: nonresponse error, sampling error and 
coverage error. Given the nonprobabilistic nature of the clustering analysis technique 
selected, it is not necessary to address these reliability issues. Clustering analysis does not 
require the sample distribution to meet certain criteria nor does the sample have to be 




across the dimensions used for the clustering analysis (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). 
The stratification process used to select the sample will attempt to ensure that cases are 
roughly distributed across dimensions used in the clustering.    
Validity 
Validity refers to generally to the extent to which evidence supports the truth of 
an inference. Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002) define four types of validity: internal, 
external, statistical conclusion, and construct validity. Internal and external validity are 
relevant only in experimental designs thus are not considered here; however, the broader 
question about generalizability—a type of external validity—is considered in the 
limitations section. Statistical conclusion validity refers to the extent to which accurate 
decisions can be made from the results of statistical tests. While this is of concern when 
evaluating differences between experimental treatment groups, for example, some of the 
post-cluster analysis techniques rely on statistical tests to determine if clusters are 
distinct. As the statistics only relate to differences between samples, rather than some a 
priori-defined population, this concern can only be addressed after data is gathered and 
confirmation is made that the test assumptions are met by the data.  
The primary validity concern lies with construct validity, which is the extent to 
which an instrument measures what it is designed to measure, or how well the measure 
captures the true reality of the abstract construct (Neuman, 2003). There are several 
facets of construct validity. First, face and content validity consider whether indicators 
are reasonable representations of constructs from the perspective of experts, and from the 
perspective of the literature evidence base. The GIIA framework represents a cumulative 




2 of this dissertation and Appendix A. From the standpoint of the current literature base, 
content validity of the GIIA is considered to be fairly high. A question that will 
ultimately be considered in this research, however, is whether the literature base is 
actually valid as to this date there has been no large scale empirical survey of the array / 
typology literature addressed in chapter 2. 
Another important facet of construct validity is termed criterion validity, which 
assesses the extent to which indicators used agree with pre-existing measures. While a 
large number of previous survey instruments were retrieved most do not rigorously 
specify the relationship between survey items and underlying constructs, with the 
exception of Thomson (2001). Bearing the constraints of survey length in mind, criterion 
validity was addressed by including some repeated measures in the survey and use of 
multiple measures in conjunction with proven valid measures used by Thomson (2001). 
Even with these measures in place, an evaluation of the criterion validity of the survey 
instrument is not possible without further testing of the survey instrument on other 
samples and research contexts.  
The final aspect of construct validity concerns the extent to which similar 
measures converge and dissimilar measures diverge. Part of the data processing will 
evaluate correlations between variables to confirm expected theoretical relationships, for 
example, whether the level of interaction is correlated with increasing trust.  
Limitations 
There are several threats to the reliability and validity of this research, which may 




be generalized to other case. These criticisms, however, are raised in light of the fact that 
this is exploratory research and the first time such a survey instrument has been used.  
A key limitation of the research design is the choice of unit of analysis. The unit 
of interorganizational-dyad means that inferences and conclusions made about the level 
of interaction—or observed clusters of cases across dimension—can only be made from 
the perspective of an individual organization. While there is nothing theoretically wrong 
with this approach and this research is the first stepping stone, the literature on 
interorganizational relations and particularly the study of collaboration tends to seek 
generalized knowledge about the “collaboration” as a whole, rather than one 
organization’s experience in the collaboration. It should be pointed out, however, that 
most collaboration studies in the public administration literature fail to adequately 
address the necessary sampling and units of analysis issues.  
A second limitation of the research design is the restricted sample, which may 
limit generalizability to other cases. The NATO/defense sector sample is fairly unique: 
defense policy issues typically engage with a different range of concerns than the 
majority of organizations typically studied in public administration. The GIIA framework 
and the concept of levels of interaction are expected to be applicable and interpretable in 
this particular sample; however, the particular clusters identified or the dimensions found 
important may vary with policy sector or organizational type. Thus the generalizability of 




CHAPTER 4:  
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents descriptive results of the empirical data analysis. First, the 
survey respondents are profiled and the survey is evaluated for demographic bias. 
Second, descriptive univariate results are presented for each of the Generalized 
Interorganizational Interaction Array (GIIA) dimensions and associated variables. This 
includes explanation of calculations for composite variables, in addition to factor analysis 
dimensionality and reliability checks for certain variables. Finally, the preparations for 
cluster analysis are reviewed. The actual results of the cluster analysis and research 
questions are presented in chapter 5. 
Survey Respondent Profile 
Survey Statistics 
From 324 individuals directly contacted via email and an estimated 100 additional 
respondents from snowball sampling, 331 respondents started the survey, with 208 
(62.9%) completed responses recorded. Two of these completed responses were 
discarded due to corrupted data, leaving an analysis sample of 206 responses. The mean 
response time was 26.6 minutes (SD = 15.9 min; range: 7.7-108.25 min). This response 
time, coupled with the encouraging free text answers, gives some indication that 
respondents thoughtfully answered the questions. From hereon, all data and analysis 





As expected, the largest respondent groups are NATO civilian employees (30.7%) 
and uniformed military (36.6%). The largest nationality groups are British (24.4%), 
American (20.5%) Dutch (8.3%), German (7.3%) and Canadian (6.8%). No data is 
available about whether this is representative generally of staff in NATO offices and 
national defense organizations. In any case, this is not relevant to the research questions, 
as the sample was profiled only by type of project and that the fact that it was in a NATO 
context. While respondent’s language ability could have foreseeably affected their 
understanding of the survey questions, this is not expected to be an issue as typically 
NATO staff officers have very high fluency in English. No significant differences in 
responses were observed between nationality groupings.  
From the 205 who chose to answer the gender question, the majority of 
respondents were male (182, 88.8%)) compared to female (23, 11.2%). As a comparison, 
females account for 14.6% of the active duty U.S military personnel, and 36.2% of civil 
servants in the U.K. Ministry of Defence.
5
 No demographic data on gender is available 
for NATO organizations. On average, respondents have 24.6 years of professional work 
experience (SD = 9.68). This indicates that the survey was successful in targeting the 
desired seniority level of respondent (NATO civilian grade A2 to A5, and military ranks 
from OF2 to OF5). 
Evaluation of Respondent Bias 
In order to evaluate whether the survey sample was subject to systematic bias, 
three demographic variables were examined for effects: gender, years of professional 
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experience, and the employing organization of the respondent. A series of independent 
sample t-tests were run to compare the difference in means across genders, and one-way 
ANOVAs for difference in means across organizational status groups, for eight 
continuous variables collected in the survey: Task_Complexity_Sum, Autonomy2_Sum, 
Trust2_Sum, and Outcome1 to Outcome5. Pearson’s correlation coefficient was 
calculated for respondents’ years of experience (Yrs_Experience) against the eight 
continuous test variables. The values indicate very little relationship between the test 
variables. In summary, the results indicate no systematic bias in the survey sample. 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
This section covers each dimension of the GIIA as captured by the survey data 
and provides descriptive univariate analysis. First, the different types of variables used in 
the analysis are presented. Second, survey variables are mapped to their respective 
dimensions in the GIIA. Finally, the full descriptive analysis broken out by dimension is 
presented.  
Instead of displaying a summary overview of descriptive analyses for the survey 
variables, for several key reasons each variable requires its own separate analysis. In 
comparison to much social science survey research, which often features multiple items 
combined in a scale that aims to identify an underlying latent factor, the majority of 
survey items in this research relate to “tangible” aspects of an organization or 
interorganizational interaction and thus require individualized and separate analysis. 
Furthermore, additional explanation is required as some variables are combined as linear 
sums, logarithmic sums, and other weighted composites to allow testing of the level of 




require specific descriptive information. The descriptive analysis is also used to select the 
variables most appropriate to perform the cluster analysis.  
Overview of Survey Variables 
This section reviews the different types of survey variables, explains the naming 
convention, and describes how they are analyzed descriptively and used in further 
analyses towards answering the main research questions.  
Nominal categorical data 
The first group of variables are those with nominal categories. Survey respondents 
were asked to select an option—usually from three options corresponding to the three 
levels of interaction in the GIIA—that best corresponded to their multiorganizational 
interaction. Nominal variables are denoted by an “N” at the end of the name, e.g. 
“Goals_N.” For the descriptives, a frequency analysis counts the number of cases in each 
level. Cluster analysis is run using nominal variables, but also by transforming the 
nominal variables into an scale (from one to three), which assumes a level of interaction. 
In some cases, weighted sums are calculated using the nominal variables by adopting this 
level of interaction assumption and treating the nominal categories as ordinal levels.  
Another type of nominal variable are multiple response questions in which survey 
respondents were asked to “select all that apply” from a list of options. Each option is 
treated as a separate binary variable (0 = not selected, 1 = selected). A multiple response 
frequency analysis is used that counts the total number of each option across all cases, 
and then compares this total count to the total number of cases (N =206). No special 





Ordinal Likert data 
Many of the survey questions are Likert items from one to seven, and are initially 
treated as ordinal data. In most cases, the Likert items are combined in some way and 
then treated as a scale. Likert items and their sums are presented with conventional 
descriptive statistics: mean, standard error of the mean, bias corrected accelerated 
bootstrap confidence intervals at 95%
6
, standard deviation and variance. Providing they 
meet reliability criteria, only summed and composite scales from multiple Likert items 
are used for clustering. 
 Linear and logarithmic summed scales 
When nominal or ordinal variables have been combined into a composite 
computed new variable, according to convention the new variable is treated as a scale. In 
the case where a linear sum is used, variable are appended with “Sum”. For more 
complex composites such as logarithm weighted sums, the variables have “Comp” in 
their name. Where items are combined into summed scales that represent an underlying 
factor, conventional scale-item analyses are performed such as inter-item correlations, 
factor analysis and reliability analyses. In some cases, however, combined items are a 
means to indicate a “position” on the GIIA framework, and should not be interpreted as 
an underlying factor.  
When appropriate, scale sums and composites are transformed back into 
categorical data according to the level of interaction specified in the GIIA. These 
dimensions will be employed in cluster analysis using association metrics rather than 
                                                 
6
 Bootstrapping is a way to estimate computationally a parameter confidence interval directly from sample 
data by collecting thousands of sub-samples and empirically determining the percentage that fall within a 
specified bound of the parameter. “Bias corrected and accelerated” refers to corrections made to improve 




distance metrics requiring ordinal or scale data. Variables are appended with an “LOI,” 
e.g. Purpose_Comp_LOI. “LOI” is used rather than “N” to separate those variables that 
were allocated into categories based on composite sums (LOI), versus those that were 
directly allocated by survey respondents (N). In the cases where scale sums were 
translated into categories, correlation analysis showed that as expected, in all cases the 
correlation between the two was very high. 
GIIA Dimension—Survey Variable Mapping 
Table 4-1 shows how survey variables map to the overall GIIA framework 
dimensions. The column denoted “Type” categorizes dimensions by whether they are: 
contextual or related to the situation (context); a feature of the participating organization 
(Org), or a feature of the emergent interorganizational form (Interorg). In general, only 
“Org” and “Interorg” are used for clustering analysis. Context and outcome variables are 
used for profiling cluster solutions.   
Table 4-1: Mapping of survey variables and questions to GIIA dimensions 







Context The overall purpose of the 
interorganizational 
interaction [Adapted from 
Mandell & Steelman (2003), 








Time Context The length of time that the 
interorganizational 
interaction is expected to 
work together to accomplish 
the policy objective 











Difficulty Context The complexity of tasks that 
the interorganizational 
interaction undertakes to 
accomplish the policy 






Role of single 
organization 
Context The roles individual 
organizations assume to 
accomplish the policy 
objective [McNamara, 2008] 
Q7 Role_Single_Org_N 
Impetus for collective 
action 
Context The reason for developing the 
interorganizational 
interaction and the way in 
which it was developed 












Context The number of organizations 
with first degree network 















History of previous 
interaction in the 
problem domain 
Context The extent to which 
organizations and 
participants from those 
organization have worked 
previously together on other 
projects in the problem 
domain [definition adapted 






Org Reflects the degree to which 
the members view the 
problem from a shared or 
individual perspective. This 
has to do with members' 
values and perceptions 













Resource allocation Org The contributions allocated by 
individual organizations to 
the interorganizational 
interaction in support of the 
policy objective [modified 










Incentives Org The intrinsic and extrinsic 
rewards provided to 
individuals and participating 
organizations to encourage 
support for the 
interorganizational 




Time to establish 
multiorganizational 
arrangement 
Context The length of time, relative to 
the time for implementation 
of the interaction, that the 
partnership takes to 
establish. [Inferred from 
Keast et al., 2007] 
Q18 Time_Interact 
Key personnel Org Personnel who are responsible 














Orientation of policy 
objective (Goals) 
Interorg The agreed and 
comprehensive nature of 
goals between interacting 
organizations [Adapted from 
D'Amour et al., 2008] 
Q22 Goals_N 
Goals_S 
Design Interorg The administrative structure 















Formality of the 
agreement 
Interorg The way in which individual 
organizations agree on their 
roles and responsibilities 
within the 
interorganizational 







Interorg The ways in which personnel 
within the 
interorganizational 
interaction use information 
and communication 
processes to attain the policy 
objective [modified from 
McNamara, 2008] 




Decision making Interorg The ways in which the 




pertaining to the policy 








Resolution of turf 
issues 
Interorg The process used for solving 
conflicts between 
organizations within the 
interorganizational 








Org The degree to which each 
partnering organization 
independently operates, in 
terms of the extent that their 
operating procedures and 
policies are adapted by the 
interorganizational 
interaction, and the extent of 
authority given to the 
collective to develop policies 
that guide operations of the 





















interaction are built 




















Descriptive Analysis for GIIA Dimensions 
This section presents the descriptive analysis for GIIA dimensions and the five 
outcome variables. As only fully completed survey responses are included in the analysis, 
the number of respondents for all variables is always equal to 206, thus N is not listed in 
the tables. Whenever a parameter of interest is stated, namely means and correlation 
coefficients, a bias corrected and accelerated 95% confidence interval is calculated from 
1000 bootstrapped samples, abbreviated as BCa 95% CI
7
.  
Purpose of the interorganizational interaction 
This dimension of the GIIA captures the overall purpose of the interorganizational 
interaction by specifying several distinct purposes for each level of interaction. These 
purposes were combined into seven possible choices on the survey question, from which 
                                                 
7
 Ideally, confidence intervals would be presented for all parameter estimates such as standard deviation, 
standard error, and effect sizes; however, for the purposes of space, intervals are not presented for measures 
of spread such as standard deviation as they do not feature prominently in the analysis. They are easily 





the respondent could select all that apply. Each of the seven choices created a new binary 
variable: Purpose1, Purpose2, …Purpose7. Descriptive results are presented in Table 4-2. 
Table 4-2: Multiple response frequencies for Purpose variables 






% (out of 
206) 
Purpose1: Create an informal network of 
communication among stakeholders 
Cooperation 81 39.3 
Purpose2: Generate support for an initiative Cooperation 63 30.6 
Purpose3: Conduct joint work with other organizations 
to ensure tasks are done, but each organization 
remains mainly autonomous 
Coordination 119 57.8 
Purpose4: Reach predetermined mutual goals together, 
while remaining autonomous 
Coordination 82 39.8 
Purpose5: Share material, personnel or financial 
resources to address common issues 
Collaboration 91 44.2 
Purpose6:Commit for a year or more to achieve short- 
and long-term outcomes 
Collaboration 94 45.6 
Purpose7: Create institutional and system change in a 
policy area 
Collaboration 64 31.1 
 





]+ [Purpose3 x 2
3
] + … + [Purpose7 x 2
7
]). This variable has the property 
that Purpose(n) is always greater than any sum of the Purpose(n-i) where i < n. For 
example, if a respondent only selected Purpose7, the score of Purpose_Comp would be 
slightly greater than a respondent that selected all from Purpose1 to Purpose6. This 
intends to convey the increasing scale of interaction. Table 4-3 shows the descriptives for 
the Purpose_Comp variable. A further variable, Purpose_Comp_LOI was calculated, 
which segments the Purpose_Comp score into three “levels of interaction” as specified by 




GIIA, collaboration is the majority (72%) level of interaction in the respondent sample 
when using purpose of the interorganizational interaction as a measure. 
Table 4-3: Purpose_Comp descriptives 
 Mean 
BCa 95% CI for Mean Std. Error of 
Mean Std. Deviation Variance Lower Upper 
Purpose_Comp  
(Range 1.00 – 7.99) 
5.819 5.572 6.047 .122 1.743 3.038 
Table 4-4: Purpose_Comp_LOI descriptives 
Purpose_Comp_LOI Level Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
1.00 = Cooperation 7 3.4 3.4 
2.00 = Coordination 49 23.8 27.2 
3.00 = Collaboration 150 72.8 100.0 
Total 206 100.0  
 
Time Duration of Multiorganizational Interaction 
This dimension captures the length of time that the multiorganizational interaction 
is expected to exist. Out of 206 respondents, 105 (51%) indicated that their interaction 
lasted “indefinitely,” and the other 101 (49%) cases specified a whole number of months 
(Time_Dur_Mths) as shown in Table 4-5. The median value is two years, and 80% of 
cases fell within three years or less.  
Table 4-5: Time_Dur_Mths descriptives 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. Deviation Variance 
Time_Dur_Mths 101 1 156 29.57 24.00 29.584 875.187 
 
Difficulty 
This dimension captures the complexity of the tasks that the interorganizational 




survey: the number of distinct tasks, similarity, clarity, interdependence, routineness, and 
the level of agreement about the tasks amongst participants in the interaction. The items 
were captured as six different variables: Task_Complexity1 to Task_Complexity6, and a 
simple linear summed Likert scale was computed (Task_Complexity_Sum). The 
descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in Table 4-6. 
Table 4-6: Task_Complexity descriptives 
Variable Name Mean 
BCa 95% CI for 
Mean Std. Error of 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Variance Lower Upper 
Task_Complexity1: number of 
distinct tasks (1=low, 7=high) 
5.01 4.77 5.24 .119 1.714 2.936 
Task_Complexity2: similarity 
(1=very similar, 7=very different) 
3.87 3.67 4.09 .109 1.567 2.456 
Task_Complexity3: clarity of tasks 
(1=known and clearly defined, 
7=ambiguous, undefined) 




5.10 4.90 5.29 .099 1.428 2.039 
Task_Complexity5: routineness 
(1=routine, 7=irregular, atypical) 
4.19 4.00 4.38 .104 1.497 2.242 
Task_Complexity6: level of 
agreement amongst participants 
(1=agreed by all, 7=highly 
contested) 
3.24 3.05 3.42 .100 1.430 2.046 
Task_Complexity_Sum 24.995 24.299 25.698 .341 4.892 23.927 
 
Reliability Analysis For Task Complexity. Given that these six variables 
purport to capture a single factor of “task complexity,” a reliability analysis was 
conducted that found Cronbach’s alpha = .477, and Guttman’s lower bound, λ2 = .506. 
This is well below the recommended .8 for a reliable scale (Field, 2013); however, 




item correlations. There are only six items in the Task Complexity scale. Furthermore, 
the inter-item (Table 4-7) and item-total correlations were low (Table 4-8), indicating 
lack of relationship between the different items.  
Table 4-7: Task Complexity Inter-Item Correlations; Pearson’s r (Significance) [Bias 
corrected and accelerated bootstrap 95% Confidence Intervals] 
Task Complexity 
(TC) TC1 TC2 TC3 TC4 TC5 TC6 
TC1 1      
TC2 .340 (.000) 
[.197, .466] 
1     






1    






1   






























Table 4-8: Item-Total Statistics for task complexity reliability analysis 
 
Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 







if Item Deleted 
TC1 19.99 17.839 .218 .147 .446 
TC2 21.13 17.194 .329 .183 .381 
TC3 21.40 17.295 .289 .179 .403 
TC4 19.90 20.853 .079 .052 .508 
TC5 20.81 18.752 .226 .123 .439 
TC6 21.76 18.185 .303 .154 .400 
 
These results indicate that Task_Complexity4 has the lowest correlations—close 




is deleted. This is still not enough indication that even if Task_Complexity4 was 
removed, the remaining items would constitute a reliable scale. 
Looking at the correlations for which r > .3, Task_Complexity1 (the number of 
distinct tasks) is significantly correlated with Task_Complexity2 (the similarity of tasks), 
r = .340 [95% BCa CI: .197; .466] (p < .0001). This result seems reasonable—the more 
numerous the tasks, the more likely they are different. Task_Complexity3 (the clarity of 
tasks) is significantly correlated with Task_Complexity6 (the level of agreement amongst 
participants), r =.324 [95% BCa CI: .191, .450].  Again, this is a sensible finding that 
confirms a basic tenet of a “wicked problem”—less clarity results in greater disagreement 
between participants (Head & Alford, 2013).  
A principal axis factoring was conducted on the six Task_Complexity items. The 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure showed poor sampling adequacy for this factor 
analysis, KMO = .520, and individual item KMO values for Task_Complexity1 and 
Task_Complexity4 were below the recommended .5 (Field, 2013). The other four 
individual item KMO values, however, were only slightly greater than .5. The 
determinant of the correlation matrix was .527, indicating that multicollinearity is not 
present. When the two items failing the KMO test were removed, a single factor had an 
eigenvalue over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and explained 21.9% of variance. 
In summary, there is limited evidence to support an underlying Task Complexity 
factor among the six items, or even when the two problematic items are removed. Thus in 
the cluster and discriminant analysis to follow, individual Task Complexity items can be 




Role of a single organization 
This dimension captures the role individual organizations assume to accomplish 
the policy objective, and was coded as a single variable: Role_Single_Org_N. Table 4-9 
shows the descriptive result for this variable.  
Table 4-9: Role_Single_Org_N descriptives 
Role_Single_Org_N Values 
Assumed Level 
of Interaction Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1: If required, my organization could achieve the 




23 11.2 11.2 
2: My organization requires some assistance from 
other organizations to accomplish the goals 
Coordination 58 28.2 39.3 
3: No organization can achieve the goal 
independently. My organization is interdependent 
with other organizations 
Collaboration 125 60.7 100.0 
Total  206 100.0  
 
Impetus for Collective Action 
This dimension captures the way in which the interorganizational interaction was 
developed, and was coded as a single categorical variable Impetus_N. A further binary 
categorical variable (Mandated) was calculated, which captured whether participation in 
the interorganizational interaction was voluntary. The results show that 130 (63.1%) 
interorganizational interaction are mandated, whereas 76 (36.9%) are voluntary. Table 4-
10 shows the descriptives for the Impetus_N variable. 
A further variable captures the reasons, measured by importance, why a particular 
organization is participating. Note this is different from the earlier Purpose dimension, 
which captures the overall policy purpose of the interorganizational interaction. This 




seven reasons (variables Reason1 to Reason7). A linear composite sum variable, 
Reason_Sum was calculated. Reason_Sum represents the overall ‘stakes’ an organization 
has in an interorganizational interaction. It is not meaningful to interpret Reason_Sum as 
an underlying latent factor, as there is no common “source” of the reasons and the 
importance of each reason to each organization is highly contextual. Thus it is not 
expected that Reason1 to Reason7 variables are highly correlated with each other and no 
scale reliability analysis is required.  
The results in Table 4-11 show that on average, Reason2 (build relationships), 
Reason4 (enhance reputation), and Reason5 (create common vision), were rated as the 
most important. Reason6 (contingent funding) and Reason7 (resolve conflicts) were 
much less important. This is expected given the large proportion of respondents working 
in governmental organizations, who generally are already funded regardless of specific 
participation in multiorganizational projects. For example, 70% of the respondents 
working in International Organizations (e.g. NATO or the United Nations) marked 
Reason 6 as low in importance. 
Table 4-10: Impetus_N descriptives 
Impetus_N Values Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1: Directly tasked by a higher authority or mandate to participate 
(e.g. a higher command, organizational policy or mission, 
organization leader decision, legal requirements) 
130 63.1 63.1 
2: No direct tasking, but not participating would result in either a 
loss of reputation or an inability to meet organizational goals. 
36 17.5 80.6 
3: Participation is voluntary and was initiated primarily by 
senior management. 
16 7.8 88.3 
4: Participation is voluntary and was initiated primarily by the 
staff level. 
24 11.7 100.0 




Table 4-11: Reason(n) and Reason_Sum descriptives 
Variable Mean 







Deviation Variance Lower Upper 
Reason1: Take advantage of partner 
organizations' resources (for example: 
money, information, expertise, physical 
property) to help my organization achieve 
its goals 
4.59 4.34 4.83 .123 1.769 3.130 
Reason2: Build relationships with partner 
organizations because we expect to 
interact with them again in the future 
5.51 5.30 5.71 .102 1.471 2.163 
Reason3: Enhance my organization's 
reputation by working with partner 
organizations that have strong reputations. 
4.46 4.21 4.70 .122 1.752 3.069 
Reason4: Enhance my organization's 
reputation by demonstrating commitment 
to resolving important problems 
5.18 4.96 5.39 .105 1.505 2.265 
Reason5: Create a common vision among 
organizations for solving problems too 
complex for my organization to solve 
alone 
5.05 4.81 5.28 .118 1.693 2.866 
Reason6: Receive funding or grants that are 
contingent upon participation 
2.69 2.41 2.99 .142 2.036 4.147 
Reason7: Resolve conflicts that have 
occurred between my organization and 
partner organizations 
3.08 2.82 3.35 .138 1.987 3.949 
Reason_Sum 30.558 29.626 31.524 .460 6.600 43.555 
 
A further variable, Reason_Sum_LOI was calculated, which segmented the 
Reason_Sum score into three “levels of interaction” as specified by the GIIA. The 
descriptives are shown in Table 4-12. This demonstrates that, according to the GIIA, 
coordination is the majority (72%) level of interaction in the respondent sample when 





Table 4-12: Reason_Sum_LOI descriptives 
Reason_Sum_LOI Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
1.00 = Cooperation 18 8.7 8.7 
2.00 = Coordination 139 67.5 76.2 
3.00 = Collaboration 49 23.8 100.0 
Total 206 100.0  
 
Number of Participating Organizations 
This dimension captures the number of organizations with first degree network 
ties participating in the interorganizational interaction. Inspection of the data revealed 
nine outliers with the number of organizations set as greater than or equal to 100. Closer 
inspection of the other responses for these cases revealed that the intent of the question 
was misunderstood, and the outliers were removed from the descriptive calculations. 
Descriptive results are shown in Table 4-13.  
 
Category of Participating Organizations 
This dimension captures the categories of participating organizations involved in 
the multiorganizational interaction. As would be expected for the defense environment, 
governmental defense organizations are the most prevalent.  
Table 4-13: Number_Orgs descriptives with outliers removed 
 N Median Mean 
BCa 95% CI for Mean Std. Error of 
Mean 
Std. 










Table 4-14: Category of participating organizations descriptives 
Category of Participating Organization 
Total count across all 
respondents 
% (out of 
206) 
1. International intergovernmental organization 160 77.7 
2. Government defense organization (Military service or civilian 
department) 
182 88.3 
3. Government organization (non-defense) 98 47.6 
4. Educational organization (civilian university or college) 84 40.8 
5. Nonprofit organization 55 26.7 
6. For-profit business / corporation 70 34.0 
7. Other 13 6.3 
 
History of Previous Interaction in the Problem Domain 
This dimension captures the extent to which organizations and participants from 
those organizations have worked previously together on other projects in the problem 
domain. From the two survey questions in this dimension, two variables were created: 
History_Org and History_Indv. History_Org is significantly correlated with 
History_Indv, r =.360 [95% BCa CI: .212; .502] (p <.001). Descriptive results are 
presented in Table 4-15. 
Table 4-15: History_Org, History_Indv and History_Sum descriptives 
Variable Name Mean 






Dev. Variance Lower Upper 
History_Org - to what extent organizations involved 
in the multiorganizational interaction have worked 
together on previous initiatives? (1=Not at all; 7=to 
a great extent) 
5.09 4.88 5.30 .110 1.573 2.474 
History_Indv - to what extent you have previously 
worked with individual staff from the organizations 
involved? (1=Not at all; 7=to a great extent) 
4.19 3.92 4.46 .135 1.940 3.764 





Participant’s Problem Orientation 
This dimension reflects the degree to which members of an interorganizational 
interaction view the problem from a shared or individual perspective. From two survey 
questions two variables were created: Problem_Orient1 and Problem_Orient2. 
Problem_Orient1 is significantly and highly correlated with Problem_Orient2, r =.569 
[95% BCa CI: .433; .690] (p <.001), suggesting that the items do measure an underlying 
factor of problem orientation. A third variable, Problem_Orient_Sum created a simple 
linear summed scale of the Likert scores. Descriptive results are presented in Table 4-16. 
Table 4-16: Problem_Orient1 & 2, and Problem_Orient_Sum descriptives 
Variable Name Mean 







Deviation Variance Lower Upper 
Problem_Orient1: Generally, people in this 
multiorganizational interaction are dedicated to 
the idea that we can make this project work 
(1=strongly disagree, 4=neutral, 7=strongly 
agree) 
6.00 5.83 6.14 .080 1.146 1.312 
Problem_Orient2: My ideas about what we want 
to accomplish with this multiorganizational 
interaction seem to be the same as the ideas of 
others (1=strongly disagree, 4=neutral, 
7=strongly agree) 
5.32 5.14 5.49 .096 1.380 1.905 
Problem_Orient_Sum 11.311 10.995 11.602 .156 2.240 5.015 
 
A further variable, Problem_Orient_Sum_LOI was calculated, which segmented 
the Problem_Orient_Sum score into three “levels of interaction” as specified by the 
GIIA. The descriptives are shown in Table 4-17. This demonstrates that, according to the 
GIIA, collaboration is the majority (72.8%) level of interaction in the respondent sample 





Table 4-17: Problem_Orient_Sum_LOI descriptives 
Problem_Orient_Sum_LOI Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
1.00 = Cooperation 10 4.9 4.9 
2.00 = Coordination 46 22.3 27.2 
3.00 = Collaboration 150 72.8 100.0 
Total 206 100.0  
 
Resource Allocation 
This dimension describes the contributions allocated by individual organizations 
to the interorganizational interaction in support of the policy objective. Three survey 
questions were coded into the variables Resource_Alloc1, Resource_Alloc2_N and 
Resource_Alloc3_N. Descriptive results are shown in Table 4-18 and Table 4-19. These 
variables are combined into a weighted composite sum: Resource_Alloc_Comp = 
Resource_Alloc1 + (Resource_Alloc2 x 2) + Resource_Alloc3. The double weighting for 
Resource_Alloc2 is to account for the fact that these three possible values strongly 
discriminate between different types of interaction. There were no significant correlations 
between the three Resource_Alloc variables. A further variable, 
Resource_Alloc_Comp_LOI segments the Resource_Alloc_Comp variable into the three 
levels of interaction as specified by the GIIA. Descriptives are shown in Table 4-20 and 
Table 4-21 . 
Table 4-18: Resource_Alloc1 descriptives 
Variable Name and Description 
 
BCa 95% CI for 
Mean Std. Error 
of Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Variance Mean Lower Upper 
Resource_Alloc1: My contribution in the 
multiorganizational interaction is considered 
part of my “regular duties” by my organization 
(1=Strongly disagree; 7= Strongly agree) 




Table 4-19: Resource_Alloc2_N and Resource_Alloc3_N descriptives 
Resource_Alloc2_N Values 
Assumed Level 
of Interaction Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1: My organization’s financial resources are not 
involved 
Cooperation 28 13.6 13.6 
2: My organization allocates (or has received) 
funding specifically for participation in the 
multiorganizational interaction 
Coordination 163 79.1 92.7 
3: My organization pools financial resources with 
other organizations into an independent operating 
fund for the multiorganizational interaction 
Collaboration 15 7.3 100.0 
Total  206 100.0  
Resource_Alloc3_N Values 
Assumed Level 
of Interaction Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1: Information Cooperation 44 21.4 21.4 
2: The time and expertise of personnel Coordination 148 71.8 93.2 
3: Financial and material assets Collaboration 10 4.9 98.1 
4: Logistical and administrative support to the 
multiorganizational group 
Collaboration 4 1.9 100.0 
Total  206 100.0  
 
Table 4-20: Resource_Alloc_Comp descriptives 
Variable Name and Description 




Dev. Variance Mean Lower Upper 
Resource_Alloc_Comp (Range = 3 – 
14) 
11.704 11.456 11.961 .132 1.893 3.585 
 
Table 4-21: Resource_Alloc_Comp_LOI descriptives 
Resource_Alloc_Comp_LOI Values Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 = Cooperation 5 2.4 2.4 
2 = Coordination 117 56.8 59.2 
3 = Collaboration 84 40.8 100.0 






This dimension captures the intrinsic and extrinsic incentives provided to 
individuals and participating organizations to encourage support for the 
interorganizational interaction. While the GIIA dimension has several different 
operationalizations of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives, due to a variety of survey-related 
issues, only the leadership factor is captured in a single survey item. Table 4-22 shows 
descriptives for the Incentives variable, and Table 4-23 shows the Incentives variable 
segmented into the _LOI version.  
Table 4-22: Incentives descriptives 
Variable Name and Description 
 






Dev. Variance Mean Lower Upper 
Incentives: select a number that indicates how 
much your organization's leadership 
recognizes the benefits of participating in the 
multiorganizational interaction (1=strongly 
disagree; 7=strongly agree) 
5.981 5.797 6.160 .089 1.292 1.688 
Table 4-23: Incentives_LOI descriptives 
Incentives_LOI Values Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 = Cooperation 7 3.4 3.4 
2 = Coordination 42 20.4 23.8 
3 = Collaboration 157 76.2 100.0 
Total 206 100.0  
 
Time Taken to Establish Multiorganizational Arrangement 
This dimension captures the length of time in months, relative to the time for 
implementation of the interaction, that the partnership takes to establish. One survey 




Understandably, the results displayed in show a high level of variance, with the standard 
deviation (15.9 months) greater than the mean (13.5 months), compared to the median 
and mode time of 6 months. While the GIIA assigns values for this dimension of “short 
term,” “medium term,” and “long term” to each level of interaction, it is not clear how 
these can be interpreted in the context of the real data, hence no attempt is made to 
segment the results into a “level of interaction” variable as done for other variables. 
Table 4-24: Time_Interact descriptives (months) 
Variable Name and Description Mean Median 




Dev. Variance Lower Upper 
Time_Interact (months) 13.52 6.00 11.51 15.92 1.109 15.921 253.490 
 
Key Personnel 
This dimension captures the involvement of the key personnel who are 
responsible for bringing together and implementing the interorganizational interaction. 
The dimension was specified by two survey questions. The first captured the role of 
leadership in the forming and planning the interorganizational interaction (coded as 
variable Leadrshp_Forming_N); the second examined the role of staff in the organization 
(coded as variable Staff_Forming_N). Descriptive results are presenting in Table 4-25.  





. The squared operation allows greater 
weighting to higher levels of interaction and increases discrimination between states in 




which staff and leadership create the interaction. A Kendall’s tau
8
 correlation analysis 
revealed a weak but statistically significant relationship between the leadership and staff 
variables (τ = 0.193 [95% BCa CI: 0.048; 0.333], p = 0.003). Descriptive results for 
Key_Personnel_Sum are shown in Table 4-26. 
Table 4-25: Leadershp_Forming_N and Staff_Forming_N descriptives 
Leadrshp_Forming_N Values 
Assumed Level 
of Interaction Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1: Organizational leadership is not involved in 
decisions to work together 
Cooperation 
 
19 9.2 9.2 
2: Organizational leadership is openly supportive, but 
isn't involved in detailed planning of contributions 
to a multiorganizational interaction 
Coordination 127 61.7 70.9 
3: Organizational leadership is openly supportive 
AND is involved in planning contributions to the 
multiorganizational interaction 
Collaboration 60 29.1 100.0 
Total  206 100.0  
Staff_Forming_N Values 
Assumed Level 
of Interaction Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 




45 21.8 21.8 
2: Mid-level management implement and administer 
organization's involvement in interaction 
Coordination 67 32.5 54.4 
3: The level of staff involved and their 
responsibilities adapt to the task at hand; each role 
is considered equally important 
Collaboration 94 45.6 100.0 
Total  206 100.0  
Table 4-26: Key_Personnel_Sum descriptives 
Variable Name and 
Description Mean Median 




Deviation Variance Lower Upper 
Key_Personnel_Sum 
(Range: 2 – 18) 
10.806 13.00 10.193 11.528 .319 4.577 20.947 
 
                                                 
8
 Kendall’s tau was used as the data are nominal with very few categories, thus the number of tied ranks is 




As with the other survey variables, Key_Personnel_Sum was then segmented into 
the three levels of interaction as specified by the GIIA. The descriptive results presented 
in show that 51.9% of cases are rated as “collaboration.” 
Table 4-27: Key_Personnel_Sum_LOI descriptives 
Key_Personnel_Sum_LOI Values Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 = Cooperation 41 19.9 19.9 
2 = Coordination 58 28.2 48.1 
3 = Collaboration 157 51.9 100.0 
Total 206 100.0  
 
A third survey question was included in the Key Personnel dimension. This 
question captured whether organizations were equal, or whether one or more 
organizations shared leadership of the group. Descriptives for this question, coded as 
variable Org_Lead_N are presented in Table 4-28. 
Table 4-28: Org_Lead_N descriptives 
Org_Lead_N Values 
Assumed Level 
of Interaction Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1: All organizations are equal partners Cooperation 35 17.0 17.0 
2: One organization leads the group Coordination 82 39.8 56.8 
3: A few organizations share leadership of the group Collaboration 89 43.2 100.0 
Total  206 100.0  
 
The Org_Lead_N variable was not included in the Key_Personnel_Sum variable 
because after consideration, it was realized that it does not add further information about 
the key personnel, but rather expresses something at a higher, interorganizational level of 
analysis. The variable will be used as an additional profiling for cluster solution in later 




Orientation of Policy Objective (Goals) 
This dimension describes whether policy objectives (or “goals”) between 
interacting organizations are agreed and comprehensive in nature. A single survey 
question presented three options, which were coded into a variable Goals_N. Descriptives 
for Goal_N are shown in Table 4-29. A scale version of the variable was also computed 
for use in cluster analysis, Goals_S. 
The frequencies show only one case at a level of cooperation, which when 
compared to the other variables appears to be an outlier. The free text responses for this 
case do not give any cause for concern and the case’s responses on other variables were 
not problematic. The overall response for the Goals_N may indicate a poorly specified 
question. “Goals” were not defined in the question, and the notion expressed in the first 
possible response that “(t)here are no shared goals” goes against a normative belief about 
collective working. Thus it is likely that respondents answered this question with some 
optimism.  
 
Table 4-29: Goals_N descriptives 
Goals_N Values 
Assumed Level 
of Interaction Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1: There are no shared goals Cooperation 1 0.5 0.5 
2: Some shared goals, in addition to individual 
organizational goals 
Coordination 124 60.2 60.7 
3: Shared goals agreed between all participants Collaboration 81 39.3 100.0 







This dimension captures the administrative structure that emerges in the 
interorganizational interaction. The survey presented six different multiple response 
options, coded in binary variables, Design1, Design2…Design6. Table 4-30 shows the 
total count across all respondents for each design option, and a percentage out of 206, 
which was the total number of possible positive responses for each variable.  





]+ [Design3 x 2
3
] + … + [Design6 x 2
6
]). The properties of this composite 
variable are the same as for Purpose_Comp. Descriptive results for the Design_Comp 
variable are shown in Table 4-31.  
 
Table 4-30: Multiple response frequencies for Design variables 







% (out of 
206) 
Design1:  Informal communications between staff   Cooperation 175 85.0 
Design2:  Official communications backed by 
organizational leadership 
Cooperation 116 56.3 
Design 3:  Regular official meetings between working 
level staff 
Coordination 176 85.4 
Design4:  Regular official meetings between 
organizational leadership 
Coordination 94 45.6 
Design5:  Executive decision boards / committees 
created especially for the multiorganizational group in 
which leadership make decisions about the interaction 
Collaboration 104 50.5 
Design6:  A new joint organization is created to 
implement the tasks of the multiorganizational 
interaction 







A further variable, Design_Comp_LOI was calculated, which segmented the 
Design_Comp score into three “levels of interaction” as specified by the GIIA. The 
descriptives are shown in 
Table 4-32. This demonstrates that, according to the GIIA, collaboration is the 
majority (62%) level of interaction in the respondent sample when using design of the 
interorganizational interaction as a measure. 
Table 4-31: Design_Comp descriptives 
 N Mean 
BCa 95% CI for Mean Std. Error 
of Mean Std. Dev. Variance Lower Upper 
Design_Comp 
Range (1 to 6.98) 
206 5.0635 4.857 5.244 0.100 1.429 2.041 
 
Table 4-32: Design_Comp_LOI descriptives 
Design_Comp_LOI Level Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
1.00 = Cooperation 10 4.9 4.9 
2.00 = Coordination 72 35.0 39.8 
3.00 = Collaboration 124 60.2 100.0 
Total 206 100.0  
 
Formality of the Agreement 
This dimension captures the way in which individual organizations agree on their 
roles and responsibilities within the interorganizational interaction. A single survey 
question presented three options, which were coded into a variable Formality_N. 
Descriptives for Formality_N are shown in Table 4-33. A scale version of the variable 





Table 4-33: Formality_N descriptives 
Formality_N Values 
Assumed Level 
of Interaction Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1: There are no shared goals Individual organizations 
informally agree to work together to achieve 
individual or mutually-beneficial goals 
Cooperation 61 29.6 29.6 
2: Policy documents (such as terms of reference or 
memoranda of understanding) identify each 
organization's roles and responsibilities, and are 
signed off by leadership 
Coordination 98 47.6 77.2 
3: Policy documents (such as terms of reference or 
memoranda of understanding) describe detailed 
implementation plans in addition to roles and 
responsibilities, and are signed off by leadership. 
Collaboration 47 22.8 100.0 
Total 206 100.0  
 
Information Sharing and Communications 
This dimension captures the ways in which personnel within the 
interorganizational interaction use information and communication processes to attain the 
policy objective. The survey presented six different multiple response options, coded in 
binary variables: Info1, Info2…Info6. Table 4-34 shows the total count across all 
respondents for each Information Sharing and Communications option, and a percentage 
out of 206, which was the total number of possible positive responses for each variable. 
A composite variable was calculated: Info_Comp = Log2([Info1 x 2
1
] + [Info2 x 
2
2
]+ [Info3 x 2
3
] + … + [Info6 x 2
6
]). This variable has the same properties as 
Purpose_Comp and Design_Comp. Descriptive results for the Info_Comp variable are 
presented in Table 4-35. A further variable, Info_Comp_LOI was calculated, which 
segmented the Info_Comp score into three “levels of interaction” as specified by the 
GIIA. The descriptives are shown in Table 4-36. This demonstrates that, according to the 




when using information sharing and communications methods of the interorganizational 
interaction as a measure 
Table 4-34: Multiple response frequencies for Info variables 










Info1: Information is shared through informal channels 
and relationships between participants (e.g. staff email) 
Cooperation 157 76.2 
Info2: Formal (official documents) and informal 
communication channels are used 
Cooperation 141 68.4 
Info3: Interorganizational communication is formalized, 
with staff given mandate to share information 
Coordination 79 38.3 
Info4: Formalized communications infrastructures begin to 
develop (group email lists, shared web-based 
information repositories etc.) 
Coordination 98 47.6 
Info5: Open and frequent communication through formal 
and informal channels 
Collaboration 140 68.0 
Info6: Interorganizational communication is 
institutionalized in organizational policies and processes 
(e.g. policy requirements to share information with 
partner organizations) 
Collaboration 66 32.0 
 
Table 4-35: Info_Comp descriptives 
 N Mean 
BCa 95% CI for Mean Std. Error 
of Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Variance Lower Upper 
Info_Comp 
Range (1 to 6.98) 
206 5.278 5.032 5.495 .109 1.558 2.428 
 
Table 4-36: Info_Comp_LOI descriptives 
Info_Comp_LOI Level Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
1.00 = Cooperation 8 3.9 3.9 
2.00 = Coordination 39 18.9 18.9 
3.00 = Collaboration 159 77.2 100.0 





This dimension captures the ways in which the organizations within the 
interorganizational interaction make implementation decisions pertaining to the policy 
objective. The survey presented six different multiple response options, coded in binary 
variables: Decision1, Decision2…Decision6. Table 4-37 shows the total count across all 
respondents for each decision making option, and a percentage out of 206, which was the 
total number of possible positive responses for each variable. A Decision_Comp variable, 
and a Decision_Comp_LOI variable were calculated in the same way as for the 
Information Sharing and Communications Dimension. The descriptive results are 
presented in Table 4-38 and Table 4-39.  











Decision1: Decisions are made independently by each 
organization 
Cooperation 50 24.3 
Decision2: Centralized decision making is practiced; a 
lead organization(s) dominates the decision making 
process 
Cooperation 58 28.2 
Decision3: Senior leadership (chief executive or command 
group level) conducts collective decision making about 
the interorganizational interaction 
Coordination 74 35.9 
Decision4: Participative decision making based on 
consensus and compromise generates rules to govern 
activities and relationships between organizations 
Coordination 105 51.0 
Decision5: Organizational representatives have latitude to 
negotiate rules and discuss agreements to identify 
common ground 
Collaboration 103 50.0 
Decision6: Joint decision making occurs at all levels of 
organization 





Table 4-38: Decision_Comp descriptives 
 N Mean 
BCa 95% CI for Mean Std. Error 
of Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Variance Lower Upper 
Decision_Comp 
Range (1 to 6.98) 
206 4.943 4.679 5.154 .120 1.725 2.977 
Table 4-39: Decision_Comp_LOI descriptives 
Decision_Comp_LOI Level Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
1.00 = Cooperation 14 6.8 6.8 
2.00 = Coordination 57 27.7 34.5 
3.00 = Collaboration 135 65.5 100.0 
Total 206 100.0  
 
Organizational Autonomy 
This dimension captures the degree to which partnering organizations 
independently operate. A single survey question presented three options related to the 
compatibility of policies, which were coded into a variable Autonomy1_N. Descriptives 
for Autonomy1_N are shown in Table 4-40. Another set of three survey items were 
offered (Autonomy2a, Autonomy2b, Autonomy2c), which combine to form a scale that 
measures the extent to which an organization’s autonomy is affected. Descriptives for the 
Autonomy2 items and an Autonomy2_Sum scale are presented in Table 4-41 . 
Table 4-40: Autonomy1_N descriptives 
Autonomy1_N Values 
Assumed Level 
of Interaction Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1: The multiorganizational group does not have policies Cooperation 44 21.4 21.4 
2: Policies developed for the multiorganizational group 
are compatible with my organizations policies 
Coordination 100 48.5 69.9 
3: Partner organizations jointly develop policies and 
negotiation is required when they conflict with 
individual organization policies 
Collaboration 62 30.1 100.0 




Table 4-41: Autonomy2 and Autonomy2_Sum descriptives 
Variable Name and Item Description Mean 
BCa 95% CI for 
Mean Std. Error 
of Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Variance Lower Upper 
Autonomy2a: The multiorganizational 
interaction hinders my organization from 
meeting its own organizational mission 
(1=Not at all; 7=to a great extent) 
1.97 1.80 2.15 .094 1.356 1.838 
Autonomy2b: My organization’s independence 
is affected by having to work with partner 
organizations on activities related to the 
multiorganizational interaction (1=Not at all; 
7=to a great extent) 
2.90 2.62 3.17 .133 1.908 3.639 
Autonomy2c: As a representative of my 
organization, I feel pulled between trying to 
meet both my organization’s and the 
multiorganizational interaction's expectation 
(1=Not at all; 7=to a great extent) 
3.33 3.07 3.57 .134 1.929 3.723 
Autonomy2_Sum_S 2.731 2.549 2.909 .097 1.388 1.925 
 
Reliability Analysis for Autonomy2. According to Thomson (2001), the three 
Autonomy2 items should form a single factor of “organizational autonomy,” which 
constitutes the dimension in the GIIA. A reliability analysis was conducted that found 
Cronbach’s alpha (N=206) = .704, and Guttman’s lower bound λ2 = .704. This is below 
the recommended .8 for a reliable scale; however, others note that for exploratory 
research lower values can be acceptable (Field, 2013). Furthermore, given that 
Cronbach’s alpha is highly dependent on the number of items, in addition to inter-item 
correlation, the reliability of the Autonomy2 scale is likely affected by the low number of 
items. Results indicate moderate correlations between items (Table 4-42) and the highest 






Table 4-42: Autonomy2 Inter-Item Correlations; Pearson’s r (Significance) [Bias 
corrected and accelerated bootstrap 95% Confidence Intervals] 
Autonomy2 Autonomy2a Autonomy2b Autonomy2c 
Autonomy2a 1   
Autonomy2b .527 (.000) 
[.419, .630] 
1  





Table 4-43: Item-total statistics for Autonomy2 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 








if Item Deleted 
Autonomy2a 6.23 10.128 .621 .387 .546 
Autonomy2b 5.29 8.198 .503 .294 .643 
Autonomy2c 4.87 8.202 .489 .271 .664 
 
A principal axis factoring test of the dimensionality of the Autonomy2 scale 
showed that a single factor is present, as expected from Thomson (2001, 2009). The 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure verified a reasonable sampling adequacy for this 
factor analysis, KMO = .657, and KMO values for individual items were  >.618 thus all 
above the recommended .5 (Field, 2013). The determinant of the correlation matrix was 
.527, indicating that multicollinearity is not present. A single factor had an eigenvalue 
over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and explained 48.6% of variance (Table 4-44). 
Table 4-44: Factor analysis results for the Autonomy2 scale 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 1.941 64.689 64.689 1.457 48.576 48.576 
2 .625 20.836 85.525    
3 .434 14.475 100.000    




Relationship between Autonomy1_N and Autonomy2_Sum. The relationship 
between Autonomy1_N—a three-level categorical variable and Autonomy2_Sum—a 
continuous scale, provides a test of criterion validity of the Autonomy2_Sum scale. It is 
expected that the importance of organizational autonomy increases as the partnership 
develops joint policies, thus for each level of Autonomy1_N, Autonomy2_Sum should 
increase. This was tested using a one-way ANOVA with planned contrasts with the three 
Autonomy1_N levels as the grouping variable, and Autonomy2_Sum as the ‘dependent’ 
variable.  
There is a significant effect of Autonomy1_N level on the value of 
Autonomy2_Sum, F(2, 203) = 7.150, p =.001, ω =.24. The planned contrasts reveal that, 
compared to level 1 of Autonomy1_N, level 2 is significantly associated with an mean 
increase of 0.572 in Autonomy2_Sum, t(203) = 2.345, p =.02, r = 0.16. Compared to 
level 2 of Autonomy1_N, level 3 is significantly associated with a mean increase of .433 
in Autonomy2_Sum, t(203) = 1.986, p = .048, r = .14. In other words, there is evidence to 
support the assertion that the impact of organizational autonomy (Autonomy2_Sum) 
increases as the partnership develops joint policies (Autonomy1_N). While the 
association is significant, the effect sizes are small, hence closer scrutiny is required. 
First, differences in variances between groups were examined: Levene’s test is not 
significant, indicating nonsignificant differences in variance between groups, F(2, 203) = 
1.482, p =.230. Group sample sizes are different, however, so the Gabriel post-hoc test 
was used. Gabriel’s test was only significant for the mean difference comparison = 1.004 
(95% CI .367, 1.642) between level 3 and 1 of Autonomy1_N, p = .001. The mean 




In conclusion, given the presence of a single factor, the moderate inter-item 
correlations, the maximum scale value of Cronbach’s alpha with all items included, and 
the criterion validity test, the analysis can proceed with the assumption that Autonomy2 




This dimension captures the extent to which trustworthy relationships between 
organizations within the interorganizational interaction are built. A single survey question 
presented three options, which were coded into a variable Trust1_N. Descriptives for 
Trust1_N are shown in Table 4-45. Another set of three survey items were offered 
(Trust2a, Trust2b, Trust2c), which combine to form a scale that measures the dimension. 
Descriptives for the Trust2 items and the Trust2_Sum scale are presented in Table 4-46. 
 
Table 4-45: Trust1_N descriptives 
Trust1_N Values 
Assumed Level 
of Interaction Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1: Trust relationships are not required Cooperation 12 5.8 5.8 
2: Trust relationships are useful, but must be based 
on reciprocal behaviors 
Coordination 70 34.0 39.8 
3: Trust between organizations is necessary; in all 
levels of staff 
Collaboration 124 60.2 100.0 








Table 4-46: Trust2 and Trust2_Sum descriptives 
Variable Name and Item Description Mean 
BCa 95% CI for Mean Std. Error 
of Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Variance Lower Upper 
Trust2a: The people who represent 
partner organizations in the 
multiorganizational interaction are 
trustworthy (1=Strongly disagree; 
7=strongly agree) 
5.78 5.60 5.96 .083 1.96 1.430 
Trust2b: My organization can count on 
each partner organization to meet its 
obligations in the multiorganizational 
interaction. (1=Strongly disagree; 
7=strongly agree) 
4.94 4.70 5.15 .105 1.513 2.289 
Trust2c: My organization feels it 
worthwhile to stay and work with 
partner organizations rather than leave 
or scale back commitments to the 
multiorganizational interaction 
(1=Strongly disagree; 7=strongly 
agree) 
5.83 5.66 6.00 .086 1.232 1.517 
Trust2_Sum 5.518 5.374 5.660 .071 1.015 1.030 
 
Reliability Analysis for Trust2. According to Thomson (2001), the three Trust2 
variables should form a single factor of “organizational trust,” which constitutes the 
dimension in the GIIA. A reliability analysis was conducted that found Cronbach’s alpha 
(N=206) = .653, and Guttman’s lower bound λ2 = .668. As was the case with the 
Autonomy scale, the value of reliability measures should be interpreted in the context of 
the low number of items. Results indicate (Table 4-47) moderate and significant 
correlations between Trust2a and Trust2b (r = .573 (p =.000) [.464, .675]), and low and 
significant correlations for the other item combinations. The highest value of Cronbach’s 






Table 4-47: Trust2 Inter-Item Correlations; Pearson’s r (Significance) [Bias corrected 
and accelerated bootstrap 95% Confidence Intervals] 
Trust2 Trust2a Trust2b Trust2c 
Trust2a 1   
Trust2b .573 (.000) 
[.464, .675] 
1  





Table 4-48: Item-total statistics Trust2 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 








if Item Deleted 
Trust2a 10.77 4.850 .568 .353 .430 
Trust2b 11.61 3.868 .523 .339 .476 
Trust2c 10.72 5.791 .331 .113 .716 
 
 
A principal axis factoring test of the dimensionality of the scale showed that a 
single factor is present as expected from Thomson (2001, 2009). The Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO) measure verified a reasonable sampling adequacy for this factor analysis, 
KMO = .599, and KMO values for individual items >.570, thus all above the 
recommended .5 (Field, 2013). The determinant of the correlation matrix was .596, 
indicating that multicollinearity is not present. A single factor had an eigenvalue over 






Table 4-49: Factor analysis results for the Trust2 scale 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 1.794 59.791 59.791 1.303 43.441 43.441 
2 .780 26.003 85.794    
3 .426 14.206 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
 
Relationship between Trust1_N and Trust2_Sum. The relationship between 
Trust1_N—a three-level categorical variable and Trust2_Sum—a continuous scale, 
provides a test of criterion validity of the Trust2_Sum scale. It is expected that the 
organizational trust factor score (Trust2_Sum) should increase as the relevance of trust in 
the multiorganizational interaction increases (Trust1_N), thus for each level of Trust1_N, 
Trust2_Sum should increase. This was tested using a one-way ANOVA with planned 
contrasts with the three Trust1_N levels as the grouping variable, and Trust2_Sum as the 
‘dependent’ variable.  
There is a significant effect of Trust1_N level on the value of Trust2_Sum, F(2, 
203) = 9.277, p =.000, ω =.27. The planned contrasts reveal that the difference in means 
between level 1 and level 2 of Trust1_N is not significant,  (t(203) = -.138, p = .890, r = 
.01), and is found to be slightly negative, rather than positive as expected. The mean 
difference between level 2 and 3 is positive (.603) and significant, t(203) = 4.130, p 
=.000, r =.28. The mean difference between level 3 and 1 is positive (.561) but just fails 
the significance criteria, t(203) = 1.900, p = .059, r = .13.  
Due to the low effect sizes and differences in group sizes, Gabriel’s post-hoc 
comparison test was performed, indicating that the only significant difference is between 




sample size for level 1 (N = 12) and the fact that there may be a normative bias in this 
question—respondents may not have wanted to state that “trust is not required”—the 
results for this level will be discounted. The ANOVA and planned contrast tests support 
the assertion that the organizational trust factor score (Trust2_Sum) should increase as 
the relevance of trust in the multiorganizational interaction increases (Trust1_N), with the 
exception for when no trust relationships are required.  
In conclusion, given the presence of a single factor, the moderate inter-item 
correlations, and the criterion validity test, the analysis can proceed with the assumption 
that Trust2 constitutes a single factor and thus the Trust2_Sum variable can be used as a 
single clustering dimension. Given the weak Cronbach alpha scores, however, the 
Trust2_Sum variable will be closely scrutinized when employing statistical based tests 
such as discriminant analysis. 
 
Outcome Variables 
In addition to the dimensions captured in the GIIA, the survey also included five 
interorganizational interaction “outcome” variables, which examined respondents 
perceptions about the overall effectiveness of the interaction, and whether participating in 
the interaction affected the quality of working relationships that developed, broadened the 
organization’s view about the original policy problem, improved the quality and quantity 
of interactions, and increased an organizations influence over others. The descriptives for 






Table 4-50: Outcome variable descriptives 
Variable Name Mean 
BCa 95% CI for Mean Std. Error 
of Mean Std. Dev. Variance Lower Upper 
Outcome1: Overall, the 
multiorganizational interaction is 
effective in achieving expected 
outcomes. (1=strongly disagree, 
4=neutral, 7=strongly agree) 
5.46 5.28 5.63 .092 1.320 1.742 
Outcome 2: Overall, high quality 
working relationships have 
developed between my organization 
and partner organizations as a result 
of this multiorganizational 
interaction. (1=strongly disagree, 
4=neutral, 7=strongly agree) 
5.30 5.09 5.48 .100 1.430 2.044 
Outcome3: Overall, my organizations 
view of the issue(s)/problem(s) that 
brought the organizations together 
has broadened as a result of the 
interaction. (1=strongly disagree, 
4=neutral, 7=strongly agree) 
5.59 5.41 5.76 .089 1.284 1.648 
Outcome 4: Overall, my organization 
has increased its interaction with 
partner organizations as a result of 
the multiorganizational interaction. 
(1=strongly disagree, 4=neutral, 
7=strongly agree) 
5.14 4.93 5.33 .110 1.576 2.483 
Outcome 5: Overall, the 
multiorganizational interaction has 
helped to make partner 
organizations’ influence on each 
other more equal. (1=strongly 
disagree, 4=neutral, 7=strongly 
agree) 
4.64 4.45 4.83 .098 1.414 1.999 
 
There are moderate, positive, significant correlations present between all 
Outcome variables. This indicates that the five variables are relatively concurrent, 
although there is not theoretical justification to support an underlying factor analysis as 
the operationalizations are somewhat crude (Thomson, 2001). The correlation results are 




Table 4-51: Outcome Variable Correlations; Pearson’s r (Significance) [Bias corrected 
and accelerated bootstrap 95% Confidence Intervals] 
Outcomei  
Variable Outcome1 Outcome2 Outcome3 Outcome4 Outcome5 
Outcome1 1     
Outcome2 .471 (.000) 
[.324, .605] 
1    




1   

















Preparing for Clustering Analysis 
As explained in chapter 3, several interrelated issues concerning the data, 
variables and the clustering method must be addressed before starting the analysis (Hair 
et al., 2006). The following issues are reported on in the last part of this descriptive 
analysis section: 
 Assessing adequacy of the sample size 
 Standardization of the data or variables 
 Reviewing outliers 
 Examining multicollinearity 
Sample Size Adequacy 
Given the 5n to 2
n
 range criterion for sample size (Mooi & Sarstedt, 2011), where 
n is the number of clustering variables, the required number of cases ranges from 55 to 
2048, assuming n = 11 –the maximum number of variables that could be used for 




1024. The sample size of N = 206 is within the desired range. In addition this numerical 
criteria, Hair et al. (2006) recommend simply that the sample size should be large enough 
to ensure that all expected groups are adequately represented. This criterion is now 
reviewed by comparing the nominal counts of levels of interaction for each clustering 
variable. 
As explained in the descriptive statistics, the 11 dimensions of the GIIA used for 
clustering can be represented by nominal variables with three levels corresponding to the 
three levels of interaction: cooperation, coordination and collaboration. Comparing basic 
frequency data for the nominal variables shows that, on average, the 11 clustering 
dimensions are 54.3% at the level of collaboration, 36.3% at the level of coordination, 
and 9.4% at cooperation Table 4-52. Five variables have counts at ten or less for the level 
of cooperation. This implies that, if a distinct level—or cluster—of “cooperation” can be 
discerned from the structure of the data, it is unlikely that these variables will contribute 
very strongly in determining the cluster solution.  
The variables Resource_Alloc_Comp_LOI, Incentives_LOI, Info_Comp_LOI, 
and Problem_Orient_Sum_LOI were segmented into the three levels based on continuous 
scale variable, thus the low count of values at the level of cooperation actually represents 
an underlying range. This is not the case, however, for the Goals_N variable, which is 
based on a single survey question. Thus the single count at the level of cooperation means 
that only one case has a value of 1 in the Goals_S version of the variable. For this reason, 





This variable-averaged breakdown of cases across the three levels of interaction 
does not mean that the sample has more instances of collaboration than coordination, as 
often a particular multiorganizational interaction (case) exhibits some variables at a level 
of collaboration and some at coordination or cooperation. Furthermore, using a three 
level scheme may conceal underlying structures in between the overall levels of 
coordination and collaboration, for example, that can only be discerned by looking either 
at the continuous scale variables or with associative measures of similarity in the nominal 
variables.  
Table 4-52: Frequencies of levels of interaction for clustering variables 
Potential Clustering Variables 
Count 
Cooperation Coordination Collaboration 
Problem_Orient_Sum_LOI 10 46 150 
Resource_Alloc_Comp_LOI 5 117 84 
Incentives_LOI 7 42 157 
Key_Personnel_Sum_LOI 41 58 107 
Goals_N 1 124 81 
Design_Comp_LOI 10 72 124 
Formality_N 61 98 47 
Info_Comp_LOI 8 39 159 
Decision_Comp_LOI 14 57 135 
Autonomy1_N 44 100 62 
Trust1_N 12 70 124 
Total count for level (% of 2266 ) 213 (9.4) 823 (36.3) 1230 (54.3) 
Mean count for each level 19.4 74.8 111.8 
 
In summary, the sample size of 206 is suitable for clustering 11 dimensions (or 
ten with the Goals_S variable removed), and for most variables there is a adequate spread 
of values across expected levels. The difference in counts between levels may indicate 




Standardization of data 
As the clustering dimension variables are measured on difference scales, using 
them in an undstandardized form would give larger weighting to variables with 
numerically larger scales. There is no theoretical reason to retain the original scales, thus 
all variables are standardized as z-scores as recommended by Hair et al. (2006). 
Outliers 
Clustering solutions are potentially affected by outliers, especially hierarchical 
approaches (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). Data for all clustering dimensions was 
inspected for outliers, identified by z scores of |4| or greater, with none found. Given that 
all dimensions are constructed from Likert items with seven levels, the ranges of resultant 
composite scales are fairly limited and all variables are of the same order of magnitude.  
Multicollinearity 
Variables with high multicollinearity are weighted more in the development of 
cluster solutions, as the proportion of variance explained by a single variable decreases 
when other highly correlated variable are included (Hair et al., 2006). Thus it is important 
to inspect the overall correlations of cluster variables. The highest correlation is between 
Trust2_Sum and Problem_Orient_Sum, r = .550 [95% BCa CI: .429; .654] (p < .0001). 
Correlations between the continuous scale variables are displayed in Table 4-53. Given 
the medium to low correlations between variables, analysis will proceed under the 
assumption that multicollinearity is not an issue. The major impact of this is that 
conventional similarity measures can be used, rather than generalized distances that 
account for multicollinearity such as the Mahalanobis D
2





Table 4-53: Clustering variable correlations; Pearson’s r (significance) [Bias corrected 
and accelerated bootstrap 95% Confidence Intervals] 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1: Problem_Orient_ 
    Sum 
1      
2: Resource_Alloc_ 
    Comp 
.229 (.001) 
[.093, .368] 
1     




1    
4: Key_Personnel_ 
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7: Formality_S 1     
8: Info_Comp .359 (.000) 
[.255, .463] 
1    
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CHAPTER 5:  
STUDY FINDINGS 
This chapter discusses the main results of the empirical study and draws initial 
conclusions. First, the steps performed for clustering analysis are described and cluster 
solutions are presented. Subsequent sections address each of the four research questions 
in turn. Finally, conclusions are drawn and the Generalized Interorganizational 
Interaction Array (GIIA) is evaluated. 
Clustering Analysis 
This section presents the steps taken to arrive at a stable set of final cluster 
solutions that are used to address the research questions in the following sections. A 
cluster solution is the main result from the cluster analysis process, which assigns a 
cluster membership to each of the 206 cases in the sample. In a “three-cluster” solution, 
for example, each case is assigned a value of one, two or three, corresponding to 
membership in cluster one, cluster two or cluster three. The following steps in the cluster 
analysis are presented. First, initial cluster results from a hierarchical agglomerative 
cluster analysis are described and profiled. Other than ensuring cluster distinctiveness, no 
interpretation is made at this stage. Second, taking the optimal clusters from the 
hierarchical stage as seed points, the k-means cluster analysis results are presented and 





Hierarchical Analysis Results 
Using the approach described in chapter three, a hierarchical cluster analysis with 
Ward’s algorithm was run and the agglomeration schedule, dendrogram, and cluster 
membership tables were generated. The results were checked for outliers and for small or 
single member clusters. No single member clusters were observed. The five-, six-, seven- 
and eight-cluster solutions had a cluster of eight cases; however, this was combined with 
another by the four-cluster solution. No outliers such as single cases joining cluster 
solutions at later stages of the process were observed.  
In order to determine the number of cluster solutions taken forward for analysis, 
the agglomeration schedule for the last ten stages was inspected and the percentage 
change in the agglomeration coefficient with each clustering stage was calculated (Table 
5-1). Using the stopping rule of a five percent minimum change, the agglomeration 
schedule indicated that the five-, four-, three-, and two-cluster solutions were optimal. 
Inspecting the dendogram and cluster descriptives, however, showed that three clusters in 
the four-cluster solution were identical to three clusters in the five-cluster solution and 
that the small cluster of eight cases was simply combined with another.  
This suggests that there is limited meaningful difference between the five- and 
four-cluster solution and only the four-cluster solution is taken forward. On the basis of 
this stopping rule analysis and the subsequent descriptive analysis, the two-, three-, and 
four cluster solutions are retained and provided as the seed points for the k-means 
clustering.  
These cluster solutions were then profiled across each of the clustering variables 




variables, the mean and standard deviation was calculated for each cluster. Using 
clustering membership as the independent variable and clustering variables as dependent 
variables, an ANOVA examined the differences between cluster means. 
Table 5-1: Agglomeration schedule for hierarchical cluster analysis 
 Hierarchical Process Stopping Rule 
 Number of Clusters Agglomeration Coefficient 
Cluster Stage Before After Value % Increase to Next Stage 
197 10 9 1166.058 3.62 
198 9 8 1208.268 3.92 
199 8 7 1255.633 4.92 
200 7 6 1317.372 4.99 
201 6 5 1383.069 6.10 
202 5 4 1467.383 6.91 
203 4 3 1568.828 11.42 
204 3 2 1748.035 17.27 
205 2 1 2050 — 
 
The results presented in Table 5-2, Table 5-3 and Table 5-4 show that with the 
exception of the two-cluster solution, there are significant differences across clusters for 
all clustering variables, indicating that all identified clusters are distinctive. The two-
cluster solution was only nonsignifcant (at the .01 level) for V10: Autonomy2_Sum. 
Furthermore, no cluster contains less than ten percent of total cases, and from inspecting 
the means and the plots, each cluster is sufficiently distinct—in addition to significantly 
different
9
—thus they are all good candidates for seed points for the k-means analysis. 
                                                 
9
 Ward’s algorithm maximizes differences between cluster means regardless of whether there are actually 
natural clusters, thus p-values cannot be interpreted in the same context as for ‘natural’ groups and only 
provide a descriptive indicator of cluster distinctiveness (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). The use of 
significance tests is appropriate, however, when profiling clusters against variables that were not used in 




Table 5-2: Four-cluster solution using Ward's method 
 
4-Cluster Sol. Ward Method   
1 2 3 4 ANOVA* 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F η
2
 
V1 .554 .452 .369 .677 -.033 .675 -1.666 .984 80.755 .545 
V2 .402 .635 -.308 1.070 .273 .741 -.695 1.299 13.516 .167 
V3 .482 .501 -.426 1.322 .238 .705 -.559 .915 14.850 .181 
V4 .314 .833 -.526 .879 .542 .793 -.634 1.054 22.650 .252 
V6 .347 .695 -.645 1.101 .489 .701 -.374 1.005 21.464 .242 
V7 .166 .876 -.717 .779 .563 .982 -.040 .827 21.825 .245 
V8 .525 .529 -.731 1.126 .280 .745 -.147 1.039 23.009 .255 
V9 .492 .543 -.670 1.189 .108 .851 .128 .901 16.972 .201 
V10 -.618 .583 -.560 .674 .890 .735 .511 1.052 58.373 .464 
V11 .498 .733 .209 .864 -.082 .905 -1.167 .909 27.538 .290 
N 58 58 59 31   
*For all ANOVAs, dfB = 3, dfW = 202, p < .001 
 
Table 5-3: Three-cluster solution using Ward's method 
 
3-Cluster Sol. Ward Method   
1 2 3 ANOVA* 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F η
2
 
V1 .258 .644 .369 .677 -1.666 .984 99.995 .496 
V2 .337 .691 -.308 1.070 -.695 1.299 20.025 .165 
V3 .359 .622 -.426 1.322 -.559 .915 21.112 .172 
V4 .429 .818 -.526 .879 -.634 1.054 32.804 .244 
V6 .419 .698 -.645 1.101 -.374 1.005 31.851 .239 
V7 .366 .948 -.717 .779 -.040 .827 29.004 .222 
V8 .401 .656 -.731 1.126 -.147 1.039 33.144 .246 
V9 .298 .738 -.670 1.189 .128 .901 22.320 .180 
V10 .142 1.005 -.560 .674 .511 1.052 16.507 .140 
V11 .206 .871 .209 .864 -1.167 .909 32.474 .242 
N 117 58 31   






Table 5-4: Two-cluster solution using Ward's method 
 
2-Cluster Sol. Ward Method   
1 2 ANOVA* 
Mean SD Mean SD F η
2
 
V1 .258 .644 -.339 1.256 99.995 .088 
V2 .337 .691 -.443 1.163 20.025 .150 
V3 .359 .622 -.472 1.193 21.112 .170 
V4 .429 .818 -.564 .939 32.804 .243 
V6 .419 .698 -.551 1.071 31.851 .232 
V7 .366 .948 -.481 .855 29.004 .177 
V8 .401 .656 -.527 1.126 33.144 .213 
V9 .298 .738 -.392 1.157 22.320 .118 
V10 .142 1.005 -.187 .967 16.507 .027 
V11 .206 .871 -.270 1.096 32.474 .056 
N 117 89   
*For all ANOVAs, dfB = 1, dfW = 204, p < .001, except V10 where p = .02 
 
K-Means Nonhierarchical Analysis Results 
Using the cluster centroids from the hierarchical analysis above, a k-means 
optimization cluster analysis was run for two-, three-, and four-cluster solutions. The k-
means cluster solutions were profiled by in the same manner as the hierarchical solutions. 
The means and standard deviations per cluster were obtained for each of the ten 
clustering variables. Using clustering membership as the independent variable and 
clustering variables as dependent variables, an ANOVA examined the differences 
between cluster means for each variable. The results presented in Table 5-5, Table 5-6 
and Table 5-7 show that with the exception of the two-cluster solution, clusters are 
significantly different across all clustering variables, indicating that all identified clusters 
are distinctive. As in the hierarchical analysis, the two-cluster solution was only 




contains less than ten percent of total cases, and inspection of the means and the plots 
shows that each cluster is sufficiently distinct—in addition to significantly different. 
Table 5-5: Four-cluster solution using k-means method 
 
4-Cluster Sol. K-means method using seed points from hierarchical results   
1 2 3 4 ANOVA* 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F η
2 
V1 .494 .560 .245 .858 -.044 .770 -1.449 1.068 46.012 .406 
V2 .259 .745 -.347 1.093 .364 .690 -.865 1.263 16.596 .198 
V3 .391 .581 -.489 1.274 .282 .747 -.811 1.075 19.417 .224 
V4 .030 .856 -.491 .973 .623 .800 -.635 .994 19.579 .225 
V6 .140 .819 -.920 1.078 .625 .592 -.287 .900 30.625 .313 
V7 -.137 .900 -.839 .722 .729 .822 .048 .851 30.659 .313 
V8 .325 .558 -1.278 1.105 .513 .555 .009 .817 56.837 .458 
V9 .427 .558 -1.032 1.142 .187 .846 .073 .909 28.674 .299 
V10 -.737 .490 -.376 .760 .824 .720 .634 1.082 62.487 .481 
V11 .525 .728 .086 .808 -.047 .884 -1.287 .890 34.936 .342 
N 72 43 61 30   
*For all ANOVAs, dfB = 3, dfW = 202, p < .001 
Table 5-6: Three-cluster solution using k-means method 
 
3-Cluster Sol. K-means method using seed points from hierarchical 
results  
 
1 2 3 ANOVA* 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F η
2
 
V1 .402 .551 .243 .808 -1.255 1.035 78.023 .435 
V2 .368 .776 -.278 1.001 -.444 1.154 15.380 .132 
V3 .441 .607 -.310 1.161 -.566 1.045 24.199 .193 
V4 .460 .841 -.571 .892 -.241 .995 27.644 .214 
V6 .460 .706 -.735 1.053 -.008 .881 36.910 .267 
V7 .343 .930 -.776 .719 .314 .893 35.839 .261 
V8 .543 .500 -.926 1.099 .069 .742 68.856 .404 
V9 .434 .651 -.632 1.152 -.095 .941 27.705 .214 
V10 -.030 .911 -.523 .714 .805 1.037 29.021 .222 
V11 .370 .792 .205 .786 -1.130 .874 55.461 .353 
N 100 62 44   




Table 5-7: Two-cluster solution using k-means method 
 
2-Cluster Sol. K-means method using seed points from 
hierarchical results  
 
1 2 ANOVA* 
Mean SD Mean SD F η
2
 
V1 .161 .810 -.221 1.182 7.582 .036 
V2 .365 .695 -.499 1.133 45.725 .183 
V3 .373 .628 -.510 1.178 48.206 .191 
V4 .422 .862 -.578 .883 66.322 .245 
V6 .434 .695 -.593 1.051 71.209 .259 
V7 .420 .895 -.574 .840 65.152 .242 
V8 .497 .516 -.679 1.100 104.600 .339 
V9 .351 .728 -.480 1.119 41.608 .169 
V10 .113 .998 -.154 .987 3.633 .017 
V11 .194 .909 -.265 1.061 11.077 .052 
N 119 87   
*For all ANOVAs, dfB = 1, dfW = 204, p < .01, except V10 where p = .058 
 
Assessment of Cluster Stability 
As the structure of cluster solutions is dependent on the clustering procedure, it is 
necessary to evaluate “cluster stability” (Hair et al., 2006)—the robustness of cluster 
solutions to variations in method. Several confirmatory tests were run to compare 
different cluster solutions: first, the original Ward’s method solutions were compared 
with the seeded k-means solutions; second, the seeded k-means solutions were compared 
with randomly generated seed points; and finally, clusters generated by randomly 
assigning cases to a cluster were compared with the k-means solutions.  
For each comparison, a chi-square test was run to determine the strength of 
association between each cluster solution, with the null hypothesis that there is no 
association. Cluster stability is indicated by a significant result, occurring when the 




solutions. Additionally, Cohen’s kappa (κ) was calculated to determine the magnitude of 
agreement between different cluster solutions.  
The results in Table 5-8 show that in all cases, the association between test 
solutions and the seeded k-means solutions is high. Similarly, Cohen’s κ is generally high 
and significant with the exception of the four-cluster solution comparison between the 
random and seeded k-means approaches where κ is low but significant. These results are 
supportive of the existence of a natural cluster structure in the data. The final test was 
performed by randomly generating clusters. Chi-square tests and ANOVAs on the 
clustering variables were nonsignificant, indicating that clusters are different from 
random. 
Table 5-8: Results of cluster stability tests 
Comparison 
Measure of Association Inter-Solution Agreement Rating 
χ2 * 
(Cramer’s V) *  df κ* 
BCa 95% CI 
Lower Upper 
2-Cluster Solution: Wards 
vs. seeded k-means 
119.649 
(.762) 
1 .762 .665 .847 
3-Cluster Solution: Wards 
vs. seeded k-means 
225.321 
(.740) 
4 .736 .653 .809 
4-Cluster Solution: Wards 
vs. seeded k-means 
332.938 
(.734) 
9 .697 .623 .766 
2-Cluster Solution: Seeded 
vs. random k-means 
140.334 
(.825) 
1 .817 .722 .896 
3-Cluster Solution: Seeded 
vs. random k-means 
313.290 
(.872) 
4 .871 .810 .928 
4-Cluster Solution: Seeded 
vs. random k-means 
190.818 
(.556) 
9 .291 .200 .378 





Research Question 1 
The first research question asks to what the levels of interaction corresponding to 
the constructs of cooperation, coordination and collaboration are observed. In other 
words, from the 206 cases of interorganizational interactions in the sample, are there 
observed clusters that can be interpreted according to the three levels of interaction 
defined in the GIIA? The question is answered in this section as follows. First, the three-
cluster solution is profiled. Second, concurrent validity is evaluated by profiling observed 
clusters against variables not used for clustering, namely the “contextual” category of 
variables. Third, the predictive validity of the clusters is examined using 
interorganizational outcome variables. Finally, an overall interpretation is made and 
summary results presented.  
Profile of the Three-Cluster Solution 
If the GIIA and the concept of a level of interaction were accurate representations 
of reality, the results would show three, roughly horizontal and equally spaced lines on a 
means plot across the clustering variables. As shown in Figure 5-1 this is not the case. 
Cluster one is composed of 100 cases (48.6% of total cases) and is characterized by an 
higher than average score on the clustering variables with the exception of the 
Autonomy2_Sum variable, which was lower than average. Cluster two is composed of 62 
cases (30.1% of total cases) and displays a range of high and low scores, but they are 
consistently below those of cluster one. Cluster three, composed of 44 cases (21.4% of 
total cases), is almost a mirror image of cluster two and displays a range of high and low 





Figure 5-1: Three-cluster solution standardized means plot 
 
 
Cluster two is characterized by a high level of shared perspectives (V1) and trust 
(V11) between interacting organizations, with an overall low level of formalization and 
structure of the interorganizational interaction in terms of the extent of collective 
decision-making (V9), joint working (V6), communications (V8) and formalized policies 
(V7). Cluster two has the lowest score for the impact of organizational autonomy (V10), 
meaning that an organization’s autonomy is not much affected by participation in the 
interaction. Cluster three, on the other hand, has low levels of shared perspectives (V1) 
and trust (V11), but moderate to high levels of formalization in terms of collective 




(V7). Cluster three has the highest score for the impact of organizational autonomy 
(V10), meaning that an organization’s autonomy is affected by participation in the 
interaction. For both cluster two and three, organizations are moderately involved in their 
respective interorganizational interactions in terms of the extent of resources allocated 
(V2), the extent to which leadership recognizes the benefits (V3), and the level of staff 
involved in the interaction (V4). 
In cluster one, there is a high level of trust and shared perspectives, a high level of 
organizational involvement in terms of resources, and a high level of formalization and 
structure in the interorganizational interaction. The exception is that the impact of 
autonomy is lower than in cluster three, but above cluster two.  
While standardization of clustering variables removes the problem of distortions 
caused by different measurement scales, this transformation effectively weights each 
variable according to its standard deviation (Everitt et al., 2011). Thus for cluster 
interpretation it is necessary to inspect each variable in terms of its “natural” 
measurement scale. Given that most of the clustering variables are composite sums, 
however, the natural scales are not intuitive. Instead, the categorical versions of the 
variables can be used, which have the advantage of being more readily interpretable thus 
facilitating a direct comparison between the cluster solution and the GIIA.  
Cross-tabulations were run to compare each clustering variable in its “_LOI” 
form, with the three-cluster solution. For the autonomy and trust variables, no LOI 
variables were created, thus they are reported in their natural Likert scale with a range of 
one to seven. In Table 5-9, for each clustering variable, each cluster is described in terms 




three levels in the clustering variables, the maximum value (in terms of percentage of 
cases within that cluster) was identified. This gives an indication of the overall 
“conformity” of the three-cluster solution to the GIIA. 
Table 5-9: Three-cluster solution profiled in terms of levels of interaction 
Clustering Variable 
Percentage of cases in cluster at the specified level of interaction for 
the clustering variable 
Cluster 1 
N = 100 
Cluster 2 
N = 62 
Cluster 3 
N = 44 
1: Problem_Orient_Sum 90.0% collaboration 82.3% collaboration 61.4% coordination 
2: Resource_Alloc_Comp 59.0% collaboration 72.6% coordination 72.7% coordination 
3: Incentives 91.0% collaboration 67.7% collaboration 54.5% collaboration 
4: Key_Personnel_Sum 71.0% collaboration 38.7% coordination 45.5% collaboration 
9: Decision_Comp 81.0% collaboration 45.2% collaboration 59.1% collaboration 
6: Design_Comp 80.0% collaboration 59.7% coordination 59.1% collaboration 
8: Info_Comp 96.0% collaboration 45.2% collaboration 79.5% collaboration 
7: Formality_S 52.0% coordination 64.5% cooperation 59.1% coordination 
10: Autonomy2_Sum F(2,203) = 29.021, p = .000, η
2
 = .222 
Mean 2.690 2.005 3.849 
Std. deviation 1.264 .991 1.439 
Median 2.667 1.667 4.000 
11: Trust2_Sum F(2,203) = 55.461, p = .000, η
2
 = .353 
Mean 5.893 5.726 4.371 
Std. deviation .804 .797 .887 
Median 6.000 5.667 4.333 
 
From this initial profiling, cluster one can be interpreted as collaboration. All but 
one of the clustering variables one through nine are at a majority level of collaboration. 
The exception—Formality_S—which captures the extent to which plans and 
implementation details are formalized, is at a level of coordination for both clusters one 
and three, and cooperation for cluster two. The value of Formality_S for the level of 




thus it is likely that this occurs infrequently. Collaboration for this variable is defined as 
“Policy documents (such as terms of reference or memoranda of understanding) describe 
detailed implementation plans in addition to roles and responsibilities, and are signed off 
by leadership.” The descriptive results for Formality_N (Table 4-33) show that only a 
minority of cases, 47 out of 206, selected this option. Out of those 47, 33 are in cluster 
one and 13 in cluster three, while only one is in cluster two. Cluster interpretations will 
be expanded upon in the summary at the end of this section. 
Concurrent Criterion Validity of Three-Cluster Solution 
Concurrent criterion validity in the context of cluster analysis is a determination 
of the extent to which variables not included in the clustering process are associated or 
related to each cluster. From the 20 dimensions in the GIIA, ten were used in clustering, 
and these dimensions were categorized as “organizational”—i.e. features of the 
participating organizations, and “interorganizational”—i.e. features that exist only 
because of the interorganizational interaction. The remaining dimensions are 
“contextual,” meaning they relate to the surrounding context or situation. In some cases, 
however, the GIIA essentially makes a hypothesis that certain contextual features will be 
associated with certain levels of interaction, for example, that collaboration occurs with 
difficult policy problems. Thus we can expect that these contextual dimensions will 
discriminate between different clusters.  
In this section, the contextual variables that were not included in the clustering 
analysis, plus a few organizational variables that were omitted, are tested against the 
three-cluster solution to determine if the variables can discriminate clusters. The primary 




Purpose of interorganizational interaction 
The chi-square shows that there is no relationship between the levels of 
Purpose_Comp_LOI and the three clusters, χ
2
(4) = 1.019, p = .912. As the 
Purpose_Comp_LOI variable was artificially segmented into the three categories, the 
underlying Purpose_Comp variable was also tested to see if the means varied across 
clusters. A one-way ANOVA was run that found no significant differences between the 
mean of Purpose_Comp across clusters, F(2,203) = 2.058, p = .130. 
Table 5-10: Profile of three-cluster solution against Purpose_Comp_LOI variable 
Purpose_Comp_LOI  
Cluster Total 
(N=206) 1 2 3 
1 Number 3a
 
3a 1a 7 
 % within cluster 3.0% 4.8% 2.3% 3.4% 
2 Number 25a 15a 9a 49 
 % within cluster 25.0% 24.2% 20.5% 23.8% 
3 Number 72a 44a 34a 150 
 % within cluster 72.0% 71.0% 77.3% 72.8% 
Total Number 100 62 44 206 
χ2(4) = 1.019, Cramer’s V = .050, p = .912; Each subscript letter denotes a cluster proportion 
whose values do not differ significantly across columns at the .05 level (Bonferroni corrected). 
 
These results suggest that the overall purpose of an interorganizational interaction 
may not be critical in defining the type or level of interaction. This is inconsistent with 
existing literature that aligns collaboration with more complex purposes, for example 
Keast et al. (2007). 
Time duration of the interorganizational interaction 
Out of the 206 cases, 101 reported a finite time duration in months. A one-way 
ANOVA was run to determine if clusters varied in the mean time duration for 




clusters, thus Welch’s F is reported. There was a significant, weak effect of cluster 
membership on the time duration of the interorganizational interaction, F(2, 65.023) = 
3.652,  p = .031, η
2
 = .026. The Games-Howell post-hoc test showed a significant 
difference only between cluster one (mean = 32.95 months, SD = 31.080) and cluster 
three (mean = 19.89 months, SD = 11.761), p = .05. This mean difference fits the 
interpretation of cluster one as “collaboration,” but there is limited support overall for the 
time duration dimension in the GIIA.  
The remaining 105 cases recorded the duration of the interorganizational 
interaction as “indefinite.” A cross-tabulation and chi-square analysis in Table 5-11 
showed a significant but weak relationship between the indefinite status of an interaction 
and the three clusters, χ
2
(4) = 6.832, p = .031, V = .182 , p = .031. Cluster one was more 
likely to be indefinite, indicating support for its interpretation as “collaboration.” 
Table 5-11: Profile of three-cluster solution against the time duration of interaction 
Time duration of interaction  
Cluster Total 
(N=206) 1 2 3 
Not indefinite Number 43a
 
39b 19a,b 101 
 % within cluster 43.0% 62.9% 43.2% 49.0% 
Indefinite Number 57a 23b 25a,b 105 
 % within cluster 57.0% 37.1% 56.8% 51.0% 
Total Number 100 62 44 206 
χ2(4) = 6.832, Cramer’s V = .182, p = .031; Each subscript letter denotes a cluster proportion 
whose values do not differ significantly across columns at the .05 level (Bonferroni corrected). 
 
Difficulty of Task 
The descriptive analysis of this dimension (Table 4-6) indicated that there is not 
an underlying task complexity factor in the data as hoped, thus the individual items are 




variables and cluster membership as the independent, with a follow-up univariate 
ANOVA (Table 5-12). As cluster sizes are different, but other MANOVA assumptions 
are met, Pillai’s trace is reported. The results indicate a significant effect of cluster 
membership on task complexity, V = .275, F(12, 398) = 5.287, p < .001, η
2
 = .137, 
meaning that a linear combination of task complexity items discriminates between 
clusters.  
Table 5-12: ANOVA results for task complexity variables and three-cluster solution 
Task  Complexity Variables 
Cluster Means (Seeded K-means) ANOVA* 






Task_Complexity1: number of distinct tasks 
(1=low, 7=high) 
5.37 4.39 5.07 6.679 
(.002) 
.062 
Task_Complexity2: similarity (1=very 
similar, 7=very different) 
3.87 3.79 3.98 .182 
(.834) 
.002 
Task_Complexity3: clarity of tasks 
(1=known and clearly defined, 
7=ambiguous, undefined) 





5.09 4.97 5.30 .678 
(.509) 
.007 
Task_Complexity5: routineness (1=routine, 
7=irregular, atypical) 
3.81 4.31 4.89 8.786 
(.000) 
.080 
Task_Complexity6: level of agreement 
amongst participants (1=agreed by all, 
7=highly contested) 
3.15 2.76 4.11 13.365 
(.000) 
.116 
N 100 62 44   
*For all ANOVAs, dfB = 2, dfW = 203 
 
Follow-up univariate ANOVAs revealed significant but weak effects for Task 
Complexity variables except Task_Complexity2 and Task_Complexity4. For all variables 




two. Post-hoc follow-ups using Gabriel’s test showed that these differences were 
significant at the .001 level for Task_Complexity1, 3, 5 and 6.  
Role of single organization 
The results indicate that the extent to which an organization can achieve 
unilaterally the goal of the multiorganizational interaction does not significantly 
discriminate between clusters, χ
2
(4) = 4.946, p = .298. The single largest cell value in the 
cross-tabulation in Table 5-13, however, is consistent with the interpretation of cluster 
one as “collaboration,” with 67 out of 100 cases in cluster one reporting that no 
organization can achieve the goals independently (Role_Single_Org_N = 3).  




) 1 2 3 
1 = If required, my organization could 
achieve the goals independently without 
support from other organizations 
Number 7a 9a 7a 23 
% within 
cluster 
7.0% 14.5% 15.9% 11.2% 
2 = My organization requires some 
assistance from other organizations to 
accomplish the goals 
Number 26a 20a 12a 58 
% within 
cluster 
26.0% 32.3% 27.3% 28.2% 
3 = No organization can achieve the goals 
independently. My organizational is 
interdependent with other organizations 
Number 67a 33a 25a 125 
% within 
cluster 
67.0% 53.2% 56.8% 60.7% 
Total Number 100 62 44 206 
χ2(4) = 4.946, Cramer’s V = .110, p = .298; Each subscript letter denotes a cluster proportion whose 
values do not differ significantly across columns at the .05 level (Bonferroni corrected). 
 
Impetus for collective action 
The results shown in Table 5-14 indicate that the way in which the 






(6) = 21.290, p = .001, the effect size, Cramer’s V = .227 , p = .001, is 
moderate. 
Table 5-14: Profile of three-cluster solution against Impetus_N 
Impetus_N  
Cluster Total 
(N=206) 1 2 3 
1 = Directly tasked by a higher authority or 
mandate to participate (e.g. a higher command, 
organizational policy or mission, organization 
leader decision, legal requirements) 
Number 74a 27b 29a,b 130 
% within 
cluster 
74.0% 43.5% 65.9% 63.1% 
2 = No direct tasking, but not participating 
would result in either a loss of reputation or an 
inability to meet organizational goals 
Number 13a 14a 9a 36 
% within 
cluster 
13.0% 22.6% 20.5% 17.5% 
3 = Participation is voluntary and was initiated 
primarily by senior management 
Number 8a 6a 2a 16 
% within 
cluster 
8.0% 9.7% 4.5% 7.8% 
4 = Participation is voluntary and was initiated 
primarily by the staff level 
Number 5a 15b 4a,b 24 
% within 
cluster 
5.0% 24.2% 9.1% 11.7% 
Total Number 100 62 44 206 
χ2(6) = 21.290, Cramer’s V = .227, p = .001; Each subscript letter denotes a cluster proportion whose 
values do not differ significantly across columns at the .05 level (Bonferroni corrected). 
 
While the Impetus_N variable discriminates between clusters, the results are not 
immediately interpretable in terms of the GIIA levels of interaction and it is not clear that 
cluster one can be interpreted as “collaboration.” Recent literature suggests that a special 
case of collaboration occurs when the interaction is “mandated” by either law or by 
senior leadership decision (McNamara, 2016). By combining responses 2, 3, and 4 in the 
Impetus_N variable, a new binary variable was created that determines whether the 
interaction was mandated or not mandated. The cross-tabulation results for “Mandated” 
in Table 5-15 indicated a significant, moderate relationship between Mandated and 
clusters, χ
2




Table 5-15: Profile of three-cluster solution against mandated / voluntary status 
Mandated  
Cluster Total 
(N=206) 1 2 3 
Voluntary Number 26a
 
35b 15a,b 76 
% within cluster 26.0% 56.5% 34.1% 36.9% 
Mandated Number 74a 27b 29a,b 130 
% within cluster 74.0% 43.5% 65.9% 63.1% 
Total Number 100 62 44 206 
χ2(2) = 15.432, Cramer’s V = .274, p = .000; Each subscript letter denotes a cluster proportion 
whose values do not differ significantly across columns at the .05 level (Bonferroni corrected). 
 
The final component of the impetus for collective action dimension is the reason 
why a particular organizations joins, captured in Reason_Sum and Reason_Sum_LOI 
variables. The results indicate that Reason_Sum_LOI does not significantly discriminate 
between clusters, χ
2
(4) = 4.737, p = .317.  
Table 5-16: Profile of three-cluster solution against Reason_Sum_LOI 
Reason_Sum_LOI  
Cluster Total 
(N=206) 1 2 3 
1 Number 9a 6a 3a 18 
% within cluster 9.0% 9.7% 6.8% 8.7% 
2 Number 62a 42a 35a 139 
% within cluster 62.0% 67.7% 79.5% 67.5% 
3 Number 29a 14a 6a 49 
% within cluster 29.0% 22.6% 13.6% 23.8% 
Total Number 100 62 44 206 
χ2(4) = 4.737, Cramer’s V = .107, p = .317; Each subscript letter denotes a cluster proportion 
whose values do not differ significantly across columns at the .05 level (Bonferroni corrected). 
 
As the Reason_Sum_LOI variable was artificially segmented into the three 




varied across clusters. A one-way ANOVA was run that found no significant differences 
between the mean of Reason_Sum across clusters, F(2,203) = 1.609, p = .203. 
Numbers of participating organizations 
A one-way ANOVA was run to determine if clusters could be distinguished by 
the mean number of organizations participating in the interorganizational interaction. 
Levene’s test indicated unequal variances between clusters, thus Welch’s F is reported. 
There is a significant, weak effect of cluster membership on the numbers of organizations 
participating in the interorganizational interaction, F(2, 113.752) = 3.000,  p = .051, η
2
 = 
.023. The Games-Howell post-hoc test shows a significant difference only between 
cluster one (mean = 14.403 organizations, SD = 11.765) and cluster three (mean = 10.238 
organizations, SD = 7.798), p = .041.  
History of previous interaction in the problem domains 
A one-way ANOVA was run to determine if history of previous interaction 
discriminated clusters. The results found no significant differences between the mean of 
History_Sum across clusters, F(2,203) = 1.269, p = .283. 
Time take to establish multiorganizational interaction 
A one-way ANOVA was run to determine if the time taken to establish the 
multiorganizational interaction could discriminate clusters. The results found no 
significant differences between the mean time in months across clusters, F(2,203) = .501, 
p = .607. 
Goals 
Goals_N is an interorganizational-type variable that was originally considered as 




and was reserved instead for profiling the cluster solutions. After adding the outlier case 
to the next level up, the cross-tabulation and chi-square analysis indicate a significant but 
weak relationship between the orientation of the policy objective in interaction (Goals_N) 
and the three clusters, χ
2
(2) = 6.640, V = .177 , p = .040 
Table 5-17: Profile of three-cluster solution against Goals_N 
Goals_N (Adjusted outliers)  
Cluster Total 
(N=206) 1 2 3 
2 = Some shared goals, in addition 
to individual organizational goals 
Number 56a 35a,b 34b 125 
% within cluster 56.0% 56.5% 77.3% 60.7% 
3 = Shared goals agreed between all 
participants 
Number 44a 27a,b 10b 81 
% within cluster 44.0% 43.5% 22.7% 39.3% 
Total Number 100 62 44 206 
χ2(2) = 6.460, Cramer’s V = .177, p = .040; Each subscript letter denotes a cluster proportion whose 




Org_Lead_N is an “organizational” type variable that was originally included as 
part of the Key Personnel dimension of the GIIA. It was not included in the 
Key_Personnel_Sum variable due to concerns about its meaning, and was retained for 
cluster profiling. The results indicate that Org_Lead_N does not significantly 
discriminate between clusters χ
2
(4) = 4.946, V = .089, p = .298.  
 
 




Table 5-18: Profile of three-cluster solution against Org_Lead_N 
Org_Lead_N  
Cluster Total 
(N=206) 1 2 3 
1 = All organizations are equal 
partners 
Number 19a 12a 4a 35 
% within cluster 19.0% 19.4% 9.1% 17.0% 
2 = One organization leads the 
group 
Number 36a 26a 20a 82 
% within cluster 36.0% 41.9% 45.5% 39.8% 
3 = A few organizations share 
leadership of the group 
Number 45a 24a 20a 89 
% within cluster 45.0% 38.7% 45.5% 43.2% 
Total Number 100 62 44 206 
χ2(4) = 3.261, Cramer’s V = .089, p = .521; Each subscript letter denotes a cluster proportion whose 
values do not differ significantly across columns at the .05 level (Bonferroni corrected). 
 
Trust 
The nominal Trust1_N variable used to check the reliability of the scale 
Trust2_Sum was not used for clustering and can therefore be used to profile. Results 
indicate that Trust1_N significantly but weakly discriminates clusters χ
2
(4) = 13.829, V = 
.183, p = .007. Clusters one and two are significantly more likely to report that trust is 
necessary between organizations in all levels of staff, in comparison to cluster three.   
Table 5-19: Profile of three-cluster solution against Trust1_N 
Trust1_N  
Cluster Total 
(N=206) 1 2 3 
1 = Trust relationships are not 
required 
Number 3a 6a 3a 12 
% within cluster 3.0% 9.7% 6.8% 5.8% 
2 = Trust relationships are useful, 
but must be based on reciprocal 
behaviors 
Number 25a 23a, b 22b 70 
% within cluster 25.0% 37.1% 50.0% 34.0% 
3 = Trust between organizations is 
necessary; in all levels of staff 
Number 72a 33a 19b 124 
% within cluster 72.0% 53.2% 43.2% 60.2% 
Total Number 100 62 44 206 
χ2(4) = 13.829, Cramer’s V = .183, p = .007; Each subscript letter denotes a cluster proportion whose 






While the autonomy scale (Autonomy2_Sum) was used in clustering, the nominal 
Autonomy1_N used to check the scale reliability was not and can therefore be used to 
profile the cluster solutions. Results indicate that Autonomy1_N significantly and 
moderately discriminates clusters χ
2
(4) = 34.790, V = .291, p < .001. Cluster two is 
significantly more likely to report that the multiorganizational group does not have 
policies compared to cluster one and cluster three.   
Table 5-20: Profile of three-cluster solution against Autonomy1_N 
Autonomy1_N  
Cluster Total 
(N=206) 1 2 3 
1 = The multiorganizational group 
does not have policies 
Number 12a 28b 4a 44 
% within cluster 12.0% 45.2% 9.1% 21.4% 
2 = Policies developed for the 
multiorganizational group are 
compatible with my organizations 
policies 
Number 49a 27a 24a 100 
% within cluster 49.0% 43.5% 54.5% 48.5% 
3 = Partner organizations jointly 
develop policies and negotiation 
is required when they conflict 
with individual organization 
policies 
Number 39a 7b 16a 62 
% within cluster 39.0% 11.3% 36.4% 30.1% 
Total Number 100 62 44 206 
χ2(4) = 34.790, Cramer’s V = .291, p < .001; Each subscript letter denotes a cluster proportion whose 
values do not differ significantly across columns at the .05 level (Bonferroni corrected). 
 
Evaluation of Systematic Bias in the Clusters 
A final chi-square analysis was run to determine if clusters were differentiated 
based on work status, organizational status, and gender variables. No significant 




Predictive Criterion Validity of Three-Cluster Solution 
Predictive validity is evaluated by determining whether clusters predict a 
theoretically-expected relationship. This is tested by profiling the clusters against the five 
outcome variables, as literature suggests that different interorganizational forms will vary 
in terms of outcome (Jennings, 1994; Jennings & Ewalt, 1998). The hypothesis for this 
test is that there will be significant differences in outcome variable means for different 
clusters. The null hypothesis is that no significant differences in outcome variables is 
observed. 
A MANOVA was run with the five outcome variables as dependent variables and 
cluster membership as the independent. As cluster sizes are different, but other 
MANOVA assumptions are met, Pillai’s trace is reported. The results indicate a 
significant but weak effect of cluster membership on perceived outcomes of the 
interorganizational interaction, V = .220, F(10, 400) = 4.946, p < .001, η
2
 = .110, 
meaning that the a linear combination of outcome variables discriminates between 
clusters and explains 11% of variance overall.   
Follow-up univariate ANOVAs revealed significant differences between cluster 
means for all variables except Outcome5 at the .05 level, and generally weak effect sizes 
(Table 5-21). For all variables, cluster one reports higher mean scores than clusters three. 
Post-hoc follow-ups using Gabriel’s test showed that these differences were significant at 
the .001 level for Outcome1, 2, 3, and 5. There were no significant differences at the .05 
level between clusters one and two. The difference in means between clusters two and 




Table 5-21: Profile of three-cluster solutions against outcome variables 
Outcome Variables  
(1=strongly disagree, 4=neutral, 
7=strongly agree) 
3-Cluster Sol. K-means method using seed points from 
hierarchical results  
 
1 2 3 ANOVA 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F(2, 203) η
2
 
Outcome1: Overall, the 
multiorganizational interaction 
is effective in achieving 
expected outcomes 
5.76 1.182 5.65 1.103 4.50 1.471 17.172* .145 
Outcome 2: Overall, high quality 
working relationships have 
developed between my 
organization and partner 
organizations as a result of this 
multiorganizational interaction 
5.70 1.227 5.19 1.566 4.52 1.338 11.695* .103 
Outcome3: Overall, my 
organizations view of the 
issue(s)/problem(s) that 
brought the organizations 
together has broadened as a 
result of the interaction 
5.82 1.192 5.47 1.457 5.25 1.144 3.514
X 
.033 
Outcome 4: Overall, my 
organization has increased its 
interaction with partner 
organizations as a result of the 
multiorganizational interaction 
5.33 1.615 5.15 1.658 4.70 1.286 2.442
O 
.023 
Outcome 5: Overall, the 
multiorganizational interaction 
has helped to make partner 
organizations’ influence on 
each other more equal 
5.02 1.263 4.55 1.467 3.89 1.368 10.966* .098 
N 100 62 44   
* p < .001; 
X
 p = .032; 
O
 p = .090 
 
The results support the prediction that the type of interorganizational interaction 
affects perceived outcomes of the interaction. In this case, cluster one is generally 
perceived as having better outcomes than cluster three. There is no substantial nor 




Summary of Results for Research Question 1 
This section summarizes the evidence presented for research question one. A 
three cluster solution was produced using a k-means optimization algorithm, with seed 
points from a hierarchical Ward’s cluster algorithm. The cluster solution was evaluated in 
four different ways. First, cluster stability tests ensured that clusters were robust to 
changes in clustering algorithm. The final cluster solutions were compared with 
hierarchically-produced cluster solutions and randomly generated k-means solutions, 
producing statistically significant chi-square test results. Comparison with completely 
random clusters showed no significant results.  
Second, the clusters were evaluated for their distinctiveness by comparing means 
across the clustering variables and examining profile plots. ANOVAs were run that 
compared means for the clustering variables across the clusters, finding significant 
results. Third, clusters were assessed for criterion validity on set of 17 demographic, 
contextual, and organizational variables not used in the clustering. There were nine 
variables that did not significantly discriminate clusters: Purpose_Comp_LOI, 
Org_Lead_N, Gender, Work_Status, Org_Status, Role_Single_Org_N, History_Sum, 
Time_Interact, and Reason_Sum_LOI. Eight variables significantly discriminated 
clusters:  
 Time_Dur_Mths – the mean time duration of the interaction was significantly 
higher for cluster one (32.95 months) compared to cluster three (19.98 months) 





 Task_Complexity – cluster three involved interorganizational interactions with 
higher ratings overall for task complexity;  
 Mandated – clusters one and three were more likely to be mandated, compared to 
cluster two, which was predominately voluntary;  
 Num_Orgs – the mean number of organizations involved in the 
interorganizational interactions was significantly higher for cluster one (14.4) than 
cluster three (10.2); 
 Goals_N – cluster three was the least likely to have shared goals between all 
participants; 
 Autonomy1_N – cluster two was more likely to report that the interorganizational 
interaction did not have policies; 
 Trust1_N – clusters one and two rated the necessity of trust significantly higher 
than cluster three. 
Finally, clusters were tested for predictive validity by profiling against outcome 
variables. The five outcome variables significantly distinguished between clusters one 
and three, and to a limited extent cluster two and three. Cluster one was overall 
associated with better perceived outcomes, followed by cluster two then cluster three.  
Interpretation of the Three-Cluster Solution 
The results in Table 5-9 and Figure 5-1 suggest that cluster one can be interpreted 
as “collaboration” and support the description of this level of interaction in the GIIA. The 
criterion profiling also supports this interpretation. Cluster one is more enduring, either 




shared goals. The other clusters are not so readily interpretable, however, thus warrant 
closer scrutiny.  
The majority of clustering variables are at a level of collaboration also for cluster 
three, and the Formality_S variable is equal in score. This suggests that cluster three can 
be interpreted as a “different variant” of collaboration. Where cluster one and cluster 
three differ most in terms of their natural scores is on Problem_Orient_Sum, 
Autonomy2_Sum, and Trust2_Sum. Problem_Orient_Sum describes the extent of shared 
perspectives. Cluster one scores highly on this variable, supporting its interpretation as 
collaboration. The literature consistently identifies shared perspectives as an essential 
criterion for collaboration (Gajda, 2004; Gajda & Koliba, 2007; Gray, 1989; Mattessich 
et al., 2001) 
Autonomy2_Sum captures the impact on organizational autonomy from 
participating in the interaction. Cluster one records a below average score of autonomy 
(V10). This suggests that the formalized collaborative processes (V6—V9), combined 
with shared perspectives (V1) and high trust (V11), serve to mitigate the overall impact 
of organizational autonomy (V10). Again, this finding is consistent with the 
interpretation of interorganizational collaboration as a relatively structured state of 
interaction in which the collective processes serve to mitigate the overall impact of the 
interaction on each organization. In contrast, cluster three seems to be a “difficult” state 
of interaction, in which—compared to cluster one—the slightly lower amount of 
collaborative process (V6, V8, V9) with the same level of formalization (V7), results in a 




The difference in levels of trust between the clusters offers another important 
layer of interpretation. Cluster one is characterized by a high level of trust (V11), whereas 
cluster three is low. The structure of cluster three suggests that collaborative processes (as 
indicated by V6—V9) can still occur in the absence of high levels of trust (V11) and 
shared perspectives (V1). As noted above, however, the tradeoff is the impact on 
organizational autonomy and outcomes. 
To interpret and compare further cluster three and cluster one, the criterion 
profiling results are useful. The GIIA dimension “difficulty” and its Task_Complexity 
variables used for profiling were able to discriminate clusters (Table 5-12). Cluster three 
reported generally higher ratings of task complexity than for cluster one. This fits with 
the overall impression of cluster three as a “difficult” variant of collaboration—low trust 
and shared perspectives, and greater than average difficulty and complexity of tasks. 
Another key difference between cluster one and three that is consistent with this 
interpretation is the Goals_N variable, which significantly discriminated clusters. 22.7% 
of cluster three cases scored the interaction as having “shared goals agreed between all 
participants” compared to 44.0% of cluster one. Similarly, the predictive validity tests 
showed that cluster one reports the highest perceived outcomes and cluster three the 
lowest.  
Cluster two is not significantly different to cluster three across the three 
organizational category “objective” variables Resource_Alloc_Comp (V2), Incentives 
(V3) and Key_Personnel_Sum (V4). This means that cluster two and cluster three are, on 
average, similar in the overall magnitude and scale of commitments made by 




significantly different across the other three organizational category “perception” 
variables: Problem_Orient_Sum (V1), Autonomy2_Sum (V10) and Trust2_Sum (V11). 
Cluster one, however, is significantly different across all these variables.  
Some perspective is offered by the four interorganizational category variables: 
Design_Comp (V6), Formality_S (V7), Info_Comp (V8), Decision_Comp (V9). These 
variables capture the heart of interorganizational interaction, describing features that only 
emerge out of an interorganizational interaction such as joint policies and collective 
decision processes. Cluster two differs most from the others on Design_Comp, which 
describes the structural features of the interaction (e.g. meetings, decision boards, new 
joint organizations), and Formality_S, which describes the level of formality of policy 
documents governing the interaction. Cluster two is predominately at the level of 
coordination for Design_Comp, meaning that most cases within cluster two do not have 
executive decision boards or joint organizations created for the interorganizational 
interaction. Cluster two is at the level of cooperation for Formality_S, meaning that there 
are not formalized policies governing the interaction and organizations work informally 
together.  
The presence of these two results means that cluster two cannot be interpreted as 
collaboration—at least not in the same sense as the other two clusters, which do have 
formalized policies and executive decision boards created especially for the interaction. 
Likewise, cluster two cannot accurately be described as “cooperation”—in terms 
portrayed by the GIIA—as its score on Decision_Comp was 45.2% at the level of 
collaboration. Given its high scores for trust and shared perspectives and low score on 




may be better described as “partnering” in a manner similar to Woodland and Hutton 
(2012). 
Research Question 2 
The second research question asks to what extent other constructs or levels of 
interaction are observed that depart from the three-level framework in the GIIA. This 
question is answered in this section as follows. First, the two-cluster solution is profiled, 
tested for criterion validity and predictive validity, and then interpreted. Second, the four-
cluster solution is evaluated in the same manner. For space considerations, discussion of 
the results is left until the interpretation sections, and only summary results are presented 
for the profiling and criterion validity tests. 





Profile of Two-Cluster Solution 
In the same manner as for the three-cluster solution, the value of each clustering 
variable can be expressed in terms of the level of interaction according to the GIIA, as 
shown in Table 5-22. The values for the autonomy and trust variables are expressed in 
their natural scales (Likert scales from one to seven). 
Table 5-22: Two-cluster solution profiled in terms of levels of interaction 
Clustering Variable 
Percentage of cases in cluster at the specified level of interaction 
for the clustering variable 
Cluster 1 
N = 119 
Cluster 2 
N = 87 
1: Problem_Orient_Sum 79.0% collaboration 64.4% collaboration 
2: Resource_Alloc_Comp 56.3% collaboration 74.7% coordination 
3: Incentives 89.1% collaboration 58.6% collaboration 
4: Key_Personnel_Sum 69.7% collaboration 37.9% cooperation 
9: Decision_Comp 78.2% collaboration 48.3% collaboration 
6: Design_Comp 79.0% collaboration 55.2% coordination 
8: Info_Comp 95.8% collaboration 51.7% collaboration 
7: Formality_S 52.9% coordination 54.0% cooperation 
10: Autonomy2_Sum F(1,204) = 3.633, p = .058, η
2
 = .017 
Mean 2.888 2.517 
Std. deviation 1.385 1.369 
Median 2.667 2.000 
11: Trust2_Sum F(1,204) = 11.878, p = .001, η
2
 = .052 
Mean 5.713 5.249 
Std. deviation .923 1.077 
Median 6.000 5.667 
 
Two-Cluster Solution Criterion Validity 
In the same manner as performed for the three-cluster solution, the criterion 




ANOVAs. For conciseness, the cross-tabulations are not presented and only summary 
results given in Table 5-23. 
Table 5-23: Summary results from profiling two-cluster solution for criterion validity 
Variable Statistic 
Effect 
Size Sig. Details of Significant Results 
Work_Status χ2(3) = 15.144 
 
V = .271 .002 Cluster one > cluster two for military 
personnel 
Cluster one < cluster two in civilian 
government employees 
No practical significance of result 
Org_Status χ2(2) = 1.073 V = .072 .585  
Gender χ2(1) = .332 V = .404 .564  
Purpose_Comp_LOI χ2(2) = .695 V = .291 .706  
Purpose_Comp F(1, 204) = .561 η
2
 = .003 .455  
Time_Dur_Indef χ2(1) = 4.295 V = .144 .038 Cluster one more likely to be 
indefinite in duration (57% of 
cases) 
Time_Dur_Mths F(1, 99) = .106 η
2
 = .001 .745  
Task_Complexity 
(Multivariate) 
Pillai’s V = .129 
F(6,199) = 4.895 
η
2
 = .129 .000 Clusters are weakly discriminated by 
a multivariate task complexity 
Task_Complexity1 F(1, 204) = 11.906 η
2
 = .055 .001 Cluster one reports higher numbers 
of tasks 
Task_Complexity2 F(1, 204) = .909 η
2
 = .004 .341  
Task_Complexity3 F(1, 204) = 3.450 η
2
 = .065 .017 Cluster one reports less task clarity 
Task_Complexity4 F(1, 204) = 2.343 η
2
 = .011 .127  
Task_Complexity5 F(1, 204) = 11.793 η
2
 = .055 .001 Cluster two reports less routine, more 
atypical tasks 
Task_Complexity6 F(1, 204) = .001 η
2
 = .000 .976  
Role_Single_Org_N χ2(2) = 5.230 V = .159 .073 Cluster one more likely to report that 
no organization can achieve goals 
independently (66.4% of cases) 
Impetus_N χ2(3) = 21.692 V = .325 .000 Cluster one more likely to be directly 
tasked by higher authority 
Cluster two more likely to be 
voluntarily initiated by lower staff 
levels 
Mandated χ2(1) = 16.519 V = .283 .000 Cluster one more likely mandated 
Cluster two more likely voluntary 






Size Sig. Details of Significant Results 
Reason_Sum F(1, 204) = .751 η
2
 = .004 .387  
Num_Orgs F(1, 195) = 3.593 η
2
 = .018 .060  
History_Sum F(1, 204) = 6.679 η
2
 = .032 .010  
Time_Interact F(1, 204) = .106 η
2
 = .001 .745  
Goals_N χ2(2) = 2.336 V = .106 .311  
Org_Lead_N χ2(2) = .468 V = .048 .791  
Autonomy1_N χ2(2) = 22.322 V = .329 .000 Cluster one more likely to have 
jointly developed policies 
Cluster two more likely to have no 
joint policies 
Trust1_N χ2(2) = 6.983 V = .184 .030 Cluster one more likely to report 
necessity of trust at all levels 
 
 
Two-Cluster Solution Predictive Validity 
A MANOVA was run with the five outcome variables as dependent variables and 
cluster membership as the independent. As cluster sizes are different, but other 
MANOVA assumptions are met, Pillai’s trace is reported. The results indicate a 
significant but weak effect of cluster membership on perceived outcomes of the 
interorganizational interaction, V = .966, F(5, 200) = 3.625, p < .001, η
2
 = .083, meaning 
that the a linear combination of outcome variables discriminates between clusters and 
explains 8.3% of variance overall.   
Follow-up univariate ANOVAs revealed significant differences between cluster 
means for Outcome2, Outcome3, and Outcome5 at the .01 level, and generally weak 
effect sizes (Table 5-24). For all variables, cluster one reports higher mean scores than 







Table 5-24: Profile of two-cluster solution against outcome variables 
Outcome Variables  
(1=strongly disagree, 4=neutral, 7=strongly 
agree) 
2-Cluster Sol. K-means method using 
seed points from hierarchical results   
1 2 ANOVA 
Mean SD Mean SD F(1, 204) η
2
 
Outcome1: Overall, the multiorganizational 
interaction is effective in achieving expected 
outcomes 
5.56 1.182 5.31 1.367 1.850 .009 
Outcome 2: Overall, high quality working 
relationships have developed between my 
organization and partner organizations as a 
result of this multiorganizational interaction 
5.56 1.267 4.93 1.561 10.267* .048 
Outcome3: Overall, my organizations view of 
the issue(s)/problem(s) that brought the 
organizations together has broadened as a 
result of the interaction 
5.79 1.149 5.32 1.410 6.875* .033 
Outcome 4: Overall, my organization has 
increased its interaction with partner 
organizations as a result of the 
multiorganizational interaction 
5.25 1.558 4.99 1.596 1.409
 
.007 
Outcome 5: Overall, the multiorganizational 
interaction has helped to make partner 
organizations’ influence on each other more 
equal 
4.91 1.321 4.26 1.458 10.906* .051 
N 119 87   
* p < .01 
 
 
Two-Cluster Solution Interpretation 
The two-cluster solution is composed of one cluster of 119 cases (57.8%) and 
another cluster of 87 cases (42.2%). As the clusters are comprised of more cases than the 
three- and four-cluster solutions, they have higher variances across the clustering 




This has the effect of lowering the scores for each variable but increasing the error 
margins.  
The profiling in Table 5-22 shows that cluster one can clearly be interpreted as 
collaboration, in terms of the GIIA. Clustering variables (V1 to V9) are predominately at 
the level of collaboration, albeit with slightly less prevalence compared to the three-
cluster solution due to the increasing variance effect mentioned above. As with the three-
cluster solution, Formality_S (V7) is a the level of coordination.  
The criterion validity tests demonstrate cluster discrimination across eight 
variables: Work_Status, Time_Dur_Indef, Task_Complexity, Role_Single_Org_N, 
Impetus_N, Mandated, Autonomy1_N, and Trust1_N. Predictive validity tests of the five 
Outcome variables show that, as in the case of the three-cluster solution, cluster one is 
generally rates higher outcomes that cluster two. The multivariate and univariate tests 
discriminated between the clusters. The results are supportive of an interpretation of 
cluster one as collaboration. Cluster one is more likely to: be of indefinite duration; 
involve higher numbers of tasks of less clarity; report that no individual organization in 
an interorganizational interaction can achieve the collective goal independently; report 
that trust is required at all levels; and involve joint policies.  
Inspection of a cross-tabulation of the two-cluster solution against the three-
cluster solution shows that 99% of cluster one cases in the three-cluster solution are 
present in cluster one of the two-cluster solution. Likewise 97% of cluster two cases in 
the three-cluster solution are in cluster two of the two-cluster solution. Cluster three of 
the three-cluster solution, however, is roughly equally divided between cluster one and 




for autonomy (V10) and very low scores for shared perspectives (V1) and trust (V11). 
The division of cluster three cases between cluster one and two in the two-cluster solution 
has the effect of smoothing out the differences between these variables, as shown by the 
overlapping error bars in the means plot.  
The implication is that for the two-cluster solution, the “perception” type 
variables (shared perspectives (V1), autonomy (V10) and trust (V11)), are reduced in 
their discriminating effect, whereas the structural- and process-related organizational and 
interorganizational category variables are increased in their discriminating effect. 
In terms of evaluating the overall meaning of the two-cluster solution, the results 
suggest that collaboration is still a distinct and observable level of interaction, but only in 
the “pure” sense of tangible structural, resource, and process factors. There are factors 
that fundamentally define collaboration—jointly developed policies, executive decision 
boards created only for the interorganizational interaction, joint decision making at 
leadership and staff levels simultaneously. It would not be meaningful to call something 
collaboration in the absence of these factors.  
There is no logical constraint, however, on the variation of perception of trust or 
autonomy among the participants. In other words, the presence of a jointly developed 
policy does not logically require a certain level of trust; however, high levels of trust may 
contribute to a more successful experience—evidence that is provided by the higher rated 




Profile of Four-Cluster Solution 
In the same manner as for the two- and three-cluster solution, the value of each 
clustering variable can be expressed in terms of the level of interaction according to the 
GIIA, as shown in Table 5-25. The standardized means plot is displayed in Figure 5-3. 
 
Table 5-25: Four-cluster solution profiled in terms of level of interaction 
Clustering Variable 
Percentage of cases in cluster at the specified level of interaction for 
the clustering variable 
Cluster 1 
N = 72 
Cluster 2 
N = 43 
Cluster 3 
N = 61 
Cluster 4 
N = 30 
1: Problem_Orient_Sum 91.7% collab. 83.7% collab. 72.1% collab. 66.7% coord. 
2: Resource_Alloc_Comp 50.0% collab. 69.8% coord. 52.5% collab. 76.7% coord. 
3: Incentives 87.5% collab. 65.1% collab. 86.9% collab. 50.0% coord. 
4: Key_Personnel_Sum 51.4% collab. 37.2% coord. 80.3% collab. 50.0% coop. 
9: Decision_Comp 86.1% collab. 41.9% coord. 63.9% collab. 70.0% collab. 
6: Design_Comp 65.3% collab. 60.5% coord. 86.9% collab. 46.7% coord. 
8: Info_Comp 93.1% collab. 51.2% coord. 93.4% collab. 73.3% collab. 
7: Formality_S 55.6% coord. 69.8% coop. 50.8% collab. 63.5% coord. 
10: Autonomy2_Sum F(3,88.97) = 74.800, p = .000, η
2
 = .481 (Welch’s F reported) 
Mean 1.708 2.209 3.874 3.611 
Std. deviation .681 1.054 .999 1.501 
Median 1.667 2.000 4.000 3.500 
11: Trust2_Sum F(3,202) = 34.936, p = .000, η
2
 = .342 
Mean 6.051 5.605 5.470 4.211 
Std. deviation .739 .821 .897 .903 








Figure 5-3: Four-cluster solution standardized means plots 
 
 
Four-Cluster Solution Criterion Validity 
Summary results of criterion validity tests of the four-cluster solutions are 
presented in Table 5-26. 
Table 5-26: Summary results from profiling four-cluster solution for criterion validity 
Variable Statistic 
Effect 
Size Sig. Details of Significant Results 
Work_Status χ2(9) = 23.135 V = .193 .006 No practical significance of result 
Org_Status χ2(6) = 5.880 V = .119 .442  
Gender χ2(3) = .955 V = .068 .844  
Purpose_Comp_LOI χ2(6) = .9.309 V = .150 .150  
Purpose_Comp F(3,202) = .980 η
2
 = .014 .403  






Size Sig. Details of Significant Results 
Time_Dur_Mths F(3,97) = 1.302 η
2
 = .039 .278  
Task_Complexity 
(Multivariate) 
Pillai’s V = .347 
F(18,597) = 4.332 
η
2
 = .116 .000 Clusters are weakly discriminated by 
a multivariate task complexity 
Task_Complexity1 F(3, 202) = 5.104 η
2
 = .070 .002 Cluster one and three report higher 
numbers of tasks than two and four 
Task_Complexity2 F(3, 202) = 2.121 η
2
 = .031 .099 Cluster one and three report greater 
task dissimilarity than two and four 
Task_Complexity3 F(3, 202) = 8.646 η
2
 = .114 .000 Cluster one reports greatest task 
clarity, cluster four reports least 
Task_Complexity4 F(3, 202) = .957 η
2
 = .014 .414  
Task_Complexity5 F(3, 202) = 4.077 η
2
 = .057 .008 Cluster four reports least routine, 
most atypical tasks; cluster three 
reports most routine, least atypical 
tasks 
Task_Complexity6 F(3, 202) = 11.619 η
2
 = .147 .000 Cluster four reports least agreement 
about tasks 
Cluster one reports most agreement 
Role_Single_Org_N χ2(6) = 7.091 V = .131 .316  
Impetus_N χ2(9) = 25.960 V = .205 .002 Cluster one, three and four more 
likely to be directly tasked by 
higher authority 
Cluster two more likely to be 
voluntarily initiated by lower staff 
levels or by leadership 
Mandated χ2(3) = 21.850 V = .326 .000 Cluster three most likely to be 
mandated (82% of cases) 
Cluster one and four are 60% 
mandated / 40% voluntary 
Cluster two more likely voluntary 
(63% of cases) 
Reason_Sum_LOI χ2(6) = 9.091 V = .149 .168  
Reason_Sum F(3,202) = .320 η
2
 = .005 .811  




 = .036 .001 Cluster three has highest mean 
number of participating orgs. (15) 
Cluster four has the lowest (8.3) 
History_Sum F(3,202) = 1.711 η
2
 = .025 .166  
Time_Interact F(3,202) = .592 η
2






Size Sig. Details of Significant Results 
Goals_N χ2(6) = 11.455 V = .075 .047 Clusters three (62%) and four (83%) 
have higher proportions of “both 
shared and individual” goals 
compared to cluster one (50%) and 
two (58%) 
Org_Lead_N χ2(6) = 4.042 V = .099 .678  
Autonomy1_N χ2(6) = 27.566 V = .259 .000 Cluster two more likely to have no 
joint policies 
Trust1_N χ2(6) = 11.013 V = .163 .085 Cluster one more likely to report 
necessity of trust at all levels 
 
Four-Cluster Solution Predictive Validity 
A MANOVA was run with the five outcome variables as dependent variables and 
cluster membership as the independent. Box’s M test of equality of covariance matrices 
was highly significant, indicating that a key assumption for MANOVA was violated. 
Furthermore, Levene’s test of equality of variances failed for three out of the five 
outcome variables. Thus it is not possible to determine if a multivariate combination of 
outcome variables can discriminate clusters in the four-cluster solution.  
Follow-up univariate ANOVAs, correcting for the unequal variances, revealed 
significant differences between cluster means for all outcome variables, but generally 
weak effect sizes with the exception of Outcome1, which accounted for 14.8% of 
variance between clusters (Table 5-27). For all variables, cluster three reports 
significantly higher mean scores than clusters four. Cluster one reports significantly 





Table 5-27: ANOVA results for outcome variables and the four-cluster solution 
Outcome Variables  
(1=strongly disagree, 4=neutral, 
7=strongly agree) 
4-Cluster Sol. K-means method using 
seed points from hierarchical results  
 














Outcome1: Overall, the 
multiorganizational interaction is 














Outcome 2: Overall, high quality 
working relationships have developed 
between my organization and partner 










F(3,202) = 6.557 
.000 
.089 
Outcome3: Overall, my organizations 
view of the issue(s)/problem(s) that 
brought the organizations together has 














Outcome 4: Overall, my organization 
has increased its interaction with 















Outcome 5: Overall, the 
multiorganizational interaction has 
helped to make partner organizations’ 









F(3,202) = 6.523 
.000 
.088 
N 72 43 61 30   
 
Four-Cluster Solution Interpretation 
In the four-cluster solution, cluster one has 72 cases (35.0% of the total number), 
cluster two has 43 cases (20.9%), cluster three has 61 (29.6%), and cluster four has 30 
cases (14.6%). As the clusters are comprised of less cases than the two- and three-cluster 
solutions, they have generally lower variances across the clustering variables and more 
diverse or extreme means. The smaller clusters tend to exhibit greater error bars, as 




The profiling in Table 5-25 shows that cluster one clearly can be interpreted as 
collaboration in terms of the GIIA as clustering variables (V1 to V9) are predominately at 
the level of collaboration. As with the three-cluster solution, Formality_S (V7) is at the 
level of coordination. Cluster one in the four-cluster solution is characterized by high 
levels of organizational commitment (V2 – V4), high levels of structure, process and 
formality (V6 – V9), the highest levels of shared perspectives (V1), the highest levels of 
trust (V11) and low levels of impact of autonomy (V10), more so than even for cluster 
one in the three-cluster solution. Cluster three, on the other hand, has similar levels across 
V2 – V9, but a high level of impact of autonomy (V10), average shared perspectives (V1) 
and a slightly lower trust score (V11) compared to cluster one. Cluster three appears to be 
a highly formalized variant of collaboration, but without the high levels of trust in cluster 
one, and having a great impact on participating organization’s autonomy.  
Cluster two exhibits high trust and shared perspectives, moderate organizational 
commitments, low levels of structure, process and formality, and a low level—not 
significantly different from cluster one—of autonomy. Cluster two receives an overall 
rating of cooperation for Formality_S (V7), with 70% of cases indicating that no 
formalized agreements exist in their respective interorganizational interactions. Cluster 
two may be interpreted as another variant of “partnering” described in the three-cluster 
solution, as the level of organizational commitment is higher than would be expected for 
cooperation, but the level of formality and structure is fairly low.  
Cluster four exhibits the lowest levels of trust and shared perspectives, low levels 
of organizational commitment, moderate to high levels—between collaboration and 




autonomy. Cluster four is significantly lower across all outcome variables. Cluster four 
may be the “difficult” collaboration variant observed in the three cluster solution.   
Inspection of a cross-tabulation of the three-cluster solution with the four-cluster 
solution shows that the original “collaboration” cluster in the three-cluster solution was 
split evenly between clusters one and three in the four-cluster solution, supporting further 
the interpretation of cluster three in the four-cluster solution as a collaboration variant. 
Furthermore, about 30% of cases from cluster two in the three-cluster solution were 
allocated to cluster one in the four-cluster solution, and about 70% formed a new cluster 
two. The “difficult collaboration” cluster three in the three-cluster solution was split in 
two in the four-cluster solution, with 36% of cases going to cluster three and 63% of 
cases to cluster four. Closer inspection shows that the “difficult” cases ended up in cluster 
four, whereas the less difficult cases went to cluster three.  
The criterion validity tests demonstrate cluster discrimination across eight 
variables: Work_Status, Time_Dur_Indef, Task_Complexity,  Num_Orgs, Impetus_N, 
Mandated, Autonomy1_N, and Trust1_N. Predictive validity tests of the five Outcome 
variables were less conclusive due to violation of statistical assumptions required for the 
MANOVA. Individual univariate tests showed generally higher means for clusters one 
and three compared to cluster two and four. The univariate tests discriminated between 
the clusters with Bonferroni-adjusted significance values. The criterion and predictive 
results are supportive of an interpretation of cluster one and cluster three as collaboration. 
Cluster one and three are more likely to: be indefinite in duration; involve higher 




interorganizational interaction can achieve the collective goal independently; report that 
trust is required at all levels; and involve joint policies. 
The more granular look at the cluster structure reveals an inconsistency with the 
interpretation from the three-cluster solution, in which cluster one was a high outcome, 
high trust collaboration with low impact on autonomy, and cluster three was a low 
outcome, low trust collaboration with high impact on autonomy. In the four-cluster 
solution, there are three variants of collaboration, two high outcome variants (cluster one 
and three) with high and average trust scores but significantly different high and low 
autonomy levels, and a low outcome variant, with very low trust and high impact on 
autonomy. The narrative in the interpretation for the three-cluster solution suggested that 
in cluster three—the “difficult collaboration”—the low trust and shared perspectives 
coupled with the high level of formalization contributed to a state of high impact on 
autonomy. But in the four-cluster solution we now see a high impact of autonomy 
collaboration (cluster three) and low impact of autonomy collaboration (cluster one) that 
have similar levels of trust and similar high outcomes compared to the other clusters. A 
series of MANCOVA tests were run to investigate these results further, especially 
concerning the trust variable, which are explained in research question four.  
Research Question 3 
Research question three examines which dimensions of the GIIA are most 
important for predicting an organization’s level of interaction in an interorganizational 
interaction. In other words, which variables are most important in discriminating cluster 




could be included in an analysis, thus selecting a parsimonious yet theoretically 
meaningful set is important.  
A series of discriminant function analyses were run for the two-, three-, and four-
cluster solutions with the clustering, contextual and outcome variables. The aim of each 
analyses was to investigate differences between clusters by creation of a discriminant 
function—a linear combination of GIIA variables that maximizes group separation. The 
coefficients of the discriminant functions, coupled with the function-variable correlations, 
allow the relative contributions of variables to cluster separation to be assessed.  
This section is organized as follows: first, the protocol concerning discriminant 
analysis assumptions is reviewed; second, for each clustering solution the clustering, 
contextual and outcome variables are assessed using the discriminant function 
significance and model fits, the standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients 
and function-variable correlations; and third, the ability of functions to correctly classify 
cases is checked. After reviewing the two-, three-, and four-cluster solution discriminant 
analyses, an overall assessment is made about the contribution of the variables. For space 
considerations, only the results from the clustering variables are shown in detail, and 
results are only reported if the discriminant analysis assumptions are met.  
Assumptions of Discriminant Analysis 
Discriminant function analysis is fairly sensitive to assumptions concerning 
sample size, multicollinearity, and equality of covariance between the tested groups. 
First, the sample size must be assessed. Hair et al. (2006) recommend that the sample size 
be 20X the number of independent variables. With ten clustering variables and a sample 




correlations between variables affects their importance in the discriminant functions. The 
results in Table 4-53 showed that only moderate to low correlations are present in the 
clustering variables, thus multicollinearity is not an issue. The final assumption concerns 
equality of covariance matrices. This is tested in each case using Box’s M test. If the 
covariance matrices are not equivalent—indicated by a significance test at the .001 
level—then the log determinants are compared. The convention adopted is that given the 
large sample size, failures of Box’s M test can be ignored providing that log determinants 
are of the same order of magnitude (Burns & Burns, 2008; Garson, 2012). 
The interpretations for each of the results presented are as follows: 
 Function: a projection of the data onto a latent dimension that best separates 
clusters. For more than two clusters, multiple orthogonal (i.e. uncorrelated) 
functions are created. 
 Eigenvalue: a measure of overall effectiveness of a discriminant function by 
describing how much discriminating ability a function possesses. For multiple 
functions, eigenvalues are relative to each other. 
 Percent variance: the proportion of discriminating ability of all independent 
variables in a discriminant function. 
 Wilk’s Lambda (Λ): the proportion of the total variance in discriminant scores 
unexplained by group differences, hence the closer to zero Λ is, the more 
representative a discriminant function is of the underlying variance. 
 Rc: the canonical correlations of discriminant scores with the set of independence 
variables, indicating an overall strength of relationship between the discriminant 




 Standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients: standardized weights 
for each variable in the discriminant function, which allows calculation of 
discriminant score used to classify cases. The magnitude of coefficients indicates 
how strongly discriminating variables affect the score. Their calculation is 
affected by correlation between variables, hence coefficients cannot be used as the 
only source of interpretation. 
 Variable-discriminant function correlations: Often termed the “structure matrix,” 
these report correlations between the independent variables and discriminating 
functions, indicating how much variables ‘load’ onto functions reflecting shared 
variance. 
 Classification confusion matrix: compares the prediction accuracy of the 
discriminant functions with the actual data (cluster membership).  
 
 
Two-Cluster Solution Discriminant Analysis 
Discriminant analysis for the ten clustering variables, presented in Table 5-28, 
revealed one discriminant function that significantly discriminated clusters, Λ = .323, 
χ
2
(10) = 224.7, RC
 2
 = .677, p < .001. The Wilk’s Λ indicates that 32.3% of variance in 
the discriminant scores is unexplained by the difference between clusters. The effect size, 
RC
 2
, is moderate. Table 5-29 shows the classification accuracy of the discriminant 





Table 5-28: Summary discriminant analysis results for the two-cluster solution 
Overall Model Fit: Canonical Discriminant Functions 
Function Eigenvalue 

































Independent Variable – 
Discriminant Function 
Correlations 
Function 1 Function 1 
V1: Problem_Orient_Sum .153 .133 
V2: Resource_Alloc_Comp .348 .327 
V3: Incentives .384 .336 
V4: Key_Personnel_Sum .353 .394 
V6: Design_Comp .357 .408 
V7: Formality_S .308 .391 
V8: Info_Comp .379 .495 
V9: Decision_Comp .385 .312 
V10: Autonomy2_Sum .113 .092 
V11: Trust2_Sum .083 .161 
 
Table 5-29: Classification matrix for two-cluster solution discriminant function 
  2-Cluster Sol. K-
Means Method 
Predicted Group Membership* 
Total   1 2 
Original Count 1 119 0 119 
2 7 80 87 
% 1 100.0 .0 100.0 
2 8.0 92.0 100.0 






For V2 – V8, the standardized coefficients lie within the range of .308 - .385, with 
Decision_Comp (V9) the largest. V1, V10 and V11 lie within the range of .083 - .152, 
with Trust2_Sum the smallest. These results indicate that the Trust2_Sum and 
Autonomy2_Sum variable contribute least to the discriminant function scores, which is 
further reflected in their low loadings (r =.161, r =.092, respectively). The analysis 
confirms the conclusions from the two-cluster solution profiling made earlier—at the 
relatively crude level of granularity provided by a two-cluster solution, clusters are 
distinguished most based on the interorganizational category variables, which cannot 
logically vary across groups to the extent that perceptual organizational category 
variables can.  
Another discriminant analysis was run for four contextual variables: 
Purpose_Comp, Role_Single_Org_S, Reason_Sum, and History_Sum. These variables 
were chosen because they are continuous and do not have missing values. 
Task_Complexity_Sum was not selected due to its poor multivariate performance in the 
previous tests, and Num_Orgs was omitted due to the nine cases removed for outliers. 
Time_Dur was not selected as its number of cases does not meet the assumptions for 
discriminant analysis. Other nominal variables cannot be used in the analysis due to the 
limitations of the method.  
One discriminant function was revealed that significantly but weakly 
discriminated clusters, Λ = .942, χ
2
(4) = 12.175, RC
 2
 = .059, p = .016. The Wilk’s Λ 
indicates that 94.2% of variance in the discriminant scores is unexplained by the 
difference between clusters. The effect size, RC
 2
, is low, and correspondingly the low 




discriminant function (but not generally), History_Sum is highly correlated (r = .726) 
and Role_Single_Org_S is moderately correlated (r = .643). These results confirm the 
criterion validity tests displayed in Table 5-23, which showed a significant effect for 
these variables, although History_Sum was not interpreted due to its low effect size.  
A further discriminant analysis was run for the five Outcome variables. One 
discriminant function was revealed that significantly but weakly discriminated clusters, Λ 
= .917, χ
2
(5) = 17.482, RC
 2
 = .083, p = .004. The Wilk’s Λ indicates that 91.7% of 
variance in the discriminant scores is unexplained by the difference between clusters. The 
effect size, RC
 2
, is low, and correspondingly the low classification accuracy of 64.6% 
was achieved. The structure matrix confirms the predictive validity MANOVA tests of 
the clusters, showing that Outcome5, Outcome2 and Outcome3 discriminate most, albeit 
weakly, between clusters. 
 
Three-Cluster Solution Discriminant Analysis 
Discriminant analysis for the ten clustering variables across the three-cluster 
solution, presented in Table 5-30 revealed two discriminant functions. The first explained 
53.1% of variance, RC
 2
 = .638, and the second explained 46.9% of variance, RC
 2
 = .608. 
In combination, these functions significantly discriminated clusters, Λ = .142, χ
2
(20) = 
387.9, p < .001. Removing the first function also significantly discriminated clusters, Λ = 
.391, χ
2
(9) = 186.4, p < .001. Table 5-31 shows the classification accuracy of the 






Table 5-30: Summary discriminant analysis results for the three-cluster solution 
Overall Model Fit: Canonical Discriminant Functions 
Function Eigenvalue 



















































Independent Variable – 
Discriminant Function 
Correlations 
Function 1 Function 2 Function 1 Function 2 
V1: Problem_Orient_Sum .228 .621 .231 .658 
V2: Resource_Alloc_Comp .152 .037 .265 .133 
V3: Incentives .326 .305 .325 .183 
V4: Key_Personnel_Sum .298 .084 .393 .009 
V6: Design_Comp .370 .072 .441 -.117 
V7: Formality_S .187 -.356 .374 -.261 
V8: Info_Comp .442 -.387 .591 -.202 
V9: Decision_Comp .453 -.056 .390 -.061 
V10: Autonomy2_Sum .090 -.281 .086 -.419 
V11: Trust2_Sum .026 .446 .203 .552 
 
 
Table 5-31: Classification matrix for three-cluster solution discriminant functions 
  3-Cluster Sol. K-
Means Method 
Predicted Group Membership* 
Total   1 2 3 
Original Count 1 100 0 0 100 
2 6 54 2 62 
3 4 0 40 44 
% 1 100.0 .0 .0 100.0 
2 9.7 87.1 3.2 100.0 
3 9.1 .0 90.9 100.0 





Comparing the discriminant loadings for the two functions offer the best way to 
interpret the results. The loadings for function one are highest across the 
interorganizational category variables (Design_Comp (r = .441), Formality_S (r = .374), 
Info_Comp (r = .591), Decision_Comp (r = .390)), the next highest across the 
organizational commitment group of variables (Resource_Alloc_Comp (r = .265), 
Incentives (r = .325), Key_Personnel_Sum (r = .393)), and finally lowest across the three 
perception-based organizational variables (Problem_Orient_Sum (r = .231), 
Autonomy2_Sum (r = .086), Trust2_Sum (r = .203)). Thus the interorganizational 
variables offer greatest discriminating power, confirmed by their generally higher 
coefficient magnitudes.  
In comparison, correlations of the variables with function two show the highest 
loadings—even greater in magnitude than function one—for the perception-based 
variables (Problem_Orient_Sum (r = .658), Autonomy2_Sum (r = -.419), Trust2_Sum (r 
= .552)). Conversely, the other variables now load very weakly—all less than .26—with 
function two. 
The territorial map in Figure 5-4 shows this visually. Looking horizontally across 
function one, cluster one is at a further distance from clusters two and three. Cluster one 
showed the greatest difference from the other two in terms of its interorganizational 
category variables—thus explaining why these variables load more on function one. 
Looking vertically at function two, cluster three is now at a greater distance from clusters 
one and two. Cluster three showed the greatest difference from the others in terms of its 
values for trust, shared perspectives and autonomy—explaining why these variables load 





Figure 5-4: Territorial map for three-cluster solution discriminant analysis 
 
 
Another discriminant analysis for the four contextual variables across the three-
cluster solution revealed two discriminant functions. The first explained 58.3% of 
variance, RC
 2
 = .038, and the second explained 41.7% of variance, RC
 2
 = .028. In 
combination, these functions significantly but weakly discriminated clusters, Λ = .936, 
χ
2
(8) = 13.425, p = .098. When the first function was removed, however, clusters were 
not significantly discriminated, Λ = .972, χ
2
(2) = 5.621, p = .132. The classification 




cases. Due to the weak effects, the variable-function loadings are not conclusive, but 
overall the model provides a weak confirmation of the criterion validity of clusters. 
Finally, a discriminant analysis for the five outcome variables across the three-
cluster solution revealed two discriminant functions. The first explained 88.5% of 
variance, RC
 2
 = .190, and the second explained 11.5% of variance, RC
 2
 = .003. In 
combination, these functions significantly but weakly discriminated clusters, Λ = .786, 
χ
2
(10) = 48.508, p < .001. When the first function was removed, however, clusters were 
not significantly discriminated, Λ = .970, χ
2
(5) = 6.051, p = .195. The classification 
accuracy of the discriminant functions were low, correctly classifying only 48.1% of 
cases. The overall the model provides a reasonable confirmation of the predictive validity 
of clusters. Inspection of the discriminant function centroids and territorial maps shows 
that function one discriminates cluster one from two and three, and function two 
discriminates cluster two from one and three.  
 
Four-Cluster Solution Discriminant Analysis 
Discriminant analysis for the ten clustering variables across the four-cluster 
solution revealed three discriminant functions, presented in Table 5-32. The first 
explained 52.0% of variance, RC
 2
 = .717, the second explained 36.8% of variance, RC
 2
 = 
.643, and the third explained 11.1% of variance, RC
 2
 = .209. In combination, these 
functions significantly and strongly discriminated clusters, Λ = .065, χ
2
(30) = 539.8, p < 
.001. Removing the first and second functions also significantly discriminated clusters at 
the < .001 level. Table 5-33 shows the classification accuracy of the discriminant 




Table 5-32: Summary discriminant analysis results for the four-cluster solution 
Overall Model Fit: Canonical Discriminant Functions 
Function Eigenvalue 





































































Independent Variable – 
Discriminant Function 
Correlations 
Func. 1 Func. 2 Func. 3 Func. 1 Func. 2 Func. 3 
V1: Problem_Orient_Sum -.289 .482 .322 -.214 .545 .251 
V2: Resource_Alloc_Comp .058 .286 .150 .100 .329 .218 
V3: Incentives .085 .476 -.022 .118 .373 .066 
V4: Key_Personnel_Sum .049 .174 .428 .220 .232 .360 
V6: Design_Comp .279 .368 .031 .370 .237 .108 
V7: Formality_S .369 -.150 .069 .408 .056 .224 
V8: Info_Comp .624 .022 -.289 .510 .286 -.260 
V9: Decision_Comp .396 .269 -.542 .307 .231 -.409 
V10: Autonomy2_Sum .449 -.339 .641 .428 -.385 .603 
V11: Trust2_Sum -.177 .294 .254 -.149 .502 .126 
 
Interpretation of the coefficients and loadings is more challenging with three 
functions; however, the territorial map in Figure 5-5 shows that function one separates 
out cluster two, whereas function two separates out cluster four. Again, this is due to the 
different ways to load the autonomy and trust variables compared with the 
interorganizational variables. Cluster four is the lowest on trust, but the highest on impact 





Table 5-33: Classification matrix for four-cluster solution discriminant functions 
 4-Cluster Sol. K-
Means Method 
Predicted Group Membership* 
Total 
1 2 3 4 
Original Count 1 71 0 1 0 72 
2 2 41 0 0 43 
3 1 0 59 1 61 
4 0 0 1 29 30 
% 1 98.6 .0 1.4 .0 100.0 
2 4.7 95.3 .0 .0 100.0 
3 1.6 .0 96.7 1.6 100.0 
4 .0 .0 3.3 96.7 100.0 
* 97.1% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
 





Summary of Results 
As more groups are added to the discriminant calculation, interpretation becomes 
increasingly challenging. Hair et al. (2006) recommend calculating a “potency index,” 
which creates a composite sum of a variable’s discriminating power across functions. The 
potency indices (multiplied by 100 for ease of viewing) are shown in Table 5-34. The 
indices for the two-cluster solution are simply the squared correlations (discriminant 
loadings) as there is only one function with one eigenvalue. 
Table 5-34: Potency indices for 4-, 3, & 2-cluster solution discriminant analyses 








V1: Problem_Orient_Sum 14.04 3 23.14 1 1.77 9 
V2: Resource_Alloc_Comp 5.04 10 4.56 10 10.69 6 
V3: Incentives 5.91 9 7.18 9 11.29 5 
V4: Key_Personnel_Sum 5.94 8 8.21 8 15.52 3 
V6: Design_Comp 9.32 6 10.97 4 16.65 2 
V7: Formality_S 9.33 5 10.62 5 15.29 4 
V8: Info_Comp 17.29 2 20.46 2 24.50 1 
V9: Decision_Comp 8.73 7 8.25 7 9.73 7 
V10: Autonomy2_Sum 19.03 1 8.63 6 0.85 10 
V11: Trust2_Sum 10.63 4 16.48 3 2.59 8 
The top four ranks in each solution are in bold 
 
The two-cluster solution resulted in one cluster clearly interpretable as 
collaboration, and another that, while not at any one particular level of interaction, clearly 
lacked certain key features of collaboration such as formalized policies and joint decision 
making. This is reflected in the ranking for potency indices. The top four ranks (in bold) 
all relate to “observable” aspects of an interorganizational interaction that either are or 




perspectives, which as discussed in the cluster interpretations – have no “logical” reason 
constraining their values across clusters.  
The three-cluster solution “opened up” the second cluster from the two cluster 
solution based on different scores on trust, autonomy, and shared perspectives. This is 
indicated by top rankings for these variables, with the exception of autonomy. Once 
again, Design_Comp is highly ranked, indicating that the presence—or absence—of joint 
decision-making forums is critical to distinguishing clusters. The four-cluster solution 
creates even more detail between clusters. It appears that the numerous possible 
combinations of variables two through nine smooth-out the overall importance of their 
discriminating power, leaving clusters to be primarily distinguished by variations in trust, 
autonomy and shared perspectives.  
For all solution sets, Info_Comp is consistently ranked high, either first or second, 
in discriminating ability. Reviewing the descriptives in Table 4-35 show that this variable 
scores predominately at the level of collaboration terms of the nominal categorical 
variable, Info_Comp_LOI. Examining the frequency distribution for the continuous 
version of the variable reveals a highly skewed distribution. Further analysis needs 
conducting using a stepwise approach to adding variables into the discriminant function 
to understand the importance of this finding.   
In conclusion, the discriminant function analysis adds supporting weight to the 
distinctiveness of clusters, although their interpretation in terms of the GIIA is still 
inconclusive, with the exception of the collaboration-variant clusters. The discriminant 
function analysis also reaffirms the multivariate results concerning the weak, but 




Research Question 4 
Research question four asks to what extent dimensions of an interorganizational 
interaction array can be conceptualized as “increasing” along a continuum of interaction. 
The aim is to critique and evaluate this assumption inherent in much public 
administration and organizational science literature. The analysis proceeds as follows. 
First, for each dimension of the GIIA descriptive and cluster analysis results are 
reviewed, referring back to the original GIIA framework and, where necessary, the 
supporting literature. At each stage, the ability to interpret the dimension as varying along 
a continuum is made. Second, an overall evaluation is made of the usefulness of the 
dimension in understanding or defining interaction states. Finally, the evidence for each 
dimension of the GIIA is summarized and conclusions are made. The following 
abbreviations are used: two-cluster solution (2CS), three-cluster solution (3CS) and four-
cluster solution (4CS). 
Review of GIIA Dimensions 
Purpose of interorganizational interaction 
While Mandell and Steelman (2003) and Keast et al. (2007) make the reasonable 
assumption that “increasing” levels of interaction are associated with more complex 
purposes, the purpose dimension of the GIIA does not discriminate any of the cluster 
solutions identified. The descriptive results for the Purpose_Comp and 
Purpose_Comp_LOI variables show that 72.8% of responses are at the level of 
collaboration, in GIIA terms. This should increase the chance that clusters clearly 
identified as collaboration, based on the clustering variables, would differ significantly 




result, however, as the cases with high levels of Purpose_Comp are even spread 
throughout all clusters. There are 44 case of interorganizational interactions that are 
clearly not collaboration as defined by clustering variables, but in which the purpose 
dimension is rated at the level of collaboration.  
The survey results do not support use of the purpose dimension in defining an 
interaction state. There is nothing preventing an informal network aspiring to create 
institutional and system change—the highest ranking purpose. Similarly, it is reasonable 
to assume that highly formalized and structured collaborations could be formed purely for 
the purpose of exploring interests—the lowest ranking purpose in the GIIA. There is little 
support to interpret this dimension as a continuum. 
There is a possibility, however, that results are affected by the survey sample. In 
the highly bureaucratized domain of defense organizations, interaction between 
organizations may more likely be formalized—regardless of the purpose. Thus future 
research is needed in other contexts to evaluate the importance of purpose, especially as it 
seems a popular choice in defining interaction states (Cross et al., 2009; Gajda, 2004; 
Gajda & Koliba, 2007). 
Time 
The length of time that the interorganizational interaction is expected to exist is 
significant for cluster one (collaboration) in the 2CS, and for clusters one (collaboration) 
and three (difficult collaboration) in the 3CS. No significant results are found in the 4CS. 
In general, the clusters identifying as collaboration are more likely to be either indefinite 
or of greater number of months in duration. This supports the assertion made by 




From a logical perspective, however, there is no reason why interaction states 
should be defined by time. In fact, many examples can be found of intense collaboration 
in emergency or crisis situations (Bryson et al., 2006; Simo, 2009). While the time 
dimension is a “natural” continuum, there is little reason why it should be overlain onto a 
continuum of interaction.  
Difficulty 
For all cluster solutions, the Task_Complexity variables discriminate clusters in 
the expected direction, with collaboration clusters receiving generally higher ratings. The 
factor analysis for this dimension is inconclusive, however, indicating that each element 
should be retained as a separate feature. For example, Task_Complexity6, which captures 
the level of disagreement amongst participants, may be more related to other dimensions 
in the framework such as participant’s problem orientation, trust, and autonomy.  
While task complexity overall discriminates clusters, there are some unexpected 
results. For example, task complexity is higher overall for cluster three—the “difficult” 
variant of collaboration—in the 3CS. Furthermore, results from the 4CS show that the 
cooperation-like or partnering clusters report greater task dissimilarity. This hints at the 
possibility that task complexity may not be a necessary condition for any particular 
interaction state. In other words, there is no logical reason why “collaboration” could not 
exist in the absence of high task complexity.  
Role of single organization 
For the 2CS, cluster one is more likely to report that no single organization can 
accomplish the goals alone—the highest level of Role_Single_Org_N. At the low level of 




With the greater resolution of detail in the 3CS and 4CS, however, this dimension does 
not discriminate clusters. 
Strictly, there is no logical reason why a highly formalized and structured 
collaboration could not exist for a problem that any one of the collaborating organizations 
could solve alone. A total of 36 respondents, for example, record that their participation 
in the interaction is technically “voluntary” but is necessary to prevent loss of reputation. 
For these cases there is insufficient evidence to understand the reasons for this choice of 
answer, but the possibility remains that highly capable organizations—especially in the 
defense sector—could solve problems on their own but instead choose to collaborate for 
other reasons.  
Interdependence is treated as a fundamental element of collaboration in the 
literature (Emerson et al., 2012; Morris et al., 2013; Morris & Miller-Stevens, 2016b; 
Trist, 1977), or as Gray (1989) states: “collaboration implies interdependence” (p.11). 
Thus even given the inconclusive results from the survey, there is theoretical ground to 
warrant continued inclusion of this dimension in the framework. This dimension was 
captured by a single survey question with only three possible options, which given the 
complex nature of interdependence, is probably insufficient.  
Impetus for collective action 
This dimension describes two distinct components: first whether an organization’s 
participation in an interaction is voluntary or mandated, and second, ratings of 
importance of different reasons for an organization’s participation. Result show that the 
mandated/voluntary status of an interaction significantly discriminates clusters in all 




mandated. Given the number of exceptions (e.g. 26% of cluster one was voluntary), the 
fact that an interaction is mandated does not seem to be a strong determinant of an 
interaction state: mandated cooperation could equally well exist, albeit less frequently as 
evidenced from the survey results, as mandated collaboration.   
McNamara (2016) suggests that mandated collaborations are distinct interaction 
states that occupy a separate “level” in an interorganizational array. Further testing is 
needed to determine whether this is the case and the multitude of consequences that 
result. Bryson et al. (2006) suggest that deliberate planning—i.e. joint decision boards—
is more likely in mandated collaborations. A cross-tabulation of Design_Comp_LOI with 
Mandated shows this to be the case. In the context of the present study, there is evidence 
to suggest that the mandated/voluntary nature is important in distinguishing interaction 
states, but there little justification for placing “mandated” interactions on a continuum.  
The other part of the impetus dimension captures the importance of several 
reasons for an organization’s participation. No significant relationships are found, 
indicating that the importance of a particular reason is highly contextual for each 
organization, regardless of interaction state. There is no justification for assuming a level 
of interaction in this dimension.  
Numbers of participating organizations 
In the 2CS, there are no differences between clusters in terms of the number of 
participating organizations. In the 3CS, cluster one (collaboration) has slightly higher 
mean numbers, and in the 4CS, cluster three (collaboration variant) is higher. No specific 
prediction is made in the GIIA about the numbers of organizations for each level of 




higher numbers. This may be indicative, however, of increased interdependence or task 
complexity rather than something fundamental about the number of participants. Higher 
numbers of participants may also naturally force different types of decision making 
structures, though in the terms of the present study this assertion is not supported as 
cluster three (the difficult variant of collaboration) exhibits the lowest number of 
participating organizations but has a high level of collaboration-like decision making 
structures.  
Category of participating organizations 
Margerum (2008) finds that different interaction states can be identified based on 
the types of participants, which in turn relate to the nature of the problem bringing 
organizations together. Other scholars define collaboration in terms of a cross-sector 
interaction (Ansel & Gash, 2007). Although no specific predictions are made in the GIIA, 
no evidence is found that suggests any difference between clusters in terms of 
participating organizations. The significance of this finding, however, should be 
interpreted in the context of the study sample, which was dominated heavily by 
governmental organizations. 
History of previous interaction in the problem domain 
The extent to which organizations and participants have worked together on 
previous initiatives only weakly discriminates clusters in the 2CS, with the collaboration 
cluster reporting higher previous history scores. Mattessich et al. (2001) identify previous 
history as a key element of a successful collaboration, and a major explanatory part of 
Ostrom (2005) institutional analysis framework relies on the fact that repeated 




empirical data during disaster relief collaborations, Hicklin et al. found no evidence that 
prior history affected collaboration. 
While there is very weak evidence from the present study to suggest an effect, the 
special case of the sample may affect the results. Military officers and NATO civilian 
staff tend to rotate posts fairly frequently, hence respondents may not have had a full 
appreciation of the extent of previous history of interaction with other organizations.  
Participant’s problem orientation 
The extent to which participants view problems from a shared or individual 
perspective strongly discriminates clusters, with decreasing importance moving from the 
4CS to the 2CS. Mandell and Steelman (2003) assert that shared perspectives are 
necessary for higher levels of interaction, and Mattessich et al. (2001) identify it as a 
requirement for successful collaboration. Shared perspectives are related to the more 
encompassing concept of “shared vision,” which is frequently identified as an essential 
component of collaboration (Mayer & Kenter, 2016). 
There is strong evidence for treating this dimension as varying along a continuum. 
First, its discriminating power increases with greater number of clusters, and second, the 
descriptives reveal a relatively smooth frequency distribution, albeit fairly skewed 
towards the higher end of the scale as indicated by the _LOI version of the variable.  
While the dimension does discriminate clusters, there is no logical reason as to 
why interaction states must fundamentally be defined by the presence or absence of 
shared vision, and the evidence suggests that this dimension is more indicative of the 




MANCOVA results, for example, reveal that differences in outcome variables between 
clusters become nonsignificant when controlling for the Problem_Orient_Sum variables. 
Resource allocation 
Resource allocation—or the contributions allocated by individual organizations to 
the interorganizational interaction—is a moderate discriminant of clusters. Across all 
cluster solutions, cluster tend to form into two variants with respect to this dimension—
high resource allocation at the level of collaboration in GIIA terms, and moderate 
resource allocation at the level of coordination in GIIA terms. 
The underlying distribution of Resource_Alloc_Comp values are smooth, with 
very few values below the level of coordination. This is likely a sample effect due to the 
nature of military and government organizations, which contribute relatively substantial 
resources even for small interactions. For example, almost 80% of cases indicate that 
their organization had contributed financially to interactions.  
There is justification for treating resource allocation as a continuum. Above the 
level of cooperation, the distribution of the composite variable Resource_Alloc_Comp is 
fairly smooth. Increasing resource allocation in terms of money, personnel time, or 
physical assets represents increasing “stakes” for an organization involved in an 
interaction, and there is a logical relationship between the level of organizational 
involvement and the existence of collective decision making apparatus, as portrayed by 
the interorganizational category of dimensions.  
The exception to the continuum is perhaps the idea that resources are “pooled” in 
certain interaction states. One of the survey items, taken from the “collaboration” cell of 




resources with other organizations into an independent operating fund for the 
multiorganizational interaction.” Only 7% of respondents selected this option, which 
seems incongruent with the generally higher rated answers from other items in this scale. 
Further research should expand on the meaning of pooling resources; the stated benefit of 
pooling seems linked with other important features of interorganizational interaction such 
as authority, autonomy and decision making.  
Incentives 
This dimension as stated in the GIIA captures both the intrinsic and extrinsic 
rewards provided to individuals and participating organizations. No reliable survey 
instruments were found that could capture the entire dimension and only the leadership 
element was carried forward in the survey, which rated the extent to which leaders 
recognized the benefits of participating in the interaction. This dimension is a reasonable 
discriminant of clusters and is significantly lower for the less successful clusters four (in 
the 4CS) and three (in the 3CS).  
While the descriptive results indicate a heavy skew toward the level of 
collaboration, there is nothing in principle preventing this dimension from existing on a 
continuum. It is not certain, however, whether its point on a continuum is relevant for an 
interorganizational interaction state, as leaders could equally recognize the benefit of 
participating even for a low level of interaction. For the 3CS, the results show that 67% 
of cases in cluster two—the “lower” interaction state in terms of overall mean values—




Time to establish multiorganizational arrangement 
Keast et al. (2007) suggest that the time it takes for an interorganizational to 
establish itself to the point where it could achieve its objectives, is related to the level of 
interaction. No significant results are found for this dimension. Given the lack of concern 
in the literature for this particular dimension, its removal from the GIIA is supported.  
Key personnel 
This dimension describes the extent of involvement of personnel responsible for 
bringing together and implementing the interorganizational interaction. Two questions 
looking at the role of staff and the role of leadership were combined into a single 
composite scale. The smooth variation of the scale variable suggests that this dimension 
can be interpreted as a continuum, although for this sample the distribution is skewed 
towards the level of collaboration. This dimension is best at discriminating clusters in the 
2CS. In the 3CS and 4CS, it does not discriminate between the collaboration-variant 
clusters, but does for the non-collaboration clusters. 
At the level of collaboration, the GIIA includes additional elements concerning 
the role of lead organizations, thus a third survey question was created to ask respondents 
about whether a single organization led the group (Org_Lead_N). This was not included 
in the key personnel variable due to the obvious level of analysis inconsistency, and the 
variable was instead used to profile clusters. The Org_Lead_N variable does not 
discriminate clusters, indicating that for this sample, whether an interorganizational 
interaction is led by single or multiple organization makes little difference to the level of 
interaction. This result stands in contrast to the importance placed on “lead organization-




governance (either shared, lead organization, or via a bespoke “network” organization) is 
related to the numbers of participants, goal consensus and trust.  
Orientation of policy objective (goals) 
This dimension captures the extent to which goals are agreed between 
organizations. As a result of a highly skewed response distribution, this dimension was 
not selected for clustering as originally intended and was used to profile the cluster 
solutions. The Goals_N variable significantly but weakly discriminates clusters in the 
4CS and 3CS, showing that the “difficult collaboration” cluster three is less likely to 
report shared goals than the other clusters. The evidence for this dimension’s inclusion in 
the GIIA and its interpretation as a continuum of interaction is inconclusive.  
Design 
This dimension captures the administrative structure emerging from the 
interorganizational interaction and reflects the “intensity” of the ways in which 
organizations work together. Arguably, this dimension captures a core element of 
collaboration—the presence of joint decision making boards or joint organizations 
created specifically for the interaction—a fact recognized in all the interorganizational 
array and typologies reviewed for this study, and much of the broader literature on 
collaboration (Thomson & Perry, 2006; Thomson et al., 2009).  
For the 2CS and 3CS this dimension strongly discriminates all clusters, and for 
the 4CS discriminates only cluster two, with the other three clusters being similar in 
design level. This dimension is crucial in interpreting clusters as “collaboration,” 




variable. The descriptive analysis reveals a smooth distribution of the Design_Comp 
variable, thus lending support to the interpretation of a continuum.  
Formality of the agreement 
This dimension describes the way in which organizations agree on their roles and 
responsibilities in the interaction, either informally, formally specifying roles, or formally 
specifying detailed planning in addition to roles. Overall, this dimension as strong 
discriminant of clusters for the 2CS, but less so for the other solutions, although cluster 
two in the 3CS is substantially different in its level of formality.  
Cross-tabulations with the other dimensions reveal some obvious results: 
mandated interactions exhibit more formal arrangements, and executive-level decision 
making structures are associated with higher formality. Yet it is challenging to interpret 
the dimension as a continuum; instead, it appears to be a binary condition: either the 
interorganizational interaction is informal, or there are some formalized policies. The 
significant results mainly lie in the difference between these two states, rather than the 
two variants of formalization expressed in the survey question. This binary state is 
reflected in the pattern of discriminant analysis for clusters, with the collaboration-variant 
cluster types lying close together in formality, including the “difficult” variants, and the 
non-collaboration cluster types with low formality being fairly distinct.  
Information sharing and communications 
This dimension describes the ways in which organizations use information and 
communication processes, and is a strong discriminator of clusters for all cluster 
solutions. The descriptive analysis shows, however, that the distribution is highly skewed 




the impact of this skew was not appreciated at the time the cluster analysis was 
conducted, further investigation is required concerning this dimension, including omitting 
it from further cluster analysis runs. The evidence supporting this dimension in the GIIA 
is inconclusive, even given its top ranking as a discriminant variable. There is insufficient 
evidence to evaluation its interpretation as a continuum. 
Decision making 
Decision making refers to the ways in which organizations make decisions in the 
interaction in terms of its level of collectiveness. This dimensions is one of the weaker 
discriminators of clusters and is ranked seventh out of ten in potency index for all cluster 
solutions. Given the importance of this dimension in the collaboration literature this 
result was initially surprising, however, closer analysis reveals that its discriminating 
power lies mainly in discerning collaboration from non-collaboration. Much research 
identifies certain types of collective decision making as synonymous with collaboration. 
Thomson and Perry (2006), for example, identify the decision making and governance 
mechanism as a core component of the “black box” of collaboration process, and many of 
the interorganizational arrays reviewed include this dimension (Carrasco, 2009; Gajda, 
2004; McNamara, 2012; Williams, 2010; Woodland & Hutton, 2012). Descriptive 
analysis shows a smooth distribution of scores across the sample, indicating that this 
dimension can be interpreted as a continuum.  
Organizational autonomy 
The autonomy dimension captures the degree to which each partnering 
organization independently operates. The GIIA along with much collaboration research 




autonomous as a consequence of an “intrinsic tension between self-interest and the 
collective interest.” (Thomson, 2001, p.94). Autonomy is weakly discriminating for the 
2CS, moderately discriminating for the 3CS and strongly discriminating for the 4CS.  
The results obtained do not support the hypothesis that increasing interaction 
results in loss of autonomy. In the 3CS there are two variants of collaboration, identified 
by their high scores on interorganizational dimensions, which differ markedly on the 
autonomy scores. The “difficult” collaboration variant has the highest autonomy score. 
Likewise, the four cluster solution features three variants of collaboration, two with high 
autonomy scores, and one with very low scores. Yet all of these clusters have relatively 
high scores on the interorganizational dimensions, meaning that the presence of highly 
formalized policies and joint decision making do not necessarily result in loss of 
autonomy.   
The autonomy dimension is lifted primarily from the work of Thomson (2001); 
Thomson et al. (2009), however, this dimension often gave inconclusive and sometimes 
contradictory results. This was explained by the fact that organizations in Thomson’s 
study samples “do not experience a great deal of tension between their own self-interest 
and the collective interest of the collaboration” (Thomson, 2001, p. 145). A simple and 
obvious explanation for this result, however, lies in the basic nature of interorganizational 
interaction itself: the collective structures created to govern and administer a 
collaboration may serve to mitigate the negative effects of reduced organizational 
autonomy. If an organization is involved in collaboration in the first place, that may 




The loss of autonomy may be applicable at the very start of collaboration, but as 
organizations interact and create joint governance and administration structures, the 
autonomy issue is less relevant in the context of an ongoing collaborative process.  
This suggests that, rather than considering the loss of autonomy in collaboration, 
research should focus on how collaboration mitigates or reduces the importance of this 
loss. This would involve a complete re-specification of the autonomy dimension in the 
GIIA to an “Importance of Organizational Autonomy” dimension. There is indication of 
the importance of this from the results concerning outcomes. When controlling for 
autonomy, for example, MANCOVA results show a reduced significance and effect size 
of difference between means of cluster solutions.  
Given that autonomy is shown to vary across different interactions states in which 
the interorganizational dimensions are essentially constant, there is little justification for 
interpreting autonomy as a continuum, even though descriptive results show a smooth 
distribution throughout the total sample. This also suggests that autonomy should not be 
an intrinsic part of a definition of interorganizational interaction.  
Trust 
The trust dimension refers to the extent to which trustworthy relationships 
between organizations are built. This dimension is derived from the wide literature on 
institutional rational choice and game theory, which suggests that participation in 
collective action is increased by tit-for-tat reciprocity between participants (Axelrod, 
1984; Ostrom, 2005; Thomson, 2001). Short-term reciprocal behavior creates a 
reputation and trust norm, which thus supports long term reciprocal behavior as this norm 




and typologies, trust is essential to collaboration in the absence of formal legal rational 
authority. 
Trust is strongly discriminating in the 3CS and 4CS, but differentiates clusters in 
a different manner to the autonomy dimension. In the 3CS, cluster one (collaboration) 
and cluster two (informal partnering) exhibit similar high levels of trust, but differ in their 
autonomy. Cluster three (difficult collaboration), on the other hand, is very low in trust. 
In the 4CS, the three variants of collaboration differ markedly on their trust values.  
The importance of trust can be evaluated using the five outcome variables. The 
MANOVA analysis reported previously showed a multivariate effect of cluster 
membership on outcome level for the 3CS (V = .220, F(10, 400) = 4.946, p < .001, η
2
 = 
.110). When controlling for trust, however, a MANCOVA reveals that the significance in 
differences in outcome means for each cluster are almost removed (V = .073, F(10, 398) 
= 4.946, p = .131, η
2
 = .037). Individual post-hoc comparisons between clusters reveal 
only barely significant differences between clusters one and three for Outcome2 and 
Outcome4.  
Similarly to autonomy, trust can vary significantly across similar interaction 
states, thus there is little justification for interpreting it along a continuum of interaction. 
Further research should encourage treating trust as an important interaction variable as 
Lundin (2007) does, in addition to treating it as an input and output of a collective 
process. The results in the present study do not support the description of trust in the 
GIIA. At the highest levels of interaction trust was found at both high and low values. 
The MANCOVA result show that trust is more important for outcomes than it is for 




Resolution of turf issues 
This dimension was not evaluated in the survey. 
 
Conclusions and Evaluation of Interorganizational Array Structure 
A continuum of interaction? 
The GIIA tested in this research was created from a variety of previous attempts 
in the literature, which all have two things in common. First, they assume a continuum of 
interaction, and second they define arbitrarily-named interaction states (i.e. cooperation, 
coordination or collaboration) based on their constituent dimensions. Part of the 
justification of this present study lies in the fact that many of the supporting typologies 
and arrays as a whole have not been well tested.  
While many of the dimensions included in typologies and arrays have strong 
theoretical and empirical backing for their importance to interorganizational interaction, 
when researchers attempted to overlay a continuum of interaction on these dimension, it 
forced them to create operationalizations at each level for each dimension. For the arrays 
with five or more discrete levels such as those by Mandell and Steelman (2003) and 
Gajda (2004), it is questionable whether the level of detail is meaningful. With the large 
sample of evidence presented in the present study what, if anything, needs to change? Are 
the typologies and arrays valid and useful?  
The results summarized in Table 5-35 at the end of this section paint a mixed 
picture. Some dimensions can be interpreted as a continuum, while others cannot. The 
fact that a dimension is a continuum, however, does not necessarily signify theoretical or 




interaction states, many of the interorganizational-type dimensions exhibit “threshold” 
effects, independent of the level of interaction. Once a certain value is reached, any 
additional variation makes no further difference. For the sample surveyed in this research, 
the interorganizational-type dimensions are important only in a “binary” sense—either 
they are high or low, and this is the only meaningful distinguishing feature between the 
various clusters found. The implication for the GIIA or other arrays is that is it is not 
meaningful to create highly refined graduations to distinguish interaction states.  
On the other hand, three of the organization-type variables—problem orientation, 
autonomy, and trust—are clearly continuous, thus one might assume that they can be 
overlain on a continuum of interaction. The results show, however, that this is not the 
case. In the four cluster solution, three collaboration-variant clusters are observed—based 
on the interorganizational dimension values—yet these three clusters have completely 
different values for autonomy. Thus it is clearly false to assign a particular level of 
autonomy in the way in which the GIIA and many other arrays do. A similar result is 
found for trust and also problem orientation. The results do not suggest that these 
dimensions are unimportant, but merely that they cannot be included on a continuum of 
interaction.  
The importance of dimension type 
From the twenty or so typologies and arrays reviewed in chapter two, a 
framework was created to organize and categorize the dimensions encountered (Table 2-
7). This framework distinguishes dimensions based on whether they are contextual, 
organizational or interorganizational. From the literature analysis, a conclusion was 




states, as they are by definition—contextual. The cluster analysis results show that this 
conclusion is warranted: with the exception of the interdependence (role of single 
organization) and the mandated/voluntary (impetus) dimensions, the contextual 
dimensions generally have no bearing on the state of interaction. This does not imply that 
they are unimportant, just that they should not be called upon do create fundamental 
definitions.   
The organizational- and interorganizational-type dimensions, on the other hand, 
are key in defining interorganizational interaction states. The two-cluster solution shows 
two distinct clusters in which the trust, autonomy and problem orientation dimensions are 
essentially averaged out, but the interorganizational and remaining organizational 
dimensions are either high or low. The “higher resolution” three-cluster and four-cluster 
solutions mainly increase the detail of the “high” cluster in the two-cluster solution. Part 
of the reason is that the interorganizational-type dimensions logically “hang” together—a 
collective decision making process and an executive level decision board would suggest 
that a formalized agreement is present between participants.  
Likewise, the organizational-type dimensions of key personnel and resource 
allocation logically are related: the extent to which personnel throughout an organization 
are involved in an interaction, is likely related to the extent to which financial and 
physical resources are involved. Again, the cluster solutions generally indicate that these 















Context N N No logical reason 
No evidence 
Time Context Y N No logical reason 
No evidence 
Difficulty Context Y N No logical reason 
Weak evidence of discriminating 
interaction states 
Role of single 
organization 
Context Y Y No evidence, but poorly 
specified dimension 
Important theoretical reasons for 
inclusion 
Improvement required in 
construct of “interdependence” 
Impetus for collective 
action: Mandated 
vs. voluntary 
Context N Y Important in discriminating 
clusters 
Impetus for collective 
action: Reasons 









Context N Inconclusive Theoretical reasons for 
inclusion, but evidence 
inconclusive 
History of previous 
interaction in the 
problem domain 
Context N Inconclusive Theoretical reasons for 




Org Y N Varies across similar states of 
interaction 
Treat as important condition or 
contextual factor 









GIIA? Justification / Recommendations 
Incentives Org Y N Varies across similar states of 
interaction 
Time to establish 
multiorganizational 
arrangement 
Context Y N No evidence 
Key personnel Org Y Y Importance to defining 
interaction states may be 
binary 
Orientation of policy 
objective (Goals) 
Interorg N Inconclusive Theoretical reasons for 
inclusion, but insufficient 
evidence to assess 
Design Interorg Y Y Importance to defining 
interaction states may be 
binary 
Formality of the 
agreement 
Interorg N Y Importance to defining 
interaction states may be 
binary 
Info. sharing and 
communications 
Interorg Y Inconclusive Poorly specified dimension 
Insufficient variation in data to 
account for trends 
Decision making Interorg Y Y Importance to defining 
interaction states may be 
binary 
Resolution of turf 
issues 
Interorg Not tested Not tested Not tested 
Organizational 
autonomy 
Org N N Varies across similar states of 
interaction 
 






CHAPTER 6:  
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter summarizes the data analysis and results presented in chapters four 
and five. The theoretical significance of the results is discussed in the context of the 
literature, and then the practical significance of the results is assessed in terms of their 
impact on managing and evaluating interorganizational interactions. The overall study 
limitations are evaluated. Finally, the chapter lays out an agenda for future research and 
offers concluding remarks to the study. 
Study Conclusions 
This study has investigated conceptualization and operationalization of 
commonly-used constructs of interorganizational interaction in the public administration 
literature. This research is important primarily because interaction between organizations 
that occur outside of traditional government hierarchies is now commonplace in policy 
implementation (Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2011; Goldsmith & Kettl, 2009; O'Leary & 
Bingham, 2009). Thus it is essential for public administration research to develop stable 
constructs of interorganizational interaction to allow cumulative research and shared 
knowledge (Morris & Miller-Stevens, 2016a; Thomson et al., 2009; Wood & Gray, 
1991). 
Yet there are several problems in the way interorganizational interaction has been 
conceptualized to date. There is a mismatch between systems-based frameworks that 
emphasize process dynamics and typology / array frameworks that present detailed but 




“continuum of interaction,” and more generally, both frameworks and arrays have 
received little empirical confirmation. This research asked several basic questions to 
consider these issues. First, in a large sample of interorganizational interactions, are the 
most commonly described interaction states of collaboration, coordination and 
cooperation observed? Second, are other interaction states observed? Third, what are the 
most important dimensions for defining an interaction state? And finally, is the 
continuum of interaction concept valid? 
The results show that collaboration is the only interorganizational interaction state 
that is clearly identifiable in the sample. When the sample is divided into two clusters, 
one cluster containing over half the total cases identifies as collaboration based on the 
interorganizational-type dimensions: the “design” or ways in which organizations work 
together; the formality of agreements between organizations; the extent to which 
collective decision making is practiced; and the density and institutionalization of 
information sharing and communications in the interaction. The remaining cases in the 
second cluster cannot clearly be identified as either coordination or cooperation.  
When the sample is divided into three and four clusters, different variants of 
collaboration are revealed, distinguished by the levels of shared perspectives between 
participants, the impact on organizational autonomy, and the level of trust between 
interacting organizations. These collaboration variants differ on perception of outcomes 
from the interorganizational interaction, yet the level of trust between organizations is the 
key factor that determines overall perception of outcomes. The organizational-type 
variables are important in discriminating between different clusters, but are relatively 




the set of contextual-type dimensions studied, only a few are useful in distinguishing 
between observed clusters. A conclusion is reached that, in general, contextual 
dimensions are not useful in differentiating between interaction states, with the exception 
of whether an interaction is voluntary or mandated. In the study sample, the majority of 
interactions identifying as collaboration are mandated. 
There is little evidence supporting the relevance of conceptualizing dimensions in 
terms of a continuum of interaction. Some dimensions are “naturally” continuous such as 
the time dimensions, the extent of shared perspectives, autonomy, trust, and 
organizational commitments made in the interaction. Other dimensions appear to exist 
only in binary conditions: the formality of the agreements between organizations, and the 
voluntary or mandated status of an interaction. The extent to which a dimension can be 
interpreted as existing on a continuum, however, has little relevance in distinguishing 
between cluster structures or interaction states. Clusters that are clearly collaboration, 
based on their interorganizational-type dimensions, have large variations across the 
continuums of other dimensions, notably shared perspectives, trust and autonomy. 
Furthermore, with the exception of a few combinations (formality of agreement and 
presence of joint decision making structures), there are no logical restrictions that prevent 
the co-existence of different “levels” of dimensions in a single interaction state. In fact, 
all of the clusters observed displayed a mixture of interaction levels across dimensions, in 
terms of the GIIA interpretation.   
From the results obtained, there is little evidence to support the GIIA framework 
overall. The conclusions drawn from this study, however, apply to a specific problem 




international organizations. This is addressed further in the Study Limitations section 
below. 
Theoretical Implications 
Conceptualization and operationalization of interaction states 
The literature review shows that typologies and arrays in the public administration 
and organizational science literature seldom recognize the distinction between 
contextual-, organizational-, and interorganizational-type dimensions. The empirical 
results of this study confirm that distinguishing between these three types is essential. In 
terms of identifying differences between interorganizational interaction states, 
contextual-type dimensions have low relevance whereas interorganizational-type have 
high relevance and are fundamental to characterizing “high” levels of interaction such as 
collaboration.  
The literature review shows that many scholars use contextual-type dimensions to 
define interaction states: Mandell and Steelman (2003) use complexity and scope of 
effort; Carrasco (2009); Gajda and Koliba (2007); Woodland and Hutton (2012) use 
purpose of the interorganizational interaction; Keast et al. (2007) use purpose and the 
time taken to establish the interaction; McNamara (2008) uses time, interdependence and 
impetus for collective action; and Margerum (2008) uses the institutional level of 
interaction and type of participant. And of course the GIIA tested in this research is an 
omnibus compilation of all these dimensions.  
What can explain this preponderance of attempts to conceptualize and define 
collaboration or other interaction states using contextual-type dimensions? The systems 




dimensions are often referred to as preconditions (Wood & Gray, 1991), starting 
conditions (Ansel & Gash, 2007), or antecedents (Thomson & Perry, 2006). The systems 
framework literature, while generally conceptualizing contextual-type dimensions as 
“inputs” to the system, often identifies specific categories of inputs such as “general 
environment,” “direct antecedents,” and “contingencies and constraints” (Bryson et al., 
2006, p. 45). The systems view takes into account all parts of the system in understanding 
how it works, yet there is less concern how discrete states of interaction are defined, 
probably due to the fact that systems frameworks inherently account for dynamic 
processes. The frameworks recognize, however, that contextual dimensions may affect 
the overall process or outcomes in some manner.  
Returning to the typology and array literature for the crucial insight, we can 
observe that scholars who use contextual-type dimensions in conceptualizations generally 
tend to refer to “collaboration” in the context of the entire system. On the other hand, 
scholars who omit the contextual-type dimensions tend to conceptualize only the process 
elements of collaboration—or other interaction states. Thus thinking of collaboration as a 
system naturally requires consideration of all variables: contextual, organizational and 
interorganizational. Collaboration as process, however, only requires interorganizational-
type, and to some extent the organizational-type dimensions. This is not far removed 
from a similar problems with other concepts such as “governance,” for which ten 
different uses in the literature have been identified depending on whether one views it as  
system, process, structure, etc. (Kooiman, 1999). 
The key question now is how best to define an interorganizational interaction state 




invariably mix contextual-type dimensions as evidenced by the review conducted by 
Mayer and Kenter (2016). Unfortunately there is no right answer; other than to ensure 
that a distinction is made between the whole-system and process views. Adopting the 
system view to conceptualize a “collaborative system” requires contextual dimensions. It 
is safe to say that a definition of a collaboration process, such as Thomson (2001) 
approach, must include interorganizational-type dimensions: the common feature of all 
collaboration definitions, typologies, and arrays is that they identify collective decision 
making structures and processes as key to differentiating collaboration from other 
interaction states. The definitional question becomes somewhat more challenging, 
however, when considering the organizational-type dimensions. 
The results from this research show that certain organizational-type dimensions—
shared perspectives, autonomy, and trust—can vary considerably across states identified 
as collaboration based on the interorganizational-type dimensions. This is highly 
inconsistent with the typologies and arrays that use these dimensions to define interaction 
states, namely those by D'Amour et al. (2008); Keast et al. (2007); Mandell and Steelman 
(2003); McNamara (2008, 2012). It may be the case that in the global population of 
interorganizational interactions, low trust is generally associated with “cooperative” 
interactions; however, this is a result that requires empirical testing across different 
population segments to determine. 
The results from this research show that the trust and shared perspectives 
dimensions moderate the perceived effectiveness of collaboration. Thus when scholars 
define collaboration as, amongst other factors, a high trust state involving shared 




collaborations are associated with high trust and shared perspectives…” On the other 
hand, a collaboration process could be defined simply by referring to the fundamental 
interorganizational variables emerging from the interacting organizations: formalized 
agreements, joint decision making structures, collective decision making processes, and 
shared information and communications. In other words, a parsimonious definition of 
collaboration need only refer to the presence of emergent interorganizational collective 
decision making structures and processes, rather than incorporate subjective conditions 
such as trust and perspectives, or claims about effectiveness.   
This approach is somewhat at odds, however, with Thomson’s (2001) 
collaboration process framework, which is one of the most cited in the literature. 
Thomson’s framework incorporates five dimensions—joint decision making, 
administrative structures, mutuality, norms of trust, and autonomy—that are indicators of 
a higher-order latent “collaboration” dimension. The framework essentially allows 
creation of a single collaboration score based on the five dimensions, and assumes 
therefore, that higher trust and autonomy lead to higher levels of collaboration. As 
mentioned previously in chapter five, the autonomy dimension was inconclusive in 
several studies. In fact, in her original Ph.D. research (Thomson, 2001) a four-factor 
latent model omitting the autonomy dimension was found that fit the data equally well; 
however, Thomson chose to keep the autonomy dimension for theoretical reasons. 
Likewise, when Thomson’s framework was used in other studies, results were 
inconclusive for this dimension (Chen, 2006; Thomson et al., 2008). Thus taken in 
tandem with the results of the present study, the conclusion that autonomy should not be 




The systems framework literature offers some resolution to this conundrum 
concerning the organizational-type dimensions of trust, shared perspectives and 
autonomy. The early attempts by Ring and Van de Ven (1994) and more recently of 
Ansel and Gash (2007) and Emerson et al. (2012) explicitly conceive of processes such 
as trust building and developing shared perspectives that in turn affect the “institutional 
arrangements” (Emerson et al., 2012, p. 7) or the “institutional design” (Ansel & Gash, 
2007, p. 550). These frameworks allow for the natural variation and development of trust, 
which then affects the collective decision making structures, thus mitigating the impact of 
organizational autonomy of participants. In other words, in random sample of 
collaborations in different stages their life-cycle, one would expect to find trust and 
shared perspectives at different levels, as specified by the cyclical feedback loops that are 
the “engine” of many systems frameworks. 
What of the other interaction states of cooperation and coordination? The cluster 
analysis results found no interaction state that could clearly be identified as either. While 
conceptualization of collaboration is relatively stable in the literature, which identifies it 
by the presence of collective decision making structures and processes, coordination is 
less clear. There several approaches encountered. The first defines coordination as a 
formalized state of interaction, but one in which the collective decision making occurs 
either between the senior leadership of participating organizations or in a centralized 
group of actors in the interaction. This is the approach adopted in the GIIA, which was 
influenced by McNamara (2008, 2012). The second approach maps level of interaction 
with the hierarchical level of participation in the organization: Carrasco (2009) for 




occurring at the level of team or business unit, and collaboration occurring between 
leadership. Finally, the third approach is as a “continuum,” in which various elements 
gradually emerge such as consensus decision making (D'Amour et al., 2008) or collective 
leadership (Woodland & Hutton, 2012), putting coordination somewhere in the middle of 
these continuums.  
In terms of defining coordination, these approaches are clearly incompatible. A 
similar problem occurs also for cooperation, although less so given that cooperation is 
identified by an absence of formalized agreement between organizations. An approach 
taken almost two decades ago by Konrad (1996) may offer a solution. Konrad puts 
cooperation and coordination together in the same category on a continuum of “intensity 
of integration.” While the continuum has five levels, they are labeled by a higher 
category of either “informal” or “formal,” where cooperation and coordination are 
informal, collaboration lies at the boundary of informal and formal and then “integration” 
is at the higher end of formal. This is similar to the results of the cluster analysis. The 
clusters observed are either relatively formalized in terms of the interorganizational-type 
dimension, or not. Thus a key question is – do highly refined gradations of 
interorganizational-type dimensions across interaction states yield any significant 
explanatory power? This question can only be answered with additional empirical 
research; however, the exploratory results in this study show that the general variation in 
organizational-type dimensions is more important in determining outcomes rather than 




Interorganizational Interaction Arrays 
Some key conclusions can be drawn regarding the nature and structure of 
interorganizational arrays in general. First, the idea of a continuum of interaction is not 
well supported. The literature analysis shows a general lack of consistency in how 
interaction states are defined, and the empirical analysis demonstrates that organizational- 
and contextual-type dimensions are neither empirically nor logically constrained by 
interaction states. Only interorganizational-type dimensions guarantee a differentiation 
between states. Thus the evidence supports a radical restructuring of the array concept 
moving away from the idea of a continuum of interaction.  
The second conclusion concerns the utility of typologies. While typologies and 
arrays are useful for exploratory research, organizing concepts, and introducing new 
students to a subject, without a logical constraint on the possible numbers of 
combinations of dimensions, it is easy to see how the empirical utility of arrays is limited. 
In the case of this research, the array used for clustering analysis has ten dimensions each 
with three values. Thus there are 3
10
 or 59,049 possible combinations of cells, making it 
likely that the neat gradations of cooperation, coordination or collaboration are unlikely 
to be found in their “pure” states. This is important because without the ability to clearly 
identify an interaction state as “cooperation” or “coordination” versus something else, it 
is not possible to investigate meaningful research problems such as determining which is 
more effective—cooperation or coordination? While in the research sample, collaboration 
is the most prevalent state overall, there is a mixture of other states, making it challenging 
to clearly identify cooperation or coordination. The tentative conclusion is that it is not 




This result is foreshadowed in the very nature of the systems-based frameworks. 
Given that collaboration is something “special”—identified only by the presence of 
emergent collective decision structures, the majority of systems frameworks are called 
“collaboration” frameworks. While some scholars use the term “cooperation” in their 
frameworks, close inspection reveals that they are actually referring to collaboration. 
A similar situation was encountered in the policy process literature. Initially, 
scholars created typologies of the policy process, dividing it up into discrete stages. Many 
attempts to confirm empirically these typologies and stage-models failed (Smith & 
Larimer, 2009). The main reasons for failure were that the categories (i.e. dimensions) 
were rarely mutually exclusive given the complexity of the systems that the typologies 
attempted to describe, dynamic processes were not accounted for, and therefore the 
typologies as a whole lacked predictive utility (McCool, 1995). Subsequently, scholars 
went on to create systems-based frameworks that had better predictive utility and better 
captured the complexities of the system (Hill & Hupe, 2009; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 
1993). 
The overall conclusion emerging from this analysis is that GIIA—and the general 
approach of interorganizational interaction arrays—are not supported overall; systems-
based frameworks are a better approach to representing interorganizational interaction 
such as collaboration both as an entire system and a distinct process. “Lower” levels of 
interaction such as cooperation or coordination—or whatever term is chosen—could 
either represent collaborations in the process of formation, or interorganizational states 




interdependence.  The cluster analysis results do not show any practical significance in 
differences between these lower level states.   
The array research should not be abandoned completely, however. The 
operationalization of each dimension in the GIIA and the survey instrument are useful 
contributions to the literature. While some dimensions were problematic, such as the role 
of a single organization (interdependence) dimension, others showed reasonable 
performance, such as the trust and autonomy, adding to the cumulative knowledge in the 
discipline by refining the Thomson (2001) and Mattessich et al. (2001) 
operationalizations. The use of the original Thomson (2001) outcome variables also adds 
to the cumulative knowledge by showing that, at least, these outcome variables are 
relevant to distinguishing between interaction states and have a strong relationship to 
trust.  
Defining research samples in interorganizational research 
This research explicitly identifies an interorganizational-organizational unit of 
analysis, with the limitation that each data point in the sample corresponds to only one 
interorganizational-organizational dyad. The implications of this choice, expressed in 
table 3-1 in chapter three, have received little attention in the literature, both in terms of 
the effect on research results and sampling methodology. The discussion in chapter three 
points out a critical, but unexplored point—the possibility that different organizations 
participating in an interaction may experience or be involved in the process with differing 
levels of commitment and intensity. Putting aside for a moment the fact that the 
continuum of interaction language should be discarded in the previous sections, a 




whereas organization B is only cooperating with the group. In this situation how should 
the collective interorganizational unit be described? 
In the case of collaboration, the answer may be easy: once a collective decision 
making structure is established, different organizations can participate with differing 
levels of commitments and risks, but the whole interorganizational unit can still 
meaningfully be called “collaboration.” In fact, at the time of writing, the author is 
currently involved in a collaboration in which a memorandum of understanding written 
between organizations allows for participation with differing levels of commitment. 
Findings from the network literature suggest that organizations with stronger ties to a 
collective unit have more influence on the development of trust-building processes than 
organizations with weaker ties, but that the influence of weakly tied organizations cannot 
not be ignored as they tend to bring in new information to the interaction (Brass et al., 
2004; Granovetter, 1973; Provan & Lemaire, 2012). In the case of informal 
interorganizational interactions without collective decision making structures or 
formalized agreement, it is more challenging to assess how different levels of 
commitments can be described or understand their significance.  
This short discussion highlights the importance of correctly defining—and 
consistently maintaining—the unit of analysis in any study. Depending on whether an 
organization is strongly or weakly tied to a collective group, or whether the 
interorganizational group can be considered collectively as “collaboration” makes a 
difference. If the research question focuses on strength of ties, sampling an entire 
interorganizational unit is inappropriate as the importance of each tie is averaged out in 




whole, then selecting only one organization as representative of the collective could bias 
findings depending on how strongly the sampled organization was connected.  
Practitioner Implications 
Interorganizational interactions are now commonplace in the landscape of 
contemporary governance and public administration from national homeland security 
initiatives (Hocevar, Jansen, & Thomas, 2011) to local ecosystem restoration projects 
(Morris et al., 2013). Many policy areas see interorganizational interaction mandated by 
either law or department policy (Brummel, 2010; Rodríguez et al., 2007). Besides 
addressing the challenging theoretical issues in understanding interorganizational 
interaction, there are several policy and practitioner areas that are affected by this results 
of this research.  
The first area concerns the practice of conducting evaluations of 
interorganizational interactions. Often, grant allocations to nonprofits are contingent upon 
forming community partnerships, and the growth in evaluation of interorganizational 
interaction has been driven in part by the requirement to conduct program evaluations for 
donors (Frey et al., 2006). Others also worry that the view that collaboration is a “cure-
all” is going unfounded and unchallenged in organizational policy (Conley & Margaret, 
2003). Based on these concerns and factors, a growing body of practitioner-orientated 
literature is developing various frameworks to evaluate interorganizational interactions, 
most notably the “strategic alliance formative assessment rubric” (Gajda, 2004), the 
“level of community linkage” (Cross et al., 2009), the “level of organizational integration 
rubric” (Woodland & Hutton, 2012), and most recently the “collaboration assessment 




With the exception of Marek et al. (2015), these evaluation approaches 
incorporate interorganizational arrays coupled with a continuum of interaction 
assumption. From the commentary available in the cited articles, the frameworks appear 
to be used as one aspect of a mixed-methods approach and as a discussion tool for 
organizational leadership, rather than for quantitative survey analysis. Nevertheless, 
given the results of the present study concerning the limitations of the continuum of 
interaction concept, a meta-evaluation of the evaluation templates is suggested, as 
program evaluations using the templates may be going to unnecessary levels of detail. 
Furthermore, given the sampling considerations discussed above, there is a danger of 
over- or under-emphasizing certain features of the interorganizational interaction, 
depending on the sampling strategy used. This concern is acknowledged by Cross et al. 
(2009), and the approach taken by Marek et al. (2015) actually abandons the continuum 
concept and adopts a latent factor model.  
The second practitioner implication concerns the requirements for collaboration 
set out in policy mandates, and the steps organizations take to improve their capacity to 
collaborate. In terms of policy mandates, policy makers would benefit from a more 
refined understanding of how interorganizational interaction functions, especially when it 
is required for grant allocation. Nonprofit and public managers on the receiving end of 
federal grants, however, have observed that mandates often do not allow sufficient 
flexibility (B. L. Lewis, Boulahanis, & Matheny, 2009) or run counter to local interests 
(Conley & Margaret, 2003). An evaluation conducted of federal homeless assistance 




range of interorganizational interactions (HUD, 2002). While benefits were observed, 
attribution to the level of interorganizational interaction was not possible.  
In terms of developing organizational collaborative capacity, a growing body of 
literature is developing frameworks to help organizations plan for future required 
collaboration. As an example, the lack of ability of organizations to collaborate was 
identified as a failure in the responses to Hurricane Katrina and other disasters. Since 
then, emergency management departments are investing in strategies for developing 
interorganizational collaborative capacity (R. D. Hall, 2011). A common framework in 
this discipline is that of Hocevar et al. (2011), which suffers from many of the problems 
already identified in this thesis, including mixing contextual dimensions and assuming 
levels of interaction. Thus, before this and other framework filter widely into the 
emergency management literature, further investigations are warranted on the 
applicability and relevance of levels of interaction to the development of collaborative 
capacity.   
Finally, a general implication for managers and leaders of interorganizational 
interactions is the focus on the importance of trust and shared perspectives in successful 
outcomes. The results of this research indicate that trust is the critical factor in higher 
perceived outcomes. There is a tendency for organizations to emphasize “technocratic” 
solutions to problems (Williams & Mengistu, 2015), yet the results of this thesis suggest 
that above all else, managers and leaders should emphasize developing trusting 
relationships rather than—or at least in addition to—bureaucratic solutions and 





While conceived as exploratory, the results and conclusions of this research 
should be interpreted in the light of several limitations. First, the research was conducted 
with the explicit assumptions of rational open systems organizational theory-namely that 
interorganizational interactions can be described meaningfully by “objective” structures 
that exist. Yet there are several other possible research perspectives that could affect the 
interpretations. A natural open systems approach might emphasize more the importance 
of dialogue, perspective and relationships, rather than formalization, decision making 
structure and information sharing mechanisms. As noted in chapter two, however, 
theoretical perspectives are often suited to certain contexts, and perhaps the rational 
approach is better suited to the governmental-based research sample. 
Nevertheless, care is required when interpreting the current results using other 
theoretical lenses with different assumptions. Gray’s (1985, 1989) work on collaboration, 
for example, drew heavily on conflict resolution and stakeholder theory as the 
collaborations she studied were mainly between local community groups in conflicted 
situations. Thomson (2001), on the other hand, drew her collaboration framework from a 
nationwide sample of a national nonprofit organization. An example of why this is 
important is illustrated by the voluntary / mandated dimension. The significance of a 
“mandated” collaboration is probably more for the samples used by Thomson’s and 
Gray’s original research, than the significance for the military-governmental sample in 
this study, in which organizational mandates are commonplace. In other words, mandates 
to collaborate may not affect the intrinsic process of collaboration between military 




have noted that actor-type makes a difference. Moore and Koontz (2003), for example, 
found different variants of collaboration depending on whether government agencies or 
local citizen groups were involved.  
This leads to a general point about the research sample. Results cannot be 
generalized to other research contexts (i.e. nonprofit or local community collaborations) 
as the research was performed primarily on military, government, and international 
organizations, which all display a similar characteristics of large bureaucracies with 
highly formalized decision making. As Phillips (2000, p. 32) notes: “the social processes 
that constitute a collaboration – the negotiation of membership, definition or issues and 
standardization of practices – will be enacted in terms and concepts drawn from the 
institutional fields in which members are located.” 
Finally, several methodological limitations should be noted. The survey 
prioritized quantity of dimensions over rigor in sampling each one. The approaches by 
Thomson (2001) and Marek et al. (2015) used confirmatory factor analysis approaches 
for fewer dimensions with more survey items, thus the error in each dimension is likely 
reduced. A limitation with this thesis research is that each dimension was only sampled 
by one or two survey questions. However, in essence, many questions asked simply for 
the presence or absence of certain features. Another methodological limitation concerns 
the level of analysis of the interorganizational field. While appropriate for the main 
research questions in the study, this level omits important individual level factors. One 
such factor is the importance of special individuals in collaborations and networks—
boundary spanners and managers—who have been shown to have major impacts (Meier, 




Another limitation is the way in which time is considered. Gray (1989), for 
example, recognized several distinct stages of collaboration in a life cycle. In this 
research, the survey did not take into account how interorganizational interactions might 
change with time and it is not known from the data at which stage of the life cycle 
sampled interactions were located. A much needed subject for further research, however, 
is rigorous longitudinal studies of long-term collaborations.  
Future research 
This research primarily examined the extent to which clusters of 
interorganizational interactions are distinguished by certain dimensions, in order to arrive 
at conclusions about how best to define clusters. Thus the independent variable was 
generally cluster membership. Given the data set obtained in this research, however, a 
series of analyses are now possible that could examine relationships between different 
dimensions across the whole sample, or across different clusters or interorganizational 
interaction states. The most theoretically important subjects are as follows. 
Replication Studies 
The results obtained in this research are inherently limited by the choice of 
sample, which was predominately composed of international and national defense 
organizations. Thus results are not generalizable to other contexts. Further research using 
other samples and contexts is required to increase the validity of findings. Another 
variety of replication study involves re-testing published findings using the data set taken 





Many constructs in the GIIA still require further refinement, ideally employing 
confirmatory factor analysis approach with a greater number of items for each dimension. 
Several dimensions, notably the “role of a single organization,” which captured the extent 
of interdependence needs refining. This is quite a complex theoretical issue, as the nature 
of interdependence has its source in many contextual and organizational factors (Gray, 
1989). 
The findings from this study showed that within the same type of interaction, the 
values of organizational-type dimensions could vary quite considerably. An explanation 
of this is provided by the systems-framework literature, which “allows” for dynamic 
variation of organizational commitments and perceptions within any collaboration. The 
constructs used in the GIIA do not assume anything about this dynamic variation; 
however, they merely capture a static snapshot. Hence further construct development is 
required to determine whether this static snapshot is appropriate for longitudinal research.     
Perhaps the most intriguing result of this current study is the relationship between 
trust and outcomes. While trust was positively associated with interorganizational 
outcomes, further questions remain about specifically what processes might mediate this 
relationship (Chen, 2010)? Does trust act as a replacement for legal rational authority 
(Agranoff & McGuire, 2001)? Is trust contingent on resource interdependence (Lundin, 
2007)? Likewise, many possible research questions can be examined concerning the role 




Voluntary and Mandated Interactions 
A small but growing body of literature now considers “mandated” collaboration 
as a distinct state of interorganizational interaction, yet there is little theoretical 
development or empirical studies that consider specifically how mandated collaborations 
differ in terms of process compared to voluntary interactions. This research found more 
cases of mandated interactions, but this is explained by the particular nature of the study 
sample. In any case, further research is required. One route is to continue analysis and 
refinement of interorganizational interaction arrays in which “mandated collaboration” is 
a distinct state, as suggested by McNamara (2016). Another route is to test more directly 
the factors that tend to be related with mandated interactions, notably the level of 
formalization (Nylen, 2007). 
Systems-Based Frameworks 
The literature review found many systems-based frameworks describing 
interorganizational interaction—but particularly collaboration—that were developed in 
the past decade. Yet these frameworks have rarely been empirically tested. Subsequent 
research has used them as an organizing lens for case studies, for example, rather than 
testing the framework per se (Agbodzakey, 2012; Montoya, Montoya, & González, 
2015). Given their prevalence and repeated citation in the public administration 
collaboration literature, further research is warranted on the system frameworks’ 
approaches to conceptualization and operationalization of interorganizational interaction. 
Related to the system-based framework approach is the study of 
interorganizational interaction as a form of formal organization or as a network. Both 




organizational science offers systems concepts to treat collaboration as an organizational-
form, and likewise, less intense forms of interaction can usefully be treated as networks. 
As already alluded to, the time dimension in interorganizational interaction is critical and 
systems-based frameworks offer a useful lens through which to consider the “life-cycles” 
of collaborations (Williams, Merriman, & Morris, 2016). 
Closing remarks 
This research has examined aspects of a conventional paradigm within 
interorganizational theory and conducted one of the first tests of the continuum of 
interaction concept and its application in the interorganizational array and typology 
literature in public administration. While the results were negative in the sense that the 
continuum of interaction was not empirically observed, the power of this idea runs deep 
in the public administration and program evaluation literature. There is something 
irresistible about organizing and viewing the world in neat continuums, distinct stages or 
processes, and ordered boxes. The prevalence of this idea speaks to its intuitiveness and 
success in deconstructing highly complex systems into understandable parts. Yet in a 
manner similar to the “policy stages” debate, occasionally enough problematic 
observations about the paradigm are accumulated eventually to support their fall.  
This research has cast doubt upon two notions in the conventional paradigm: the 
notion of continuum of interaction, and the idea that three distinct states of interaction 
exist called: collaboration, coordination, and cooperation. While collaboration is 
supported—although we could just as well call it something else—cooperation and 
coordination were not observed and theoretical analysis suggests that their reasons for 




conceptualization and operationalization studies are required to ensure that public 
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
Solicitation email to be sent to respondent sample 
Dear Colleague, 
 
My name is Andrew Williams and I am writing to request your participation in a survey that 
asks questions about your experiences working in a multiorganizational project. This survey 
forms part of my Ph.D. research, directed by Professor John Morris, in the Strome College of 
Business at Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia, United States.  
 
This research aims to improve understanding of how organizations work together in 
multiorganizational settings, how these interactions can be described, and which factors in 
organizations are important in making interactions work. The findings from this study will be 
used to produce my dissertation thesis and scholarly journal articles. 
 
The survey should take about 15 minutes to complete. Your participation is voluntary, and 
you can stop taking the survey at any time. The information you provide will be anonymous 
and will be reported in aggregate only. No identifying information such as individual or 
organization names will be reported in the study. 
 
If you would like to participate in this study, please click on the following link to complete 
the survey.  You are welcome to forward this survey to colleagues that worked with you in a 




Please don’t hesitate to contact me if you have any questions. I sincerely thank you in 
advance for your participation! 
 
Andrew P. Williams 
Ph.D. Candidate 
School of Public Service 
Strome College of Business 
Old Dominion University 








Informed Consent Statement (First Page of Survey) 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study on multiorganizational interaction. This 
survey asks questions about your experience, as a representative of your organization, in a 
multiorganizational project in a NATO environment.  
 
Your participation is voluntary, and you can withdraw from the study at any time. Neither 
your identity nor the identity of the organization in which you may work will be revealed in 
the publication of research results. 
 
The nature of this study should not be invasive or embarrassing. Questions are confined to 
ones that address your professional situation, work experiences, and perceptions. Any 
information provided by you in the study will be afforded professional standards for 
protection of confidentiality. 
 
By completing this study, you are consenting to the terms of this research as stated above. 
This notice serves as your copy of the consent agreement. You may also request a copy of 
these consent terms by contacting the Principal Investigators of the study. 
 
If you have any questions about the study, please contact the Principal Investigators of the 
study: 
 
Professor John C. Morris (Principal Investigator) 
School of Public Service 
Strome College of Business 
Old Dominion University 
Norfolk, VA 23529 
jcmorris@odu.edu 
 
Andrew P. Williams (Co-Principal Investigator) 
Ph.D. Candidate 
School of Public Service 
Strome College of Business 
Old Dominion University 
Norfolk, VA 23529 
awill123@odu.edu 
 
If you have any questions regarding your rights as a research subject contact the Human 






Survey Instructions (Second Page of Survey) 
 
Think of a program, project or task, either ongoing or occurring in the past five years, in 
which your organization interacted as part of a group with one or more other 
organizations in a NATO-related setting. This will be referred to in this survey as the 
"multiorganizational interaction."  
 
Answer all the survey questions with the same multiorganizational interaction in mind, 
and around the same time period.  
 
Make sure that your choice of multiorganizational interaction is one in which you directly 
participated and with which you are very familiar. 
 
Answer from the perspective of your organization, rather than as an individual or 
representative of your nation.  
 
The survey asks you to think about different organizations. An "organization" should 
be understood as a separate legal entity.  For example in the NATO case, NATO HQ, 
IMS, SHAPE, JFCBS, HQ AIRCOM, HQ ARRC, HQ SACT, JALLC, JWC etc. are 
considered separate and distinct organizations. In a national setting, the UK's Ministry of 
Defence and its agency DSTL are considered as separate organizations. 
□ I understand that I will answer the survey with the same 
multiorganizational interaction in mind. I am ready to take the survey. 
 





Q2: Which of the following best describes your work status during the 
multiorganizational interaction? Select one: 
1. NATO international civilian 
2. Uniformed military service member 




5. University faculty 
6. Other - please describe _________________________ 
 
Q3: Which of the following best describes your organization’s type? Select one: 
1. International intergovernmental organization 
2. Government defense organization (military services or civilian 
department) 
3. Government organization (non-defense) 
4. Educational organization (civilian university or college) 
5. Nonprofit organization 
6. For-profit business / corporation 




Q4: Please select the responses that most closely correspond to the main purposes for the 
multiorganizational interaction. Select all that apply. 
1. Create an informal network of communications among stakeholders 
2. Generate support for an initiative 
3. Conduct joint work with other organizations to ensure tasks are done, but 
each organization remains mainly autonomous 
4. Reach predetermined mutual goals together, while remaining autonomous 
5. Share material, personnel or financial resources to address common issues 
6. Commit for a year or more to achieve short- and long-term outcomes 
7. Create institutional and system change in a policy area 
 
 
Q5: What total length of time is the multiorganizational interaction expected to exist or 
did exist? 
1. Indefinitely 
2. Or, enter number of months ___________ 
 
 
Q6: Think about the various tasks that must be accomplished by the multiorganizational 










How would you 
characterize the 
number of distinct 









     
Very 
different 
In general, how 
similar are the tasks 
in nature? 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 
Known and clearly 
defined 
   
Ambiguous and 
undefined 
How would you 
characterize the 
clarity of the tasks? 





   Interdependent 
To what extent do 
tasks depend on one 
another? 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 Routine    Irregular / atypical  
To what extent are 
tasks routine 
business? 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 
Agreed by all 
participants 
   
Highly contested by 
participants 
How would you 
characterize the 




interaction about the 
required tasks? 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 





Q7: Think about the goals of the multiorganizational interaction. Which statement is 
most applicable to your organization? Select one: 
1. If required, my organization could achieve the goals independently 
without support from other organizations 
2. My organization requires some assistance from other organizations to 
accomplish the goals 
3. No organization can achieve the goal independently. My organization is 
interdependent with other organizations. 
 
Q8: Please select the statement that best describes why your organization participates in 
the multiorganizational interaction. Select one: 
1. Directly tasked by a higher authority or mandate to participate (e.g. a 
higher command, organizational policy or mission, organization leader 
decision, legal requirements) 
2. No direct tasking, but not participating would result in either a loss of 
reputation or an inability to meet organizational goals 
3. Participation is voluntary and was initiated primarily by senior 
management 
4. Participation is voluntary and was initiated primarily by the staff level 
 
 
Q9: Below are several reasons for joining the multiorganizational interaction. Select the 
response that best indicates how important each reason is to your organization: 
 
 
Not at all 
important 




To take advantage of 
partner organizations 
resources (for example: 
money, information, 
expertise, physical 
property) to help my 
organization achieve its 
goals 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
To build relationships with 
partner organizations 
because we expect to 
interact with them again in 
the future 




Not at all 
important 




To enhance my 
organization’s reputation 
by working with partner 
organizations that have 
strong reputations 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
To enhance my 
organization’s reputation 
by demonstrating 
commitment to resolving 
important problems 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
To create a common vision 
among organizations for 
solving problems too 
complex for my 
organization to solve alone 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
To receive funding or 
grants that are contingent 
upon participation 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
To resolve conflicts that 
have occurred between my 
organization and partner 
organizations 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 







Q11: What types of organizations are involved in the multiorganizational interaction? 
Select all that apply. 
1. International intergovernmental organization 
2. Government defense organization (Military service or civilian department) 
3. Government organization (non-defense) 
4. Educational organization (civilian university or college) 
5. Nonprofit organization 
6. For-profit business / corporation 















Indicate to what extent 
organizations involved in the 
multiorganizational 
interaction have worked 
together on previous 
initiatives? 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Indicate to what extent you 
have previously worked with 
individual staff from the 
organizations involved? 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 





















Generally, people in this 
multiorganizational 
interaction are dedicated 
to the idea that we can 
make this project work 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
My ideas about what we 
want to accomplish with 
this multiorganizational 
interaction seem to be the 
same as the ideas of 
others 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 





















My contribution in the 
multiorganizational 
interaction is considered 
part of my “regular 
duties” by my 
organization. 





Q15: Please select one answer that best describes how financial resources are used by 
your organization in the context of the multiorganizational interaction. Select one: 
1. My organization’s financial resources are not involved 
2. My organization allocates (or has received) funding specifically for 
participation in the multiorganizational interaction 
3. My organization pools financial resources with other organizations into an 
independent operating fund for the multiorganizational interaction  
 
Q16: Please select one answer that best describes the primary resource shared by your 
organization with other organizations in the context of the multiorganizational 
interaction. Select one: 
1. Information 
2. The time and expertise of personnel 
3. Financial and material assets 
4. Logistical and administrative support to the multiorganizational group 
 
Q17: Select a response that indicates how much you agree with the following statement. 
(“Leadership” refers to Chief Executive and deputy level, Command Group level, or 





















leadership recognizes the 




□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 
Q18: How long did it take to form the multiorganizational interaction to the point where 







Q19: Please select the most applicable statement describing the role of your 
organization’s leadership in forming the multiorganizational interaction. (“Leadership” 
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refers to Chief Executive and deputy level, Command Group level, or organization head 
and deputy). Select one: 
1. Organizational leadership is not involved in decisions to work together 
2. Organizational leadership is openly supportive, but isn’t involved in 
detailed planning of contributions to a multiorganizational interaction 
3. Organizational leadership is openly supportive AND is involved in 
planning contributions to the multiorganizational interaction 
 
 
Q20: Please select the most applicable statement describing the role of your 
organization’s staff in forming the multiorganizational interaction. Select one: 
1. Interaction occurs through lower levels of organizations 
2. Mid-level management implements and administers organization’s 
involvement in interaction 
3. The level of staff involved and their responsibilities adapt to the task at 
hand; each role is considered equally important 
 
 
Q21: Please select the statement which best applies to the multiorganizational interaction. 
Select one: 
1. All organizations are equal partners 
2. One organization leads the group 
3. A few organizations share leadership of the group 
 
 
Q22: Please select the most applicable statement concerning the goals of the 
multiorganizational interaction. Select one: 
1. There are no shared goals 
2. Some shared goals, in addition to individual organizational goals 
3. Shared goals agreed between all participants 
 
 
Q23: In what ways do organizations in the multiorganizational interaction work together? 
Select all that apply: 
1. Informal communications between staff  
2. Official communications backed by organizational leadership 
3. Regular official meetings between working level staff 
4. Regular official meetings between organizational leadership 
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5. Executive decision boards / committees created especially for the 
multiorganizational group in which leadership make decisions about the 
interaction 




Q24: Please select one answer that best describes the formality of the agreement between 
interacting organizations. Select one: 
1. Individual organizations informally agree to work together to achieve 
individual or mutually-beneficial goals 
2. Policy documents (such as terms of reference or memoranda of 
understanding) identify each organizations roles and responsibilities, and 
are signed off by leadership 
3. Policy documents (such as terms of reference or memoranda of 
understanding) describe detailed implementation plans in addition to roles 
and responsibilities, and are signed off by leadership 
 
 
Q25: Please select the statements that best describe information sharing in the 
multiorganizational interaction. Select all that apply: 
1. Information is shared through informal channels and relationships between 
participants (e.g. staff email) 
2. Formal (official documents) and informal communication channels are 
used 
3. Interorganizational communication is formalized, with staff given mandate 
to share information 
4. Formalized communications infrastructures begin to develop (group email 
lists, shared web-based information repositories etc.) 
5. Open and frequent communication through formal and informal channels 
6. Interorganizational communication is institutionalized in organizational 




Q26: Please select the statements that best describe decision-making in the 
multiorganizational interaction. Select all that apply: 
1. Decisions are made independently by each organization 
2. Centralized decision making is practiced; a lead organization(s) dominates 
the decision making process 
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3. Senior leadership (chief executive or command group level) conducts 
collective decision making about the interorganizational interaction 
4. Participative decision making based on consensus and compromise 
generates rules to govern activities and relationships between 
organizations 
5. Organizational representatives have latitude to negotiate rules and discuss 
agreements to identify common ground 
6. Joint decision making occurs at all levels of organization 
 
 
Q27: Please select the most applicable statement to your organization concerning policies 
(rules, memorandums of understanding, regulations, terms of reference) related to the 
multiorganizational interaction. Select one: 
1. The multiorganizational group does not have policies 
2. Policies developed for the multiorganizational group are compatible with 
my organizations policies 
3. Partner organizations jointly develop policies and negotiation is required 
when they conflict with individual organization policies 
 
 






















interaction hinders my 
organization from 
meeting its own 
mission 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
My organization’s 
independence is 
affected by having to 
work with partner 
organizations on 
activities related to the 
multiorganizational 
interaction 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
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As a representative of 
my organization, I feel 
pulled between trying 
to meet both my 




□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 




















The people who 
represent partner 




□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
My organization can 
count on each partner 
organization to meet 
its obligations in the 
multiorganizational 
interaction 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
My organization feels 
it worthwhile to stay 
and work with partner 
organizations rather 
than leave or scale 








Q30: Please select the most applicable statement concerning the role of trust between 
organizations in the multiorganizational interaction. Select one. 
1. Trust relationships are nice to have, but are actually not required for 
organizations to work together 
2. Trust relationships are useful, but must be based on reciprocal behaviors 





























interaction is effective 
in achieving expected 
outcomes 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 






as a result of this 
multiorganizational 
interaction 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Overall, my 
organizations view of 
the issue(s)/problem(s) 
that brought the 
organizations together 
has broadened as a 
result of the 
interaction 






as a result of the 
multiorganizational 
interaction 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Overall, the 
multiorganizational 
interaction has helped 
to make partner 
organizations’ 
influence on each 
other more equal 





These questions are for control purposes only and do not form part of the analysis. 
 




Q32b: What is your nationality? 
 List of NATO, EU, NATO Partnership for Peace nations, plus Multinational 
Capability Development Campaign Nations as of 2015 
 




Q32d: If desired, please provide any comments about the survey, or any relevant 







APPENDIX B: SURVEY QUESTION—DIMENSION MATCHING 
 
Table C – 1 shows which survey questions operationalize the dimensions in the 
GIIA. Several questions that are not related to the GIIA are omitted from this table:  
 Q2 and Q3 capture demographic information about the respondent and their 
organization; 
 Q31 captures 5 interorganizational output/outcome measures 
 Q32—the final survey question—is a free text field to allow the respondent to 
enter any additional information they wish. 
 
Table C-1: Link between dimensions of the GIIA and survey questions 









Context The overall purpose of the 
interorganizational 
interaction [Adapted from 
Mandell & Steelman (2003), 
and Keast et al. (2007)]  
Q1 
Q4 
Time Interorg. Policy 
Objective 
Context The length of time that the 
interorganizational 
interaction is expected to 
work together to accomplish 
the policy objective 
[modified from McNamara, 
2008] 
Q5 
Difficulty Interorg. Policy 
Objective 
Context The complexity of tasks that 
the interorganizational 
interaction undertakes to 
accomplish the policy 













Context The roles individual 
organizations assume to 
accomplish the policy 






Context The reason for developing the 
interorganizational 
interaction and the way in 
which it was developed 









Context The number of organizations 
with first degree network ties 



















organization, private sector, 
academia, think tank, etc. 
Q11 
History of previous 




Context The extent to which 
organizations and participants 
from those organization have 
worked previously together 
on other projects in the 
problem domain [definition 








Org Reflects the degree to which 
the members view the 
problem from a shared or 
individual perspective. This 
has to do with members' 
values and perceptions 








Resource allocation Organizational 
Management 
Org The contributions allocated by 
individual organizations to 
the interorganizational 
interaction in support of the 
policy objective [modified 






Org The intrinsic and extrinsic 
rewards provided to 
individuals and participating 
organizations to encourage 
support for the 
interorganizational 
interaction [modified from 
McNamara, 2008] 
Q17 






Context The length of time, relative to 
the time for implementation 
of the interaction, that the 
partnership takes to establish. 






Org Personnel who are responsible 














Interorg The agreed and comprehensive 
nature of goals between 
interacting organizations 






Interorg The administrative structure 















Interorg The way in which individual 
organizations agree on their 
roles and responsibilities 
within the interorganizational 








Interorg The ways in which personnel 
within the interorganizational 
interaction use information 
and communication processes 
to attain the policy objective 
[modified from McNamara, 
2008] 
Q25 
Decision making Interorg. 
Procedures 
Interorg The ways in which the 




pertaining to the policy 








Interorg The process used for solving 
conflicts between 
organizations within the 
interorganizational 





Autonomy Org The degree to which each 
partnering organization 
independently operates, in 
terms of the extent that their 
operating procedures and 
policies are adapted by the 
interorganizational 
interaction, and the extent of 
authority given to the 
collective to develop policies 
that guide operations of the 










Trust Norms of trust 
and 
reciprocity 
Org The extent to which 
trustworthy relationships 
between organizations within 
the interorganizational 
interaction are built [modified 
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